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“Kronos” quarterly was established in 2007 as a project of a particular generation of philos-
ophers all of whom started their studies around the transitional year 1989. “Kronos” soon 
became the largest philosophical journal in Poland. It is a new voice in Polish philosophy.
Poland at the turn of the 21st century was and is an inspiring place for thinkers; 
it is an interesting vantage point for observing and studying human nature. It is a place 
which saw genocide and two murderous experiments – the Nazi and the Soviet – the aim 
of which was to create a new type of human being. A philosopher brought up in Warsaw 
is living in a city destroyed by Hitler and rebuilt by Stalin.
The place and the time when we started studying philosophy influenced our choices 
and interests. Perhaps a philosopher is nothing but an emanation of the place and time 
which shaped him. These factors no doubt explain our interest in Hegel and Marx whom 
we have read through the lenses provided by religious messianists (Fyodorov) or 20th 
century prophets of the apocalypse (Kojève and Witkacy). The spirit of time and place 
prompted us also to study the Classics, to return in thought to Greece where – influenced 
by Hei degger and Nietzsche – we saw the eternally recurring point, where all history ends 
and every history begins.
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THE PHILOSOPHER OF CHAOS. 
A PORTRAIT OF SCHELLING
And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep.
King James Bible, Genesis 1:2
Great philosophy exists in fragments. The Presocratics are in fragments. Pascal’s 
Thoughts and Nietzsche’s Will to Power are in fragments, too. This fragmentariness, 
this dispersion, this textual chaos, however, does not diminish philosophy. Nor does 
it obstruct the understanding of it. This has been observed by the most influential 
minds of the 20th century, Hei degger and Wittgenstein, who also abandoned the idea 
of a philosophical masterwork at some point and chose their last books, Contributions 
to Philosophy and Philosophical Investigations, to be published as collections of loose 
thoughts, notes and outlines.
In this universe of fragments, in this tangle of fractions (its other name being 
“the European tradition”), Schelling’s late philosophy appears to be a unique galaxy. His 
treatise Of Human Freedom which appeared in 1809 marks the date after which Schelling 
did not publish any major philosophical work. Schelling falls silent, and he does so at the 
age of 34, almost Christ’s age. For the rest of his life he kept working on a piece which he 
could not finish, the more coherent form of which will be known in the 1840s as the Berlin 
lectures. Those lectures on the Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation were published 
posthumously by Schelling’s son, Karl, who is considered to have imposed on them his 
own order and made them a whole which they had not been originally.
Schelling’s reader faces an unusual textual universe – a universe devoid of a mas-
terwork (and thus devoid of a Center), where everything is a lecture (and is thus an oc-
casional text intended for a particular audience), a universe full of compilations (Karl 
Schelling completed the Berlin lectures with the help of earlier manuscripts), and existing 
in many copies and transcripts (today’s editions of Schelling’s lectures of the 1820s and 
30s are based on his students’ notes). In this universe one can encounter some strange 
objects, for example, the so-called Paulus-Nachschrift, which is a transcription of Schell-
ing’s winter term 1841/42 lectures, published against his will by one of his students, 
Hei nrich Paulus, under the title Die endlich offenbar gewordene positive Philosophie der 
Offenbarung (The Finally Revealed Positive Philosophy of Revelation). Schelling sued 
Paulus but he lost the case. Still, the researchers today consider this work – the work of 
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Schelling-Paulus or Paulus-Schelling – to be an important source of knowledge about the 
development of Schelling’s thought1.
The dark center of this universe constitutes a group of texts written between 1810 
and 1820, published as Die Weltalter (The Ages of the World). This was the last time when 
Schelling tried to write a philosophical work, and the first time he did not succeed. All 
that happened later was a result of this catastrophe.
THE CATASTROPHE OF THE WELTALTER
The first version of The Ages of the World was ready in the late summer of 1810. Schell-
ing’s diary contains the following entry on September 15: “3 of the Ages of the World 
drafted.” But serious work on the book began only three months later: “The Ages of the 
World – Schelling noted on December 27 – started at last.”2 The previous night a violent 
storm hit Munich. The scene is very symbolic: the storm has passed, it is morning now, 
Schelling begins to write a book about God who rises from chaos.3
The book is supposed to consist of three parts, each of which is to describe one of 
the Aeons, or metaphysical dimensions of Time: past, present and future. Schelling’s initial 
belief was that the completion of the book would not take him more than half a year: “For 
two months – Schelling writes in a letter to his publisher on January 30, 1811 – I have 
been constantly immersed in work. The book that I have been pondering over for many 
years should finally emerge before Easter.”4 ‘Book One’ of The Ages of the World, entitled 
“The Past”, was indeed composed before Easter of that year and printed for proofread-
ing. However, there soon occurred some difficulty, a discord of some kind, which caused 
Schelling to postpone the completion of the book. At first, until July. Then, until late 
summer. Finally, until Easter 1812. In November, however, Schelling had to stop work-
ing in order to write a response to Jacobi’s polemic against him, titled Von den göttlichen 
Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung (Of Divine Things and Their Revelation). He published 
the response without delay and returned to his work on the Weltalter in February 1812. 
Still, rather than finish the book, he began writing it anew. That is how Schelling created 
the second (known to us) version of The Ages of the World, which he then published at his 
own expense at the turn of 1813. This second version also consisted of only the first book, 
“The Past.”5 Also in this case its printing would soon be suspended.
Thus, in the autumn of 1813, Schelling began writing The Ages of the World for 
the third time. This is the most comprehensive version of all that are available to us today. 
While working on it, Schelling felt that he would thus give the sum of his life: “I regard 
1 Its latest edition is due to Manfred Frank’s effort, see: F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung: 1841/1842. 
Frankfurt/M, 1992.
2 F.W.J.Schelling, Philosophische Entwürfe und Tagebücher 1809 – 1813, hrsg. von L.Knatz, H.J. Sandkühler, 
M.Schraven. Hamburg 1994, pp. 52, 58. Unless otherwise stated, the quoted fragments are given in a working 
translation prepared for the purpose of this publication.
3 See: X. Tilliette, Schelling, Biographie. Paris 1999, p. 219. For a detailed reconstruction of the process of writing 
The Ages of the World, see also: A. Lanfranconi, Krisis. Eine Lektüre der „Weltalter“-Texte F.W.J. Schellings. 
Stuttgard, Bad-Canstatt 1992, pp. 59-79.
4 Schelling und Cotta. Briefwechsel 1803-1849, hrsg. von H. Fuhrmans and L.Loher. Stuttgart 1965, p. 50.
5 The two first versions were published a hundred and thirty five years later by Martin Schröter, see: F.W.J von 
Schelling, Die Weltalter. Fragmente. In den Urfassungen von 1811 und 1813. München 1946. 
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this work – we read in his letter of August 19, 1814 – to be the fruit of all my labors over 
the past twenty years. Regardless of the fact when or whether at all the system presented 
in it might prevail, it will remain a book classical for this vein of thought.”6 On May 23, 
1815 Schelling informed his publisher that the book had already been finished, and that it 
was only the political turmoil, Napoleon’s return from Elba and the Hundred Days, that 
prevented him from sending it to print. But yet again, everything seems to suggest that 
Schelling wanted to put into print only the first book of The Ages of the World since by that 
time he had decided to divide the work into two volumes of which only the first volume 
was to be published. But the book did not get published after all and Schelling continued 
working on it. Even four years later, in a letter written on January 29, 1819, he insisted that 
all he needed was a couple of hours to complete the whole: “I need a few hours of concen-
tration, free from other activities, in order to complete the whole to my own satisfaction.”7
Schelling clearly went mad. For how else can one call the state if between 1810 and 
1820 he wrote, or drafted, at least a dozen versions of one and the same book. When in 
1939 German researchers opened a huge box of manuscripts, submitted to the University 
of Munich by Schelling’s heirs, they found in it (apart from the already mentioned three 
versions of The Ages of the World) “over a dozen reworks and detailed outlines of book 
one.”8 Still more notes were discovered later in the Archive of the Berlin-Brandenburg 
Academy of Sciences and Humanities, but these have been published only recently.9 Let us 
make it clear once again at this point that what we are dealing with are almost exclusively 
drafts and versions of the first book. As if for all those years Schelling had been writing 
the same hundred pages over and over again, while the pages grew longer and gradually 
more disobedient to the author, thus developing into a whole against his will. To quote 
Schelling’s publisher, Manfred Schröter: “The unexpected outcome of our study of the 
manuscripts was that we established many substantial differences between these reworks, 
revisions, outlines and concepts, all of which, however, relate only to the first book of the 
Weltalter. This multilayered legacy seemed to tell us that Schelling was not only editing 
over and over again a single manuscript, but also writing it down from the very beginning 
again and again.”10
The whole story has yet another, tragic end, as if one catastrophe was not enough. 
At the time of the carpet bombings of Germany between July 11 and 13, 1944, the north 
wing of the University of Munich was razed to the ground. The library’s basement was 
set aflame together with Schelling’s archive which had been prepared for evacuation. It 
contained manuscripts of the 1840s lectures, manuscripts and printouts of the first two 
versions of the Weltalter, as well as a dozen or so other variants of this work – which 
Schröter saw, but the content of which will remain unknown to us. The first two versions 
of The Ages of the World survived thanks to Schröter who had managed to rewrite them 
6 Schelling und Cotta. Briefwechsel 1803-1849, p. 87.
7 Aus Schellings Leben in Briefen, hrsg. von G.L.Plitt, zweiter Band 1803-1820. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York 
2003, p. 429.
8 M. Schröter, “Vorwort”, in: Die Weltalter. Fragmente, p. VI.
9 See: Weltalter-Fragmente, hrsg. von K. Grotsch. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 2002. 
10 M. Schröter, “Die Urfassungen von Schellings ‘Weltaltern’”, in: Kritische Studien. Über Schelling und zur 
Kulturphilosophie. München 1971, p. 91. 
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some time earlier. Schelling’s work, which aimed to unveil the primordial chaos of Being 
(or the primordial chaos of God), thus returned to its source; to the place where everything 
originates. The chaos of the Spirit was engulfed by the chaos of Life from which the Spirit, 
as Schelling states, has just emerged in pains and is still struggling to rise.
The Ages of the World will thus forever remain a fragment. A fraction rescued 
from the flames. Yet this fraction has something monumental about it. Schröter visualized 
Schelling as an archaic Titan, and compared the discovered fragments to an archeological 
find. Fragments of the Weltalter, he argues, “can give us some idea of one of the greatest 
philosophical geniuses’ long-term, tireless struggle for his major work whose fate, after 
all, was to remain a torso without a head.”11 Xavier Tilliette, the author of the already 
classic monograph that covers the whole of Schelling’s philosophy, saw a romantic ruin 
in those fractions, “the grand ruin of the Weltalter”, La haute ruine des Weltalter12. If 
my understanding of Tillette is right, Schelling’s work can be said to resemble the ruined 
Gothic cathedral of Caspar David Friedrich’s paintings.
This pathos is very much justified. Apart from being a ruin, The Ages of the 
World is an attempt at a grand synthesis which can only be compared with Hegel’s syn-
thesis. Let us recall the famous story of Schelling and Hegel sharing a room together 
in a student dormitory at Tübingen in 1790. The third occupant of the legendary room 
was Friedrich Hölderlin. The three of them were looking at the same reality. The king 
was guillotined in Paris. The world of their childhood, the old order of life, was col-
lapsing before their eyes, and the modern world and modern humanity were born out 
of that collapse. A natural reaction to that great change was a desire for the synthesis 
of the old and the new, Christianity and the Enlightenment, religion and science. In his 
letter to Adolf Eschenmayer, dated April 5, 1812, Schelling writes: “Our true vocation 
is to transform science into religion, and religion into a fertile, living knowledge which 
is only possible through science and in which, I believe, lies the only hope for a future 
rebirth.”13 The advantage of Schelling’s synthesis over that of Hegel’s manifests itself 
in two respects. First, by revealing the rational sense of Christianity, Hegel annihilates 
a personal God, turning him into an abstract concept, the Spirit of history. The whole 
which he thus obtains is very incomplete. The God of the Weltalter, on the other hand, 
is – in Schelling’s words – the living God. Schelling’s God wants, needs and desires. The 
author of The Ages of the World goes further into what might be called the psychology 
or psychoanalysis of God, because this God, let us repeat, is still struggling to develop 
from the chaos of Nature as well as from his own Unconscious. This is yet another aspect 
which points to the advantage of Schelling’s synthesis over Hegel’s synthesis. Hegel is the 
philosopher of the End of History, while Schelling is, or he would like to be, the preacher 
of the eternal Beginning of Life.
We thus begin to see the first contours of the intended synthesis: Schelling wants 
to reconcile the Enlightenment project of human self-determination (man as a free and 
conscious being that rises from nature) with the pietistic vision of God who is being born 
11 M. Schröter, “Vorwort”, in: Die Weltalter. Fragmente, p. XI.
12 X. Tilliette, Schelling. Une philosophie en devenir. Paris 1970. Vol. 1, p. 581.
13 Aus Schellings Leben in Briefen, zweiter Band 1803-1820, p. 304.
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again and again and who emerges from the Divine. Man is the image of God. All that we 
know, or are able to know about God, is founded on our knowledge of ourselves. Schelling 
sees no difference between theology and anthropology: the analysis of human conscious-
ness and the reconstruction of its genesis might show us the birth of God’s Consciousness.
This grand synthesis does not, nevertheless, come into effect and the project of The 
Ages of the World breaks down completely. Still, one is likely to think that the breakdown 
was not due to the weakness of Schelling’s mind or a sudden shortage of talent, but rather 
that it had some deeper causes. Maybe the Whole which Schelling sought does not exist at 
all? Maybe reality has no Center? The first philosopher to have looked at Schelling from 
this perspective was Hei degger: “But, if one may say so, Schelling had to get stranded 
in his work (...). The only essential thinker after Schelling, Nietzsche, broke down in the 
middle of his real work, The Will to Power, for the same reason. But this double, great 
breakdown of great thinkers is not a failure and nothing negative at all – on the contrary. 
It is the sign of the advent of something completely different, the heat lightning of a new 
beginning. Whoever really knew the reason for this breakdown and could conquer it intel-
ligently, would have to become the founder of the new beginning of Western philosophy.”14 
Hei degger’s diagnosis is that Schelling (along with Nietzsche) is the last metaphysical 
thinker. He asks about being as a whole and seeks the Highest Being. Unable to find either 
that Whole or that Being, Schelling, just as Nietzsche, approaches the verge of a new era, 
and his philosophy suddenly sees an unexpected emergence of some new experience of 
existence. A reality in fractions. A horrific tangle of Life.
This is where Schelling’s greatness lies: he did not try to replace the Christian God 
with some kind of a poor substitute, such as Matter, Man, History or Progress. Schelling 
wanted to believe in God. But he understood “faith” in a strictly philosophical sense. 
To simplify, faith in this case means repeating the act of God’s self-positing. Only Free 
Spirits believe in God for only they are God’s true image and likeness. In The Ages of the 
World, however, this act turns out to be unsustainable, which makes Schelling face a real-
ity without God and also with nothing at all to replace him. A comparison with Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s last writings seems irresistible. Nietzsche is the philosopher of the “death of 
God”, while the Schelling of 1815 might be called the philosopher of a God who had never 
been born or who had been born dead.
THE LADDER TO HEAVEN
While working on The Ages of the World, Schelling was dreaming of a grand synthesis of 
the old and the new, of Christianity and the Enlightenment. That synthesis was to mean 
a radical reform of religion, as we read, again, in the letter of August 19, 1814: “The Welt-
alter is not only about a complete metaphysical system, but also a religious system. All the 
views in it were pushed to the point where they have to materialize.”15 Schelling’s Christi-
anity is of an unusual kind, and this unusualness is directly related to the form of The Ages 
of the World. The work was planned as a philosophical mythology, or a transcendental 
14 M. Hei degger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. J. Stambaugh. Athens, Ohio, 1985. 
p. 3.
15 Schelling und Cotta. Briefwechsel 1803-1849, p. 87.
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theogony; an intermediate form between Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Hesiod’s 
Birth of the Gods16.
Still, in order to understand the form of The Ages of the World, we must go back 
in time and realize who the unhappy author of this philosophical ruin was before 1811. 
Schelling enters the field of philosophy as a very young man. Announcing in 1795 his 
treatise titled Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (Of the I as Principle of Philosophy), 
he is only twenty years old. Its main argument is that the center of reality consists in the 
absolute I or the absolute Freedom that we can find in ourselves and that each of us can 
actualize. There is something symbolic about Schelling’s youth. It took place in the era 
which invented childhood as a state of mind – an invention that seems closely linked 
with the Revolution, the abandonment of tradition, and with the educational project of 
the Enlightenment17. Let us then look at our hero in the following way: in 1795 he was the 
first (and probably also the last) young man in philosophy, a philosopher-child, an Arthur 
Rimbaud of transcendental philosophy.
Young Schelling, a devotee of Fichte and Spinoza, was also an enemy of Christian-
ity and a personal adversary of God. His state of mind is best illustrated by the blasphe-
mous poem he wrote at the time, Epikurisch Glaubenbekenntniß Hei nz Widerporstens 
(Hei nz Widerporsten’s Epicurean Confession of Faith). In 1799 Schlegel and Schleier-
macher considered its publication in the Athenaeum, but wanted to conceal from the 
other editors the name of the poem’s author. They were advised against the publication by 
Goethe, on grounds of moral turpitude. The poem begins with the following statements: 
“I think nothing of the invisible, / I cling only to what is evident, / What I can smell, taste, 
and feel”. Then the tone becomes gradually more impudent: “My only religion is this, / 
That I love a pretty knee”. This is followed by an ironic apology for the Catholic Church 
as a bodily religion of this world:
For if there be a religion,
 (...)
The one that could suit me of all
Would be the Catholic religion
As it was in old times.
 (...)
16 It should also be noticed that one of the works that served Schelling as a model for his philosophical mythology 
was Dante’s Divine Comedy. “It would be of minor interest to portray Dante’s philosophy, physics and astronomy 
separately, because his peculiarity lies precisely in the way these are fused with his poetry. The Ptolemaic system 
which in a sense constitutes the basis of his poetic structure has a mythological color in itself.” In The Divine 
Comedy – we read further on – we deal with a miraculous „interpenetration of science and poetry” (Über Dante 
in philosophischer Beziehung, V, 156 and 157; for rules which I follow when referring to Schelling’s works see 
the end of the essay). As Wolfram Hogrebe has proved lately, the past-present-future structure of The Ages of the 
World was to correspond to the structure of The Divine Comedy (see: Prädikation und Genesis. Metaphysik als 
Fundamentalheuristik im Ausgang von Schellings “Die Weltalter”. Frankfurt/ M, p. 31). I will return to Schelling’s 
affinity to Dante later in this essay. 
17 Historians of culture point to Rousseau as the true author of the term “childhood” understood as a state of mind, 
not only a state of body. For further reference, see a collection of essays edited by Maria Janion: Dzieci (Children). 
Vol. 2, Gdańsk 1988, pp. 193-254. See also: P. Ariès, Centuries of Childhood, trans. R. Baldick. New York 1970.
92013
THE PHILOSOPHER OF CHAOS . A PORTRAIT OF SCHELLING 
They wouldn’t go off on wild goose chases,
Nor gawk at heaven.
They had a living ape of God,
Thought the earth the center of the universe
And Rome the center of the earth.
Later on Schelling grows blasphemous:
And besides in the lofty house of heaven
They lived high on the hog,
They had a wedding feast every day
Between the Virgin and the Old Man.18
In 1809, however, Schelling returned to Christianity. The fact would not be surpris-
ing, except that Schelling turned to the most extravagant version of Christianity, namely 
– the theosophy of Jakob Böhme. Böhme was for Schelling who the Apostle Paul was for 
St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas – the representative of Jesus Christ, the revelator of 
the truth about God’s Life. Böhme is an Erzähler, a storyteller who relates the Beginning, 
a master Sorcerer, or a mythmaker, while Schelling, as we see him in the “Introduction” 
to The Ages of the World, is a researcher, a Forscher, who translates theosophical visions 
into dialectical constructs. In The Ages of the World Schelling repeats all of Böhme’s 
doctrinal theses and evokes all of his wildest visions.
The affinity between Schelling and Böhme was considered by German researchers 
to be somewhat embarrassing. Above all, they had some doubts about Schelling’s inde-
pendence as a thinker. Horst Fuhrmans, author of the first monograph on the Weltalter, 
argues that Schelling is “almost slavishly dependent” on Böhme. “Böhme’s irrationalism 
– he argues – that dark world of theosophical thought, according to which God is born 
in an ante-tellurian process”, predominates over Schelling and his “deductions which in 
fact are not particularly apt.”19 In Jaspers’s opinion: “It is astonishing how Schelling in his 
concept of »freedom« is opposing all kinds of dogmatism (...), identifying »daydreaming« 
with dogmatism, and how he then accepts both; therefore it is justified to consider him 
a Gnostic.”20 This tradition of the reception of the Weltalter’s can be complemented by 
one more book that seems to be its mirror image, as it negates Schelling’s affinity with 
Böhme and tries to free him from the accusation of being a “theosophist” – a curious case 
of the art of interpretation, Herald Holz’s Spekulation und Faktizität (Speculation and 
Factuality). For over five hundred pages Holz argues, and his argument is very instruc-
tive, that Schelling is a Neo-Platonist, which is to suggest that his affinity with Böhme is 
only a “legend.”21
18 W. Jens and H. Küng, Literature & Religion, trans. P. Hei negg. New York 1991, pp. 169-170.
19 H. Fuhrmans, Schellings Philosophie der Weltalter. Schellings Philosophie in den Jahren 1806-1821. Zum Pro-
blem des Schellingschen Theismus. Düsseldorf 1954, p. 325. 
20 K. Jaspers, Schelling. Größe und Verhängnis. München 1955, pp. 210-211.
21 H. Holz, Spekulation und Faktizität. Zum Freiheitsbegriff des mittleren und späteren Schelling. Bonn 1970, p. 7.
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All those interpretations, however, are deaf to Schelling’s irony, insensitive to his 
passion for literature or his predilection for various pseudo-scientific practices and theo-
ries (for instance: alchemy or hypnosis). They seem not to understand Schelling’s gesture 
when he refers to God’s actions as “magic” and to the act of creation as the Great Orgasm. 
Schelling distances himself to some extent from the language in which he thinks and 
works. This distance is also the source of Schelling’s extravagance, and is deeply rooted 
in the theory of being proposed in The Ages of the World.
Let us refer once more to Schelling’s letter of August 19, 1814, addressed to his 
would-be publisher of the Weltalter, Johann Friedrich Cotta. The tone of that letter, or 
rather – the sudden changes in its tone, should prove highly instructive to the readers 
of Schelling. The beginning of the letter sounds stilted: “the truth that I have mastered, 
I would now like to pour into the hearts of my contemporaries; I wish to leave behind me 
something that would serve my people.”22 But in the next sentence Schelling goes into 
technical details of his project: “the project of this kind requires adopting positive religion 
as its base.”23 The concept of a base, Basis, has its precise meaning in Schelling’s philoso-
phy. The base is not a principle that determines the Spirit but rather the ground from which 
the Spirit detaches itself (like salt when separating itself form the base solution mixed 
with acid). A philosopher who wishes to appeal to the hearts of his nation should there-
fore take as his base positive religion, i.e. revealed religion, and should then take a jump 
together with his reader, do a somersault, which would enable them both to rise above this 
religion and detach themselves from its dogma. Schelling continues: “I remember how 
in Jena Fromman would tease me, offering me serious money if only I wrote a collection 
of sermons. This is precisely what I would like to write once the Weltalter is completed – 
sermons devoted to the whole Christian doctrine, sermons which I could put in the mouth 
of a real preacher, myself acting as the publisher, sermons in their usual form, though of 
a very different content.”24
Whoever wants to read Schelling and benefit from it, must look out for precipices 
which open up here and there. He must be aware of the fissures between the who that 
speaks, the what that is spoken and the what for. Of the sudden leaps from pathos to irony, 
from tears to laughter. Schelling begins with a description of the archaic Chaos which 
God’s Consciousness develops from. God rises from nonbeing to being. However, in order 
to describe this process, Schelling must revise traditional metaphysics. The Ages of the 
World is the first (before Nietzsche’s Will to Power) attempt to radically invert Platonism. 
Traditional metaphysics taught that there is no nonbeing, and if there is, it is a mere shadow 
of an idea, a lack of being, something secondary and derivative. This view is also the view 
of common sense: truth precedes fiction, waking goes before sleep, chaos is just a violation 
of order. In his description of the original Nonbeing, Shelling reverses these oppositions 
one by one: in The Ages of the World fiction goes before truth, sleep before waking, and 
order is only emerging from chaos. Yet this Fiction, this Sleep and this Chaos, have quite 




THE PHILOSOPHER OF CHAOS . A PORTRAIT OF SCHELLING 
different meanings than it is usually assumed, for they are not about lack, but something 
frighteningly positive.
In order to achieve this inversion, Schelling needs a very special material for 
thought and a very unusual language. He needs pseudo-concepts. Phantasmagoria. Ancient 
myths. Schelling believes in all religions at once and is ready to bow down to any religious 
nonsense. One can see it clearly in his Philosophy of Mythology. Still, it is this nonsense, 
the dead religions that no-one believes in any longer, just as the theories of alchemists 
and Böhme’s visions, that are particularly helpful when it comes to describing the dark 
Abyss, the Dark Pit which opens up in the middle of Nature. According to Schelling, it is 
precisely this Abyss and this Pit that God’s Consciousness rises from (as does all human 
consciousness).
Schelling starts as a nihilist. In the beginning there is nonsense – but it is truly 
metaphysical nonsense. And this is only the beginning. The aim of this process is God’s 
Freedom. Rising from Nonbeing, God creates the world, thereby gaining self-conscious-
ness. Schelling owes this idea to Böhme: creation is a mirror in which God sees his own 
Power and only thus turns out to be God. Schelling – let us refer to some basic facts – was 
a German idealist: thought and being are the same for him. Hence his God becomes who 
he is (i.e. becomes God) only in the course of finding out who he is. However, at the end 
of the act of creation God detaches himself from the world and becomes radically alien 
to it. Just as a man who looks at his reflection in a mirror: he is beyond what he sees and 
is someone completely different than the face that stands before him. In the Philosophy 
of Revelation, Schelling states: “God is attached to nothing, not even to his own Being.”25 
This is the meaning of the Freedom of God who rises above the world and his own Being.
Schelling describes this situation using a rhetorical figure which will help us to cap-
ture the analogy between the structure of the act of creation and the form of The Ages of 
the World. This figure is irony. Schelling would like to combine the old theology of the 
Word with Romantic irony. Following St. John, God is the Word that was made flesh. This 
sentence is interpreted as follows in The Ages of the World: all creation is God’s Word, 
a story, that which is uttered, das Ausgesprochene. God himself is the Author of this story, 
the one who utters or the Uttering, das Aussprechende26. This Author, however, appears 
only at the end of his work. Every work, Schelling argues, is the fruit of inspiration, which 
means that it is created in a completely unconscious state of mind27. Consciousness ap-
pears at the end of the work and immediately separates itself from it. In order, however, 
to separate himself from his own work, God must put it in ironic quotation marks. In the 
Philosophy of Revelation Schelling speaks of “the Godlike art of disguise or irony”28 
which causes God to be always someone Other than he seems. One might put it another 
way: we know everything about God, because the whole world is a Revelation of him 
and we are his faithful Image. At the same time, we know nothing about God, because 
a Personal God, the true Subject of this Revelation, is completely free of the world and 
25 Philosophie der Offenbarung, XIII, p. 305: “Gott ist an nichts, auch nicht an sein eigenes Sein gebunden“.
26 See: Die Weltalter, VIII, p. 272.
27 Ibid, p. 337.
28 Philosophie der Offenbarung, XIII, p. 305: die göttliche Verstellungskunst oder Ironie.
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external to it. This “everything” and that “nothing” can only be embraced and reconciled 
by the divine art of Irony.
As we can see now, there is perfect coherence between what Schelling says and 
how it was said. The Ages of the World was supposed to be a spiritual exercise – a Jacob’s 
ladder that would enable us to descend into the dark bottom of Being (which is also the 
dark bottom of our own selves), and then ascend, as Free Spirits do, above all Being. Let 
us repeat that Schelling wished to reconcile Christianity with the Enlightenment, the 
theosophical idea of the Birth of God with the Münchhausenian act of the Subject’s self-
positing as it strives to pull itself out by its own hair from the mire of Nonbeing. The me-
dium of this synthesis is literature. It enables Schelling to capture the dynamics of Being, 
its primordial Nonbeing, as well as to construct concepts so weightless, so frivolous that 
they disintegrate at once, allowing the author – and the reader – to detach from the work 
and move upwards. The notion of the Orgasm of Powers, Orgasmus der Kräfte, is precisely 
such an ironic concept29. Thus the act of writing – and the act of reading – turn out to be 
a repetition of the act of creation. Man is the image of God (one must keep repeating this 
sentence like a prayer). The act of creation must therefore be repeated by all Free Spirits.
In the beginning, however, is nonsense: Nonbeing’s heavy dream which at times 
seems more real than the visible world. We are now about to descend into that Darkness 
with the assistance of two guides – Hume and Kant. These two philosophers of the late En-
lightenment unmask the emptiness of metaphysical speculations. Metaphysics turned out 
to be mythology. Schelling will now attempt to transform it into a philosophical mythology.
THE MYTHOLOGY OF REASON: BEING
We need to regard Schelling as a successor of the Radical Enlightenment; a thinker who 
wants to return to Christianity and thus transgress the Enlightenment, carrying to an 
extreme one of its most nihilistic ideas: the conviction that fundamental concepts are 
empty. Our mind has at its disposal two fundamental concepts. The concept of “being”, 
das Seyn, and the concept of “what-is”, das Seyende. Schelling maintains that the mean-
ing of these concepts issues from the structure of a subject-predicate sentence in which 
all our cognition of reality is articulated:
For in all statements – as we read on one of the pages rewritten by Schröter 
– a double Being is distinguished: the objective one, which in the sentence 
‘A is what it is’ is expressed by the words what is, and that which is more 
interior, which withdraws from the first one into the deep and finds its ex-
pression in the word is, and which constitutes the Being of the pure Subject 
or – according to a different formula – pure Essence (esse more essentiae).30
29 See: Die Weltalter, VIII, p. 320.
30 Die Weltalter. Fragmente, p. 213: „Denn in jeder Aussage wird ein doppeltes Seyn unterscheidet, das gegenstän-
dliche, welches im Satz ‚A ist seyend’ (...) durch das Wort seyend ausgedrückt wird, u. das mehr Innerliche gegen 
jenes in die Tiefe zurücktretende, das in dem ist liegt u. welches eben das Seyn des bloßen Subjects oder wie es 
auch sonst genannt wurde des lauteren Wesens (esse more essentiae) ist“.
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Schelling’s das Seyn is usually rendered into English as „Being”. In the light of the 
above quotation it seems more appropriate than any other equivalent, because it is closer 
to the way we use this term today. A being is for us that what is. For instance, this chair is 
a being. It stands here and is the logical subject of any opinion that can be formulated about 
this object. This being (this chair) can be described in other terms as well (it is wooden 
and has one leg too short). These terms constitute what Schelling would like to call das 
Seyende. Unfortunately, English lacks an apt word for it. In the absence of better equiva-
lents we can subsititute it with the noun-phrase ‘what-is’. But what is a chair except that 
what it is? Reality seems to consist of entities (that we formulate opinions about), which 
exist (and thus are facts).
Yet in so thinking, we translate Schelling into a language and ideas that are com-
pletely alien to him. The conviction that reality is composed of things and facts is a posi-
tivist one. And there is no other school of thought that Schelling would distance himself 
from more than the positivists. The positivists were interested in positive facts; in the 
being that stands before our eyes and is tangible. But the problem that interested Schell-
ing was Abyss and Freedom, Non-being and Supra-existence. “It cannot be the aim of 
philosophy – says Schelling – to stop with the once emerged being; it has to go beyond 
this being – real, accomplished and random – in order to comprehend it.”31 A philosopher 
should therefore go beyond the present and actual being, über das vorhandene und schon 
bestehende Seyn hinweg32, because “our labors aim at discovering that which is before 
and beyond being”, was vor und über dem Seyn ist33.
In the above statements, which come from the Philosophy of Revelation, i.e. from 
the late forties, Schelling tends to use the word das Seyn in its positivist interpretation. 
In order to go beyond being thus understood, Schelling must provide his own definition 
of the term. We find this definition in The Ages of the World: Seyn ist Seinheit, Eigenheit; 
ist Absonderung34. Schelling exploits the fact that the noun das Seyn and the verb sein 
have the same form in German as the possessive pronoun sein “its” (“own”). The end-
ing -heit corresponds to the English endings: “-ness” or “-ity”. Consequently, Frederick 
de Wolfe Bolman translates this sentence as: “To be is se-ity, own-ness, seclusion.”35 In 
Jason M. Wirth’s translation we read: “Being is ipseity, particularity. It is dislocation.”36
For Schelling, to be means to be self-contained, to sustain an existential balance, ir-
respective of external circumstances. Schelling’s definition of being applies both to a chair 
(standing over there on its own legs) and to objects that are not given to us directly, for 
instance – the Whole Universe (which can neither be touched, nor taken in by the eye). 
This definition also enables us to talk about Being as such which embraces all beings and 
is the true Center of reality. This is how the authors of the past understood God. Thomas 
31 Philosophie der Offenbarung, XIII, p. 203: “Es kann überhaupt nicht die Absicht der Philosophie seyn, inner-
halb des einmal gewordenen Seyns stehen zu bleiben, sie muß über dieses Seyn, das wirkliche, das gewordene, das 
zufällige hinausgehen können, um es zu begreifen“.
32 Ibid., p. 204-205.
33 Ibid., p. 240.
34 Die Weltalter, VIII, p. 210.
35 The Ages of the World, trans. F. de Wolfe Bolman, Jr. New York 1942, p. 96.
36 The Ages of the World, trans. J. M. Wirth. Albany 2000, pp. 5-6.
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Aquinas says that God is Esse, pure Being. This Being – pure Act and core of reality – 
reveals itself in entities or beings, in what-is or that which is, entia, Seyende, something 
created and finite. Let us refer to the positivists again: their definition of reality is: “that 
what-is is being”. A thing – for example: this chair – is a fact. Schelling, however, just as 
the old metaphysicians, would like to go deeper and descend into the dark fundament of 
the visible world. His definition is therefore exactly the reverse: “Being is that what-is”, 
something is a chair while something else is the Universe as such, considered as a whole, 
in which the chair stands and to which it belongs:
The different entities or, as we usually say, the different things are distin-
guished from each other not through their Being as such, in which they all 
participate, but only through the form of that Being (...) Therefore, the Entity 
is always the same in all things.37
Being thus understood cannot be a fact (standing before our eyes). It is the Subject 
of the whole of our experience (it lies at its roots). In order to reach it, Reason must turn 
to itself and look deep inside itself. Now we are following Kant: we do not watch God 
directly, face to face, yet our mind possesses the idea of a Supreme Being as a necessary 
Basis of all phenomena. This is where a fearful abyss opens up suddenly before Kant’s 
eyes. It is one of the most extraordinary passages in The Critique of Pure Reason:
Unconditioned necessity, which, as the ultimate support and stay of all exist-
ing things, is an indispensable requirement of the mind, is an abyss on the 
verge of which human reason trembles in dismay. Even the idea of eternity, 
terrible and sublime as it is, as depicted by Haller, does not produce upon 
the mental vision such a feeling of awe and terror (...). Here all sinks away 
from under us.38
Confronted with that abyss, Kant steps back and transforms it into an idea of 
Reason, i.e. an idea entirely subjected to Reason39. It is us who have, command and use 
the concept of the Supreme Being. The abyss therefore opens solely in our minds. Schell-
ing, for whom all concepts possess or reflect some reality (or non-reality), inverts Kant’s 
critical idealism and turns the whole of his philosophy upside down. We find ourselves 
in a situation exactly opposite to the one Kant would wish for. Man is born out of the 
depths. The Abyss carries and gives birth to man. We thus return (rather unexpectedly) 
to the old doctrine of the German mystics, Eck hart and Tauler: “Deep calleth on deep 
37 Philosophie der Offenbarung, XIII, p. 223: „Die verschiedenen Seyenden oder, wie wir gewöhnlich sagen, die 
verschiedenen Dinge unterscheiden sich voneinander nicht durch das Seyn selbst, an dem sie alle Teil haben, son-
dern nur durch die Art dieses Seyns (...) Hieraus kann man dann durch einen umgekehrten Schluß herausbringen, 
daß das Seyende überall und in allen Dingen das selbe und durchaus sich gleiche ist“.
38 I. Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn. A Penn State Electronic Classics Series Publi-
cation 2010, p. 419.
39 The passage continues: “the greatest, as the smallest, perfection, hovers without stay or footing in presence of 
the speculative reason, which finds it as easy to part with the one as with the other.” (Ibid., pp. 419-420.) [emphasis 
mine]. 
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(Ps. xli: 8), exclaims the Psalmist. The created abyss, with its boundless knowledge of 
its own nothingness, calleth into itself the uncreated abyss that is the infinite God, and 
thus is it made one with Him.”40 Or, as Tauler claims earlier in his sermons: “This abyss 
is God’s chosen dwelling place, far more so than in all creatures, yea even more than in 
heaven. Whosoever comes into these depths finds God most truly, and he finds himself 
most simply and in God.”41
Schelling learned from Kant that the fundamental concepts of the mind are empty. 
In the Philosophy of Revelation we read of “This fruitless concept of Parmenides, to which 
every beginner is drawn (...) the barren and deserted Being.”42 However, it was in this 
abstract concept that Schelling saw (very much against Kant) the first rung of the ladder 
that would enable us to descend into the Primeval age and see for ourselves that pre-world 
when there was no God yet. The pre-world that precedes the act of creation. One can 
therefore repeat after Kant: the fundamental concepts of our mind (substance, the whole, 
infinity) do not reflect the entities which stand right in front of us and are empirically per-
ceptible. There are basically two concepts of being at our disposal: the positivist one and 
the metaphysical one. According to the latter, which originates with Parmenides, Being is 
the Subject and the Whole of all being. This concept, speaking in Kant’s terms, conditions 
the experience of any empirical existence since we always see the latter immersed in the 
Wholeness of Being. According to Schelling’s project, deducing that Whole and revealing 
the way in which It organizes itself are meant to allow us to recreate God’s act of creation.
The idea of going before and above being, vor und über dem Seyn, has therefore 
two meanings for Schelling. First of all, we should transgress the being which we can 
see, descend to its Subject and then embrace it as a Whole. Yet by revealing the original 
emptiness of Being Schelling goes far beyond traditional metaphysics and its concept of 
reality. Let me repeat that The Ages of the World might be considered the first attempt at 
inverting Platonism. This inversion, let me also add at this point, means transgressing 
metaphysics, although its sense as well as its form are different than in the writings of 
Hei degger. Schelling’s aim is to introduce Non-being and Freedom which are before and 
above, and thus beyond Being.
Let us return to Kant. Kant showed that the concept of necessary Being (or the 
philosophical concept of God) is a fiction created by Reason in order to organize a priori 
its own experience. In doing so, Kant carried to an extreme the Enlightenment project of 
the demystification of the world: he turned Reason against Reason itself and showed that 
it is the greatest sorcerer of all. Reason creates fables. But perhaps we should intensify 
this inclination and thus transgress it, instead of opposing it. Man is Nature’s creation. 
Acting in harmony with the deepest inclination of our mind, i.e. the inclination towards 
creating fables, we are likely to approach the primordial state of reality. Everything that 
philosophy struggles with: deserts of fundamental concepts, barren landscapes of ab-
straction, the horror of pure speculation – all this is considered by Schelling as a sign of 
the primordial state of Nature. This emptiness, the emptiness of pure reason, reflects the 
40 J. Tauler, The Sermons and Conferences of John Tauler, trans. W. Elliott. Washington D.C. 1910, p. 503.
41 Ibid., p. 50.
42 Philosophie der Offenbarung, XIII, p. 224: „Dieser unfruchtbare Begriff des Parmenides, zu dem jeder Anfan-
gende Neigung empfindet (...) das öde und wüste Seyn”.
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inner emptiness of Being. God, let us repeat once more, created man in his own image 
and likeness. Therefore the disarray of the human mind reveals a horrifying truth about 
God. It shows us the Chaos of Nature which God is only emerging from. Reason creates 
myths because Nature itself is initially a fable.
It has become clear by now what philosophical mythology means and in what sense 
it differs from the ancient mythologies. It is not the case that reason ought to be rejected 
and replaced with its opposite – a senseless fable. Schelling’s aim is to create a surrational 
discourse – one that would unite the demystification of the world with its re-enchantment. 
This aim is therefore a new kind of fable; fiction that is truth, and truth that is fiction. As 
we read in the Weltalter: “What holds back the anticipated golden age when truth again 
becomes fable and fable truth?”43. The story, however, will turn out to be an evil one. 
A grim German tale of Nothingness.
SCHELLING’S ONTOLOGY: FORMS OF BEING
We already know where it all begins. Now we need to look deep inside ourselves and 
start contemplating the fundamental concepts. This experience, Schelling claims, is truly 
terrifying. For he who sees (with his mind’s eye) the concept of Being, sees the abyss that 
opens up inside him and experiences a terrible feeling of dizziness. Parmenides’ unity, 
the concept of Being as such, “which is one and the same in everything (...) causes diz-
ziness and is of no help whatsoever.”44 It is, as we read elsewhere, “a rotating movement, 
revolving around One Point.”45
As we already know, this rotating movement, this whirl, this buzz is a relict of the 
Primeval age, a sign of the Preexistence that we reach by descending into the depths of 
consciousness. In the beginning, claims Schelling, Being is devoid of any balance whatso-
ever. It contracts and expands by turns; it explodes and then sinks back into itself. There 
are two primordial forces or two archaic Powers in it which are at war with each other: the 
attracting power and the expanding power, anziehende und ausbreitende Kraft. Neverthe-
less, this instability of being has a most logical structure. As I already mentioned, Being 
is a subject. That which is or that what-is is a predicate. The expanding power – which 
Schelling also refers to as the affirming power, bejahende Kraft – finds its expression 
in the phrase: “that is what is” or “that which is”. The predicate points to an ontological 
expansion here. The attracting power, or negating power, verneinende Kraft, is expressed 
in the phrase: “that which is not” or “that is a non-being”, describing a real lack, an ex-
isting absence. These, of course, are the two most basic sentences we can possibly utter.
Let us now face another of Schelling’s concepts, the category of “what-is” or “that 
which is”, das Seyende. “What is” is a form of being. However, “is” should by no means 
be understood in an existential sense. For example, my sentence: “the chair is a domestic 
tool” does not necessarily communicate that this chair actually exists. Schelling argues 
that “What is” initially means a kind of possibility or potency of being. At this point we are 
still following the old metaphysicians: pure ideas, which are the subject of our definitions, 
43 Die Weltalter, VIII, p. 200. English translation quoted after The Ages of the World, trans. F. de Wolfe Bolman Jr., 
p. 84.
44 Philosophie der Offenbarung, XIII, pp. 223-224.
45 Ibid., p. 97. 
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are God’s thoughts before the act of creation. Schelling, a philosopher-polyglot, refers 
to the Arabic language in which the copula “is” in the phrase “it is a being” means “can”:
In the Arabic language the Is (the copula) is expressed by a word which in 
German means “can” (...) in opposition to all languages known to me, in 
which the verb sum is followed by a nominative, the Arabs construct it with 
the accusative. The Arab does not say: homo est sapiens. (...) Against other 
grammar systems, the Arab says: homo est sapientem. The accusative sug-
gests that for the Arab Is means as much as potest since the verb possum by 
nature – and hence in most languages – governs the accusative.46
The structure of a sentence in Latin or German, in which the predicate is in the 
nominative, suggests that the subject and the predicate refer to the same substance (for 
example in the sentence “Man is wise”). But Schelling states that there is no substance 
in the beginning and reality is completely unstable. Reality begins with the gurgle of 
Being: the negating potency suppresses the affirming potency, the contracting power 
crushes the expanding power, or the other way round: the affirming potency represses 
and pushes into the deep the negating potency which, in turn, becomes being to it. Thus, 
being is originally transitive: something is being to something else. Being is the subject. 
The subject of expansion is the (repressed) contracting power. The subject of contraction 
is the (crushed) affirming power.
Thus, Being is initially an empty place into which one of the powers is forced, while 
the other one exists. Schelling interprets the latter term, die Existenz, according to its Latin 
etymology: the verb existere consists of the prefix ex (out) and the root which is derived 
from the verb sisto (to be situated, located). “To exist” then literally means “to be located 
or to stand outside”, or “to out-stand.” Read in the light of philosophical grammar, this 
term functions as a predicate in phrases such as: “being is what-is” and “being is which 
is not”. Therefore, it has nothing to do with the scholastic existentia which denoted a cre-
ated entity, ens creatum – the subject of the existential judgment “something exists.”47
There are two fundamental statements, or two Principles: “that which is” and 
“that which is not”. But Schelling claims that there is a third statement which is equally 
fundamental: “that which is neither something nor nothing”. This statement expresses the 
third form of the original Chaos: the unity of opposites, a moment of stillness, a moment 
of stability when the two basic powers suddenly cease to struggle with each other and 
immerse in mutual indifference.
These three Principles constitute the original wholeness of what-is which, however, 
still lacks something in order to become Being since it is devoid of balance. Schelling 
46 Ibid.
47 The most famous existentialist of the 20th century states that “Schelling uses the word existence in a sense which 
is closer to the literal etymological sense than the usual and long prevalent meaning of »existing« as objective 
presence. Ex-sistence, what emerges from itself and in emerging reveals itself ”. Existence thus understood is the 
opposite of ground, Grund, and not the opposite of essence, Wesen. Hence the distinction between Seyn – Seyende, 
Grund – Existenz “by no means coincides with a current one in philosophy: that of essentia and existentia, (...) 
what-ness and that-ness”, M. Hei degger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, p. 107.
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defines this incomplete whole with the term Daseyn. The words Seyn and Daseyn are near 
synonyms. They differ in the prefix Da-, meaning “over here”, “here.” Literally speaking, 
Daseyn means a limited Seyn; present or local existence. The definition of the difference 
between Seyn and Daseyn can be found in Schelling’s first work, a treatise titled Of the 
I as Principle of Philosophy:
Almost all of them use the words being (Seyn), presence (Daseyn), existence 
and reality (Wirklichkeit) as if they were synonyms. Obviously the word 
being expresses pure, absolute being-posited (Gesetztsein), whereas pres-
ence even etymologically signifies a conditioned and limited being-posited.
And a bit further in the text we read:
The word being (Sein) expresses an absolute being-posited, whereas ex-
istence (Dasein) always signifies a conditioned, and reality (Wirklichkeit) 
a specifically conditioned being-posited, determined by specific conditions. 
The individual phenomenon in the total context of the world has reality; the 
world of phenomena as such has existence; but the absolutely posited, the I, 
simply is. I am! is all that the I can say about itself.48
Consequently, the absolute I turns out to be the scholastic Esse: “The I is only 
through itself. Its original form (Urform) is that of pure being.”49 To describe this being, 
Schelling uses the metaphor of the Sun (a metaphor we already know from Plato’s Repub-
lic) which emanates or emits from itself a being of a lower order. The absolute I gathers 
“all rays of existence in the center of its identity.”50
This brings us back to the figure of inverted Platonism in Schelling’s philosophy. 
Early in his career, in 1795, Schelling maintained that the light of the absolute I constituted 
Being which precedes the darkness of this world. What he claims in 1815, however, is pre-
cisely the reverse. First comes Darkness; from it there emerges the Sun of the pure Subject, 
the Eternal Dawn, in which God can see himself. Schelling describes this Darkness using 
the terms Daseyn and Wirklichkeit which in Of the I as Principle of Philosophy referred 
to secondary and derivative forms of being. The latter term, Wirklichkeit, meaning “real-
ity”, might prove confusing to the readers of Schelling. Its English equivalent suggests an 
image of a set of things. The word “reality” originates from Latin res, whereas the noun 
Wirklichkeit comes from the verb wirken “to work” or ”to act”. Reality, in German, refers 
us to working or acting. The German language seems to suggest an activist ontology here: 
only that which works, or acts, and shows some results is considered real. Being is not 
a thing, but an act. Whenever Schelling speaks of the reality of archaic forces, he points 
to their dark activity, an invisible actuality, devoid of any substantiality, which therefore 
48 Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie, I, pp. 209-210. English translation quoted after: “Of the I as Principle of 
Philosophy, or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge”, in: The Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four 
Early Essays (1794-1796), trans. F. Marti. Lewisburg 1980, p. 105.
49 Ibid., p. 221; p. 113.
50 Ibid., p. 178; p. 83.
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– if reality is understood to consist of real things – must seem utterly unreal. It is precisely 
this un-reality that every consciousness struggles to rise from.
Yet we can articulate Schelling’s inversion of Platonism – sleep, let us repeat, goes 
before waking, dreaming before reality – in terms of the ontology outlined by Schelling 
in Of the I as Principle of Philosophy. We should keep in mind this early piece when 
reading The Ages of the World as it allows us to see the whole drama of the Weltalter. 
The basic ontological categories (whose first definitions I provided earlier in this essay) 
do not have stable, invariable meanings here, but they participate in a game in which and 
via which they acquire sense. Schelling therefore wants to articulate new thoughts in tra-
ditional language, turning it inside out, making a derivative of what used to be an axiom. 
Thus inverted, however, this language suddenly begins to change its meaning. And it is 
precisely the dynamics of this change, the spontaneous mutation of primary meanings, 
which Schelling could no longer control at some point, and which led to the collapse of 
the Weltalter project.
But before we answer the question why Schelling did not finish The Ages of the 
World, it is necessary to explain the purpose of this inversion as well as the expected ul-
timate outcome of the work. Schelling’s aim was to transform the metaphysical concept 
of Being into what he calls das Selbst, the Self. Let us begin with the way we commonly 
perceive reality and so – with Johna Locke, the founder of philosophical psychology, who 
described this mode of perception. When I say “I am my self,” I include in this formula my 
own being. A person, says Locke, is a being that “can consider it self as it self, the same 
thinking thing in different times and places.”51 When I identify myself with myself this 
way, when I “own myself” – Schelling would add – I exceed and transcend myself. The 
word „self” denotes not only my own spiritual interior and my own whole but something 
more: my personal freedom which allows me to direct myself. Keeping this experience 
in mind, as well as the analogy between human consciousness and the consciousness 
of God, we can already comprehend what it means that the creator of the universe has 
a “personal being.”
Schelling’s thesis would then be as follows: God is the Self. God determines the 
unity of the created world. The world is one because it was created by one God who is the 
Center, i.e. both the Middle of the Universum and its Interior. At the same time, God – 
who emerges from Nature amid exploding stars and the clangor of planets (Schelling often 
evokes such cosmic images) – encloses and contains the world as a Whole. Creation, as 
we know from the Catechism, is a faithful reflection of God’s thoughts and is completely 
subjected to his will:
The perfect Spirit is inevitably an all-unifyinig Spirit. It is all-unfyinig since 
it is not a pure One (unum quid), nor any abstract Unity either, but a true 
living Allness. It is all-unfyinig because as a Spirit it is only One; and since 
it is not some random, but an inevitable unity of that Allness, therefore it 
is all-unifying.52
51 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. by P.-H. Niddtich. Oxford 1975, p. 335.
52 Philosophie der Offenbarung, XIII, p. 260. 
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God is the Interior and the Wholeness of being, yet at the same time he must be 
totally independent of his creation – and external to it. Only as such can he be called the 
Absolute in the fullest sense of the word. The word “absolute,” to recall its Latin etymol-
ogy, comes from the verb absolvere (“to untie from”, “to free from”):
He is by himself, by his very Nature a Solitary (solitarius) (...) who is de-
tached, unconstrained and free of everything that can be thought beyond 
him; also in this sense he is an absolute Spirit; for being the absolute means 
being totally free of any attachment or relationship.53
If what we have called Self is to emerge from existence, all the above described 
forms of being must organize themselves into a harmonious order and create what Schell-
ing refers to as the universal Organism. The negating principle, i.e. non-being, must 
become the Interior of the Self which – as the attracting power – gathers the whole of 
what-is and makes it a unity. This nonbeing should then subordinate itself to the affirming 
principle and become being to it. The affirming principle, the expanding power, establishes 
what-is in its Wholeness. Hence, if creation is to succeed, this power should itself exist. 
And finally, above that Interior and this Whole, there should rise the third Principle – 
Indifference through which God is wholly external to the world and absolutely free of it. 
God, therefore, is Non-being, Existence, Freedom. This is how his spiritual Organism is 
constructed, how the ontological anatomy of the Self functions. This is the Being which 
is derivative in respect to its various forms, and which contains both the unreality of Non-
being and the supra-reality of Freedom.
CHAOS, ABYSS, ANTI-BEING
This question must be frankly asked: why would anyone want to read The Ages of the 
World? It is an incomplete work. A stillborn book. A sad fraction. There is no reason 
to deal with philosophy which is overtly untrue, and the philosophy of The Ages of the 
World is false by virtue of the very rules of truth which this philosophy itself establishes 
and directly formulates. For Schelling, truth is the whole of Being. We are dealing here 
with an ontological definition of truth (truth is what-is) combined with the coherence theory 
of truth (truth is a whole devoid of contradictions and uniting all fragmentary statements). 
Schelling’s stance is very firm: there is not a single statement in science that would be 
absolutely true. What is true is only the wholeness of Being in its eternal Movement. 
Each fragmentary statement is therefore false insofar as it is fragmentary and is not part 
of the universal Organism. Just as any other form of being is something unreal as long as 
it is merely local existence, das Daseyn, and as such is devoid of “divine empowering.”54
However, one can take the opposite approach. Schelling’s greatness lies in his 
failure. Die Weltalter, read in accordance with what it really represents, is a work about 
Nothingness, about various forms of Nonbeing and hierarchies of Nonexistence. This is 
53 Ibid., pp. 260-261. 
54 Die Weltalter, VIII, p. 289. English translation quoted after The Ages of the World, trans. F. de Wolfe Bolman Jr., 
p. 177.
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what seems to constitute the theoretical value of the book. One historical fact in particu-
lar is worth mentioning here: Schelling was viewed as a nihilist by his contemporaries. 
In 1803, a little book by Freidrich Köppen was published in Hamburg, titled Schellings 
Lehre oder das Ganze der Philosophie des absoluten Nichts (Schelling’s Doctrine or the 
Whole of Philosophy of the Absolute Nothing), which denounced the young Schelling 
as a nihilist. Schelling was even claimed to be the author of Nachtwachen (The Night 
Watches), the famous Romantic nihilist manifesto of 1804 whose real author was hiding 
under the pseudonym Bonaventura. Schelling used the same pseudonym.55 And even if 
Schelling was not Bonaventura, one can see a grain of truth in the suspicion. The Night 
Watches features a character that re-emerges in The Ages of the World: God who went 
mad, an insane Demiurge.
In the previous section of this essay I discussed Schelling’s theory of being. Let me 
now propose an overview of his concepts of nothingness. The two orders, that of being 
and that of nonbeing, overlap or even mingle in an unfortunate way, as I will prove later. 
The Weltalter, let me stress it once more, is a description of Nonbeing that precedes the 
act of creation.
The first of these Nothingnesses is Nature, constituted by the three Principles men-
tioned before. Nature is being devoid of stability, an archaic Chaos. Schelling is clearly 
a disciple of ancient poets on this issue. To quote Hesiod: “Verily at the first Chaos came 
to be, but next wide-bosomed Earth”56, or a corresponding fragment from Ovid: “Before 
the seas, and this terrestrial ball, / And Heav’n’s high canopy, that covers all, / One was the 
face of Nature; if a face: / Rather a rude and indigested mass: / A lifeless lump, unfashion’d, 
and unfram’d, / Of jarring seeds; and justly Chaos nam’d.”57
Schelling, a Romantic traveler to the Interior of Being, links this Chaos chiefly 
with emotions. It is an emotional chaos, emotional welter. First, claims Schelling, there 
is a clash of two forms of desire: Sucht and Begierde. The former is a morbid mania, 
a narcotic passion, a desire that goes beyond its usual limits. Der Süchtige means a drug 
addict, zigarettensüchtig means a heavy smoker, and fernsehsüchtig in the modern Ger-
man language refers to a person addicted to television. Therefore, the hunger in question 
is not a simple lack of something, located in the interior of an organism, but a voracious 
passion, which draws in and devours the object of the mania. Narcotic hunger – as the term 
should be translated – is not some inner emptiness, self-contained and static, but a kind 
of surplus, a centripetal power that encloses and draws in its surroundings. Die Begierde, 
desire, is then the symmetrical opposite of hunger thus understood; the centrifugal power. 
It is a kind of desire that we are bursting with. The two basic powers of nature manifest 
themselves in both these forms of desire: the attracting power and the expanding power.
55 Bonaventura was identified as Schelling in the lexicon of pseudonyms published in 1830 by Friedrich Rassmann. 
A copy of The Night Watches, signed by the author (Schelling), was allegedly to be found in Friedrich Schlegel’s 
library. More on this issue, see: Michel Herman’s introduction to Nachtwachen. Berlin 1905, p. XXXV-XXVI. To-
day, the authorship is attributed to August Klingemann; the researches refer to the manuscript discovered in Am-
sterdam in 1987.
56 The Theogony of Hesiod, trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White 1914. (Internet Sacred Text Archive.)
57 Ovid. Metamorphoses, trans. Sir Samuel Garth, John Dryden, et al. 1727. (Internet Classics Archive.)
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Schelling’s reasoning is as follows: Life is initially Madness. Insanity is not a disease 
in the ordinary sense of the word (i.e. not like flu that comes from outside and is something 
accidental). Insanity constitutes the dark Interior of Nature which (at best) can be hidden 
and subordinated to some higher Order. Madness is something necessary and its character is 
metaphysical. It points to the fundamental instability of local existence, das Daseyn, which 
first disintegrates into three principles, then curves and loops to become what Schelling calls 
the Wheel of Life, a nonsensical succession of the consecutive forms of reality, which con-
tradict and annihilate each other. This instability, however (and here a fundamental reversal 
should come about) points dialectically to something more which is over and above Nature.
Another form of Nothingness rises above that emotional welter: Divinity. It consti-
tutes the mysterious background of all that is taking place in Nature (Schelling follows 
here Jakob Böhme’s vision). Referring to it, Schelling repeats the ancient formulae 
of apophatic theology: Divinity is Being devoid of being, Supra-being, Supra-reality, 
Supra-existence. This Divinity – self-contained, devoid of being and existence – is the 
object of those archaic hungers, the first object of all desire. What yearns for something, 
claims Schelling, in fact wants to stop yearning. Every not-yet-being or half-being wants 
to become a nothingness of a higher order.
Many readers of The Ages of the World were misled by Schelling’s description of 
Nothingness and labeled him a Neo-Platonist. If this was the case, if Schelling was indeed 
a Neo-Platonist, then my theory that The Ages of the World represents the first attempt at 
inverting Platonism and transgressing metaphysics would obviously be false. But let us 
carefully examine to what extent Schelling makes use of that ancient model. First of all, 
he selects from it (and is infallible in his choice) that particular element which does not 
fit into what is commonly called the “metaphysics of presence”, i.e. the apophatic theol-
ogy of Dionysius the Areopagite. God is Nothingness. Second, Schelling modifies this 
model in a way that still reinforces and intensifies the nullity of this Nothing. According 
to Schelling, created reality is not an emanation of God’s Nothingness which (dialectically) 
turns out to be the Fullness of Being, a Surplus overflowing into the lower orders of being. 
In The Ages of the World, Nothingness, which is an absolute Identity (and therefore we 
cannot claim that it has being), is also a model for Nature rising from Chaos by her own 
efforts and achieving balance – an unapproachable model of stability. Nothingness thus 
interpreted is completely beyond all reality.
Bearing in mind this highest of all Nothingnesses, we can now change the order 
in which we have so far been reading the Weltalter. Until now, when talking about the 
original Chaos of Life, we were moving downward. Still, Schelling claims that when we 
reach the very bottom of Being and inquire about what is first and most primordial in 
this Chaos, the vertical order will reveal itself to us. On the one hand, there is the Abyss 
of the old mystics, God who is Nothingness and who is the primary object of all desire. 
On the other hand (we are dealing with a dialectical necessity here), there is the attract-
ing power which constitutes the first principle in Nature and which is a reverse Absolute. 
God’s Nothingness, again, is the absolute Identity, which is self-contained and devoid of 
all being, whereas the attracting power is its demonic caricature. It is a terrifying Power 
which opens up in the midst of Life, draws everything in, swallows everything, and then 
tightens – or wants to tighten – to a point where it becomes pure Identity.
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The Ages of the World, as we have already said, is a fable. Now we can follow its 
order and propose the following: in the beginning there are two Abysses, deeper even 
and vaster than the chaos of Nature. The idea originates in Böhme’s theosophy. After 
Jakob Böhme, Schelling calls them Abgrund and Ungrund. Abgrund is the attracting 
power, Nonbeing, the first principle of Nature. There is a word in the Polish language that 
seems to perfectly express Schelling’s thought. That word is czeluść, meaning “a cavity,” 
“a pit,” “the depths.” According to Andrzej Bańkowski’s etymological dictionary, it used 
to mean “jaw” in Old Polish. The source of the word is the Slavic čeljustъ “the moving 
lower jaw”. It appears in this meaning in The St. Florian Psalter 57:7 (as in the phrase: 
“the lions’ jaws”) and begins to be used as “abyss” only in the 19th century (as in Adam 
Mickiewicz’s ballad Świteź where it refers to “the unfathomable depths of a lake”)58. But 
going back to The Ages of the World: the first principle, Abgrund, is precisely the Polish 
czeluść, God-Nature’s lower jaw that grabs at everything and wants to swallow everything. 
Consequently, Sucht, the narcotic hunger, is an archaic desire that makes the jaw move.
The second of the Abysses, Ungrund, is the Nothingness of the old mystics. It is, 
again, the pure Identity that is self-contained and self-supporting. The word Ungrund 
consists of the prefix un-, meaning “un-” / “non-” or “-less”, and the root Grund, meaning 
“ground” or “cause.” What one should visualize then, is an abyss devoid of any basis, rising 
above Nature, the uplifted depths – if such a speculative image indeed can be visualized.
If we compare the descriptions of the two Abysses, it will become evident why The 
Ages of the World remained a fraction. The concept of God’s Nothingness seems somewhat 
bland and unconvincing, despite Schelling’s intention. Schelling was not a mystic but an 
intellectual. By reading voraciously he compensated for his lack of first-hand experience. 
Schelling learned about God’s Nothingness from books and transformed the knowledge 
into a dialectical construct. The concept of Nonbeing appears rather ominous against such 
a background. In his description of it, Schelling reaches new heights of both writing and 
metaphysical speculation, so that the reader has no doubt that the author actually sees what 
he is writing about and that he is writing about something that affects him directly. In 
this work the reader encounters the most interesting (from a philosophical point of view) 
concept of factual nonbeing; psychologically penetrating passages on narcotic hunger; 
and finally, some wonderful, poetic images of the depths of this world.
Still, in order to fully comprehend what happened between 1811 and 1820, we 
must consider the conceptual dynamics which drove Schelling to the edge of madness, 
and which makes – in his opinion – traditional metaphysics go beyond its form, with its 
concepts coming apart and developing into some monstrous new thing. Schelling is trying 
to invert Platonism. His effort, however, unlike that of Nietzsche, is pious. Schelling would 
like to understand the essence of God’s Freedom. We know from the Catechism that God 
is free. Freedom (and this we know from our own experience) is a choice between Yes 
and No. If God were mere Being (i.e. an eternal plenum of everything that is positive), 
then he would have no freedom. The logic of this reasoning seems irresistible. God also 
contains a negative element. If the world is God’s Revelation, this element constitutes the 
dark side of life, the horror of being itself, which we usually want to forget or turn away 
58 See: A. Bańkowski, Etymologiczny słownik języka polskiego. Vol. 1, p. 223.
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from. Rising from Chaos and positing himself in his Self, God is meant to overcome this 
horror – or at least this is what Schelling expects from God.
In order to describe this horror, Schelling introduces the concept of factual non-
being. Let us have a closer look at it. For Schelling, Non-being is the attracting power, 
the first principle of Nature, which finds expression in the phrase “something is a nonbe-
ing.” The horror of life consists in the fact that this force, which is a destructive one, at 
the same time posits every being in its ownness. Being exists due to the affirming power 
which strives towards expansion and consequently – towards dispersion and disintegra-
tion. Non-being, the centripetal power, sustains and gathers every self within itself. At the 
same time, however, this power does not allow it to settle down within itself. The drama 
experienced by every sentient being lies in the fact that what makes it itself, is also some 
foreign power, an inner abyss. This is precisely what might be called Unglück des Seyns, 
mahleur de l’Existence, “the unhappiness of Being.”59 (Were we to put the thought in 
vegetarian terms, it could be said that life is a slaughterhouse where eating and digesting 
are the condition of individual survival.)
We can finally comprehend the dynamics of inverted Platonism in the pages of the 
Weltalter. Schelling expresses his thoughts in a traditional language and – rather modestly 
– lays no claim towards originality (which might confuse the superficial reader). However, 
traditional metaphysics regarded being as a primary thing, and nonbeing – its absence, 
something which is secondary. Being was something positive and active. Nonbeing was its 
shadow. Schelling inverts this order by 180 degrees: Nonbeing turns out to be real to some 
extent. Let us repeat: “real” is that which works and involves some results. For Schelling, 
nonbeing is real, because it is active. This inversion of Platonism, however, turns – in the 
very next moment – into its deconstruction (against Schelling’s will), and a new form 
of existence emerges in the field of Schelling’s reflection: being mingled with nonbeing.
A visible sign of this deconstruction is the violation of narrative time in The Ages 
of the World. Schelling wished to return to the radical past, that which had already been 
overcome by God when he had risen from the Abyss. However, in its most illuminating 
passages The Ages of the World describes the world that we live in. It is a vision of our 
present existence. This is how Schelling’s narrative breaks away from the order of time. 
There in no line any longer, no past – present – future, that would confirm the sequence of 
the act of creation. Instead, there is psychotic repetition, a compulsive series: past – past 
– past. Schelling writes successive versions of the first book of the Weltalter, immersing 
himself in some appalling timelessness. This repetition is nonetheless a sign of Schelling’s 
struggle with an experience he cannot cope with.
So what exactly happened between 1811 and 1820? Let us relate it in the order of 
the fable. The Ages of the World is a fabulous journey into the Interior of Being. Schell-
ing wanted to descend to the bottom of Life from which God’s Consciousness struggles 
to rise – to follow Jakob Böhme once again. Yet it was precisely there, at the bottom of 
Life, that Schelling saw nonbeing as more real than being. Nonbeing, which no God is able 
to cope with, and which no God is able to overcome. What was meant to rise from it was 
the Self, a wonderful, organic synthesis of being and nonbeing. Meanwhile, Something 
59 Darstellung des Philosophischen Empirismus, X, p. 267.
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quite different appeared before Schelling’s eyes. Some terrible confusion whose nature (if 
indeed one can still speak of any nature) lies in deconstructing that older, metaphysical 
difference. Nonbeing which is not quite nonbeing (for it is not “lack”), and which is not 
being (for it is something negative), but which is at once both being and nonbeing (for it is 
an actual abyss). Emptiness as fullness. God turned upside down. Anti-being.
Thus read, the story brings to mind Nikolai Gogol’s experience. The two writers, 
Schelling and Gogol, have a lot in common. Both of them wanted to believe in Jesus Christ. 
And both had a profound awareness of the terror of life and the horror of being. Finally, 
both were fascinated with Dante and both wanted to write a book modeled on The Divine 
Comedy. Each of them, however, managed to write only its first part, that corresponding 
to the Inferno. Gogol wrote the Dead Souls. Schelling presented us with a small fraction 
of his Weltalter.
Schelling Works quoted after edition: F.W.J. Schellings sämtliche Werke. Hrsg. von 




THE QUESTION OF ETHICS  
IN THE THOUGHT OF HEI DEGGER  
AND GADAMER
THE PLACE OF ETHICS IN THE HERMENEUTIC TRADITION OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The question of the relationship between hermeneutics and ethics may be posed in various 
ways, with various possible answers. This is vividly demonstrated by a collection of essays 
entitled Hermeneutik als Ethik published a few years ago (2004) in which virtually every 
author articulates this relationship in a different way, examining it in various contexts.1 
In Polish criticism, this wide range of views on the issue is represented in Ethics in the 
Light of Hermeneutics by Andrzej Przyłębski (Przyłębski, 2010), an impressive attempt 
to capture the plurality of views which emerged within the hermeneutical tradition.
Such variety of opinions would not have been possible had the concept of her-
meneutics not undergone a profound transformation in the twentieth century. The main 
change was in the approach – hermeneutics was no longer seen solely as “the art of under-
standing” (Kunstlehre) and, at the same time, a universal method of interpreting human 
cultural products (W. Dilthey). It began to be treated as a separate philosophical discipline, 
the main task of which is to develop the pre-ontological structure of human understanding 
and to discover its relationship to “exegesis” (die Auslegung), or “interpreting.” Martin 
Hei degger made the first significant step in this direction in his Being and Time, arguing 
that the primary determinant of human behavior is Seinsverständnis, the understanding of 
Being, closely connected with its “exegesis.” What Hei degger had in mind, however, was 
not the combination of two originally separate processes, endowed with different proper-
ties, but an intertwining of two overlapping moments within the scope of understanding. 
The peculiarity of this intertwining is determined by the fact that any “understanding of 
Being” is from the very beginning accomplished as its “exegesis.” This approach implies 
that there is no such thing as “pure” understanding, following its own rules, on which 
a separate procedure of interpretation is superimposed, also governed by its own rules. 
Understanding is always a kind of interpretation, of one sort or another. In short, Hei-
degger’s “existential analytic” may be seen as a hermeneutics of Dasein, the purpose 
1 H.M. Schönherr-Mann, HRSG, Hermeneutik als Ethik. München 2004, p. 208
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which is to lay down the groundwork for the philosophical task proper, i.e. to develop 
a hermeneutics of Being which would attempt to grasp its “meaning.”
This approach implies that human understanding is not only – as assumed in the 
Cartesian tradition – one of the primary determinants of human existence, besides other 
properties such as feelings, moods, desires, etc., which are separate from it. Understanding 
as a mode of being embraces man as a whole, opening him to the world. One can even 
say that according to Hei degger man exists “hermeneutically” because all his moods, 
feelings and actions prompted by desires represent a specific “mode of being” and thus 
always already presuppose some kind of understanding of Being. They are in themselves 
also a particular “exegesis” of this understanding. Dilthey’s concept of hermeneutics as 
the methodology of human sciences appears therefore as the ontic derivative of man’s 
“hermeneutic” way of being.
Hei degger’s attitude towards Dilthey’s concept of hermeneutics and – indirectly – 
towards the entire contemporary hermeneutic tradition was later developed along similar 
lines by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer, also departing 
from the idea of hermeneutics as Kunstlehre, focused instead on expounding the phenom-
enon of the historicity of understanding. He pointed out that the constitutive elements of 
understanding as such are prejudice, tradition and authority, all of which were radically 
criticized within the rationalistic tradition of the Enlightenment.2 Although diverging in 
numerous instances from Hei degger’s “hermeneutics of Dasein” and its successor – “the 
hermeneutics of Being”, Gadamer shares with the author of Being and Time the conviction 
that all procedures of understanding and interpretation formed in the hermeneutic tradition 
are rooted in the historicity of the human way of being which is founded on the “under-
standing of Being”. From this conviction also springs hermeneutics’ claim to universality.
It is worth noting here that all the authors who developed their own hermeneutical 
approaches on the basis of Hei degger’s and Gadamer’s concept of the pre-ontological, tem-
porally historical dimension of human understanding, usually discarded the philosophical 
radicalism of this position.3 Thus, they either attempted to transform the traditional version 
of hermeneutics as Kunstlehre by opening it to the historical dimension of understand-
ing (Peter Szondi), or reformulated it in confrontation with other theories and methods 
of interpretation (Paul Ricoeur, Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas). Also, there appeared 
many “applications” of hermeneutics in such disciplines as literary theory (Hans Robert 
Jauß), the history of art (Gottfried Boehm) and theology (Rudolf Bultmann, Gerhard von 
Rad). In all of these theories, the problem of the relation between hermeneutics and eth-
ics either did not appear altogether, or was alluded to only indirectly and was understood 
very narrowly. For example, one of the questions was whether hermeneutical approaches 
to understanding and interpretation ensure an accurate reading of the meaning of a given 
work, and whether they can provide reliable criteria to assess that work’s value.
2 For a more detailed discussion of Gadamer’s views on this issue, see my book Granice rozumienia i interpreta-
cji. O hermeneutyce Hansa-Georga Gadamera. Cracow 2004.
3 Post-modern hermeneutics of Gianni Vattimo, emphasizing the anti-metaphysical edge of Hei degger’s and Ga-
damer’s hermeneutics, may be seen as an exception of a certain kind. Cf. G. Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihi-




One of the reasons behind such an approach was precisely the treatment of herme-
neutics as Kunstlehre. This meant, in practice, that the issues it dealt with were limited 
to questions concerned with developing appropriate techniques (methods) of understanding 
and interpretation in strict relation to the “subject field” of a given discipline. They were 
therefore mainly formal and technical issues, focusing on the problem of formulating 
appropriate rules of understanding and interpretation which would take into account the 
specific subject areas of a given discipline. In other words, it was a matter of creating rules 
that would enable an adequate identification of the research field of a given discipline and 
thus make it possible to properly interpret the meaning of the specific works constituting 
that field. Within the framework of this perspective, any ethical questions mattered only 
if they happened to influence, as a kind of side-effect, the process of solving the meth-
odological problems related to understanding and interpretation.
HEI DEGGER’S ETHICS OF BEING “CLAIMED BY BEING” AND HIS CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT 
OF “ETHICAL VALUES”
Hei degger’s and Gadamer’s views of the ethical issue are entirely different. Their premise 
of the close link between understanding and the historical dimension of human exist-
ence implies that the phenomenon of ethics (and related issues) is an immanent part of 
hermeneutics. In Hei degger’s thinking ethics is rooted in the way man as Dasein refers 
to Being, always understanding it in one way or another. Thus, one’s own way of being 
is closely connected to the question of “the meaning of Being.” In view of this, the exis-
tential analysis of Dasein’s way of being as presented in Being and Time constitutes – in 
essence – an ethics, since it elucidates the fact that Dasein is “concerned” about Being, 
unable to remain indifferent to the question of its “meaning.”4
This close relationship of the human way of being with the phenomenon of ethics 
will become fully explicit only after the so-called “turn” in Hei degger’s thought. At the 
same time it will imperceptibly gain a whole new meaning. In the works from this period, 
man’s ethical task in the face of “the truth of Being” as it is revealed to him consists in 
his being a shepherd responding to Being’s call, or in other words – in being “claimed by 
Being.” Thus formulated, “ethics” appears as the primary task facing man in his Being. 
Man must fulfill his destiny by resisting the many forms of “the oblivion of Being” oc-
curring in the modern world whenever Being – in one way or another – is appropriated.
For Gadamer, on the other hand, the ethical phenomenon is part of the practical 
aspect of human activity, always conducted in a particular historical situation character-
ized by specific determinants. Initially, therefore, it is indistinguishable from other factors 
determining these activities. At the same time, precisely because of the premise of the 
close connection between the ethical and the hermeneutic aspects, both Hei degger and 
Gadamer rarely speak directly about this relationship.
For Hei degger, there is yet another factor motivating his unwillingness to stress the 
strictly ethical dimension of Dasein’s way of being. I am referring to his critical attitude 
to ethics in the form in which it has developed as a distinct philosophical discipline with 
4 This is how we should understand Hei degger’s indignant reaction to the question asked by one of his students, 
“When will you write ethics?” to which Hei degger replied that Being and Time is an ethics.
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its own “subject field,” dealing with the specific issues which it considers ethical. Thus 
understood, ethics loses sight of the fundamental relationship between the phenomenon 
of ethics and the opening of the human Dasein to the truth (unhiddenness) of Being. It is 
only in view of this relationship – Hei degger believes – that Dasein can become “under-
standing.” But instead of making an effort to rethink this relationship, ethics obfuscates 
the phenomenon of ethicality with its artificial conceptual structures, assuming – for ex-
ample – the existence of distinct “ethical values” which it treats as self-evident entities. In 
general, thinking about being in terms of such or other “values” of which it is constituted 
implies alienation on the part of the thinker from the truth of Being. Therefore, a critique 
of this type of thinking has nothing to do with nihilism or relativism, but to the contrary 
– it establishes an ethos revealing itself in the experience of Being as unhiddenness:
To think against “values” is not to maintain that everything interpreted 
as “a value” –”culture,” “art,” “science,” “human dignity,” “world,” and 
“God” – is valueless. Rather, it is important finally to realize that precisely 
through the characterization of something as “a value” what is so valued is 
robbed of its worth. That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value 
what is valued is admitted only as an object for human estimation. But what 
a thing is in its being is not exhausted by its being an object, particularly 
when objectivity takes the form of value. Every valuing, even where it values 
positively, is a subjectivizing.
(Hei degger, 2008, 251)
If, however, the concept of “values” inflected in all possible ways in contemporary 
thought has undergone a peculiar fetishization, degrading everything “valuable” to the 
position of an object, then has it not become necessary to radically reformulate the status 
of everything ethical? Furthermore, taking into consideration this critical approach, is 
it still possible to treat ethics as it is treated today, namely – as a distinct philosophical 
discipline? But these are questions which go beyond the scope of this article. One way or 
another, only by taking into account the fact that Hei degger believed the phenomenon of 
ethicality to be rooted in the openness of man to the unhiddenness of Being, can we begin 
to understand his critical approach towards the concept of “ethical values”, central to the 
various contemporary theories of ethics.
According to Hei degger, such an approach – based on the assumption of the ex-
istence of some separate sphere in the realm of human relations, a sphere whose basis 
is fixed in itself – remains essentially alienated from the phenomenon of ethicality as it 
appears from the perspective of the unhiddenness of Being. Thus the belief that on the 
basis of this sphere one could derive some objective criteria for the assessment of what 
is good and evil is all the more unreasonable. The conviction that such criteria may exist 
is based on the assumption that either man himself has access to the essence of what is 
ethical (alternatively – that he is capable of somehow determining it), or that the ethical 
core resides in some higher authority (in God for example). In both cases, the result of this 
assumption is a kind of objectification of the phenomenon of the ethical, concealing the 
fact that it is embedded in man’s experience of the unhiddenness of Being. This leads to an 
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illegitimate absolutization of this phenomenon, that is – to the abovementioned treatment 
of the field of ethics as a sphere the sole justification of which lies in itself and which sets 
out the criteria for its own analysis and evaluation.
Therefore, says Hei degger, seeking to get at the root of the phenomenon of ethics 
as it is experienced from the perspective of man’s being as “understanding,” we must 
renounce the notion of “ethical values.” The notion of “ethical values” refers to nothing 
which exists in reality. It is merely an abstract conceptual formulation superimposed on 
the actual experience of the phenomenon of ethics. The emergence of this concept cor-
responds with the tendency characteristic of the modern metaphysical tradition and lately 
made more radical, i.e. the tendency to objectify all manifestations of Being in order 
to make them fully subordinate to the human subject which – modeled on the Cartesian 
cogito – “oversees” this process.
From this perspective, contemporary metaphysical theories of ethics, in which the 
notion of “ethical values” plays a key role, similarly attempt to take over and subdue the 
realm of the ethical, claiming it for absolute “objectification” (i.e. for a lucid and unam-
biguous conceptual examination of the sphere in order to arrive at “objective” criteria of 
good and evil). In doing so, however, they lose sight of the fundamental attribute of this 
phenomenon, namely – that it impossible to objectify and conceptually manipulate it in 
this manner.
Meanwhile, according to Hei degger, the ancient Greek writers and thinkers were 
able to get at the root of the ethical and describe it in a far more comprehensive way. One 
of these thinkers was Heraclitus:
Hλος means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in 
which the human being dwells. The open region of his abode allows what 
pertains to the essence of the human being, and what in thus arriving resides 
in nearness to him, to appear. The abode of the human being contains and 
preserves the advent of what belongs to the human being in his essence.
(Hei degger, 2008, 256)
These words reflect the very essence of Hei degger’s idea of ethics. We may consider 
as ethical such a form of dwelling on earth in which man claims the open space of being 
and thus makes his dwelling possible. Only then man, opening himself to that which “be-
longs to the human being in his essence,” claims his essence. Through this he is capable 
of responding to Being’s ultimate “ethical” calling, namely – to be claimed by man. At 
the same time, man claims himself, his innermost nature which is revealed in the simple 
dwelling within the open space of Being. This approach implies that “ethics” is not a mat-
ter shaped by man himself, but becomes feasible as such only from the perspective of his 
relation to Being. Ethics “besets” man the moment he responds to Being’s call, i.e. – the 
moment he claims Being. Man can exist “ethically” once he has learned to dwell on earth 
like a shepherd, concerned about claiming the truth of Being.
On the other hand, all “metaphysical” theories of ethics, in which the phenomenon 
of the ethical is objectified, inevitably lose sight of what is most essential about this phe-
nomenon: man’s openness to the truth of Being thanks to which he can fulfill his essence 
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by dwelling on earth. These theories – contrary to their universalist claims – are inherently 
“subjective” because they regard the ethos of Being in terms of “ethical values” and in the 
process they objectify it. It loses all its sublime “dignity,” is appropriated by the subject 
and becomes its function.
It is not difficult to identify Hei degger’s main antagonists in this dispute. Even 
though he does not write about it directly, clearly the main targets of his critique are the 
leading figures of twentieth-century phenomenology in whose work the notion of “ethical 
values” was the key term in any discussion of ethical issues – such figures as Edmund 
Husserl, Max Scheler and Roman Ingarden. These thinkers assumed that “ethical values” 
belong to the fundamental “givens” of human consciousness; that they are intuitively 
grasped and therefore are intersubjective in their essence. This in turn implied that they 
are rooted in the socio-cultural sphere (Lebenswelt), lending them a definite distinction 
in relation to other values. Thus, all these phenomenologists tacitly assumed that within 
the sphere of human consciousness a certain “essence” of all ethical values exists a priori, 
ideal in its nature and possible to identify in its general, universal significance.
From Hei degger’s point of view, however, all these phenomenological notions of the 
ethical are encumbered by the classical schemes of the metaphysical tradition, bent upon 
“objectifying” the various spheres of Being, and in this respect they do not substantially 
differ from the theory of ethics developed on the basis of German neo-Kantianism (Nicolai 
Hartmann) or the tradition of analytical philosophy. The only sensible alternative to this 
approach (which alienates the individual from the phenomenon of the ethical) is there-
fore – according to Hei degger – a persistent pondering of the roots of this phenomenon 
in the light of man’s “exposure” to the unhiddenness of Being, experienced by him in the 
“clearing,” in order to claim in thoughts and words the truth of Being thus revealed to him:
If the name “ethics,” in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ηθος, 
should now say that ethics ponders the abode of the human being, then that 
thinking which thinks the truth of being as the primordial element of the 
human being, as one who eksists, is in itself originary ethics.
(Hei degger, 2008, 258)
For Hei degger then, ethics is synonymous with human consideration of the “truth of 
Being” by which he claims it for himself. Thus understood, ethics is rooted deeper than any 
ontology. Ethics “besets” the moment he enters Being, and only through Being is it possible 
to think about existence, to differentiate it and to denote its constituent structures. Ethics 
experienced in this way is a power which seizes man and discloses before him the pos-
sibility of “dwelling” on earth, of inhabiting it in accordance with Being’s ultimate calling.
Hei degger’s critique of the metaphysical assumptions underlying the concept of 
ethical values and norms as it was employed within the phenomenological school creates 
a new foundation for ethics and in general lays bare the crucial weakness of all theories 
of ethics based on the concept of “ethical values.” It not only points to their dependence 
on conceptual schemes derived from the metaphysical tradition, but most importantly – it 
reveals their reductionist nature with regard to the phenomenon of ethics as it is primordi-
ally experienced in man’s opening to the unhiddenness of Being.
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The question remains, however, whether this kind of experience of the phenom-
enon of ethics is not perchance impeded by a certain absence. When Hei degger discusses 
man’s destiny to “claim” the “truth of Being” – and thus establish his own way of being 
as an ethics (or an ethos) – does he not overlook an important aspect of the phenomenon 
of ethics as it has been described by traditional philosophy?
I am talking here about the aspect almost entirely ignored by Hei degger: the sig-
nificance of human coexistence for the formation of ethics. While in Being and Time he 
argues that Being-with-others (Mitdasein) is an immanent element in the existential struc-
ture of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, he still does not develop further the implications of 
this statement, neither in this work nor in his later writings. He does not raise the question 
of the role this anterior Being-with-others in the world can play in grasping the nature of 
the circular relationship between Being and time. Also in his later works written after the 
war, when with increasing consistency Being is identified with language, the relationship 
between Dasein/man and others seems to be of secondary importance to the “truth” of 
Being / language itself. In any case, Hei degger does not explain what is the function of this 
Being-with-others within the structure of Being / language. All that seems to matter is the 
opening of man to the “truth of Being” itself, as well as his experience of its calling to be 
“claimed”. One can only assume that the “truth of Being” also somehow contains the rela-
tion to others, though Hei degger does not undertake any serious analysis of this relation.
We must seek the reasons for this approach in the origins of Hei degger’s philosophy. 
Having proposed that “the question of Being,” ignored by European metaphysics, should 
become the starting point of any consideration of particular entities, Hei degger naturally 
assigns a secondary ontological significance to the “intersubjective” dimension of the 
“truth of Being.” What is important from Hei degger’s perspective is the “truth of Being” 
as such, and not the fact that it already presupposes a relation to others. Even if this relation 
is inherently contained in this truth, it does not have a material impact on the way this truth 
experienced. An earnest reflection on the truth of Being does require the thinker to focus 
on this relation, but to experience that truth by allowing oneself to be spirited away by 
the circle of time and Being. And to express that experience in a semi-poetic language.
Also, from the point of view of Dasein’s way of Being, its Being-with-others is of 
secondary importance. This is clearly implied by the analytics of Being-towards-death, 
in which Dasein reaches the level of “authentic Being” (eigentliches Sein) through direct 
confrontation with the possibility of its own death, and not the death of others. It follows 
that the attainment of the fundamental existential structures that reveal to Dasein its way 
of Being is possible only as a result of this confrontation with the possibility of Dasein’s 
own death. At the same time, the death of others is merely a painful fact experienced by 
Dasein, which does not have any significance from the perspective of the constitution 
of its way of Being. Yet, it also means that Dasein’s “authentic” relation to others which 
results from this “critical” experience of the possibility of one’s own death is simply 
a consequence of this individual experience.
A similar situation appears when Dasein next raises the question of Being in the 
perspective of the temporality of its own existence, the true meaning of which lies in 
its historicity. Dasein’s “authentic” experience of this historicity as shared with others 
to whom it is now “authentically” directed, experiencing with them the “resoluteness” 
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of Being-towards-death, is also a simple consequence of the possibility of Dasein’s own 
individual death. In short, Dasein’s relation to others plays here a secondary ontological 
function compared to the significance attributed by Hei degger to Dasein’s existential 
experience which comes into being through its relation to itself, possible only in the per-
spective of Dasein’s relation to the truth of Being.
In the end, this experience turns out to be decisive when Hei degger later poses 
what he calls the “ascending” questions about Being. These questions place Dasein in 
the context of experiencing the “impossible possibility” of its own death, which opens it 
to “temporality” (historicity) as the ultimate “meaning” of its own existence, “drawing” 
– by its “resoluteness” – others with whom it is connected through a particular histori-
cal situation. Apart from the fact that in the historical context in which they were writ-
ten Hei degger’s words gain sinister overtones (the statement about the “resoluteness” of 
a generation willing to face its own Being-towards-death sounds quite ominous today), 
this approach stresses the “individualism” of Dasein’s questioning of Being and of expe-
riencing its “truth.”
What counts first and foremost in this perspective is the way the individual Dasein 
experiences and expresses in semi-poetic terms the “truth” of Being/language, “claiming” 
it for itself and others. Similarly, when in his late works Hei degger speaks of the “fourfold 
of Being,” one pole of which is represented by the Mortals and the other – by the Divini-
ties, these words merely imply the existence of an “intersubjective” dimension opened by 
Being/language. However, he says virtually nothing about the relationship which connects 
these Mortals both to other Mortals and to the Divinities within this “fourfold.”
This is presumably because such issues are to Hei degger’s mind of secondary 
importance (just as in Being and Time the hermeneutics of Dasein is secondary to the 
hermeneutics of Being which was supposed to grow out of it). The only thing that matters 
is the truth of Being/language that reveals itself in the “clearing,” while all relations to oth-
ers contained within it are mere contingencies (to say nothing of the ethical dimension 
inherent in these relations). A closer examination of this problem, however, is rendered 
almost impossible by the fact that the truth of Being/language must be proclaimed – as 
Hei degger insists – in a manner akin to poetry. After all, for Hei degger only language 
matters, the very fact of using it by the thinker to proclaim the “truth” of Being/language 
to Mortals and thus to claim it for himself and for others.
HEI DEGGER AND THE EXTERMINATION CAMPS
In the end, the most problematic point in Hei degger’s views on the phenomenon of ethics 
is precisely what is most crucial here: the identification of the ethos with a particular way 
of being human, in which man “claims” the truth of Being. Even if the phenomenon of the 
ethical thus formulated opens a whole new perspective of thought ignored in the context 
of the contemporary metaphysical tradition, building awareness of the threat posed by 
the modern man’s ill-conceived “essence” of technology, the fact that this view ignores 
the crucial significance that the relation to others has for this phenomenon, drastically 
narrows the consideration of all that is ethical. And this neglect which may even be called 
ignorance, may seem astonishing especially if we consider the way that the ethical issues 
are explored in the most recent philosophical tradition. However, in both the early and late 
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Hei degger’s works, one will not find even a sentence on the subject. It is as if something 
which to us seems quite obvious, bore no significance for him. Our astonishment grows 
the more when we read the following statement by Hei degger, in which he eloquently, 
brutally, and yet astutely speaks about the hundreds of thousands people dying in the 
extermination camps:
Do they die? They decease. They are eliminated. They become pieces of 
inventory in the warehouse of the fabrication of corpses. They are imper-
ceptibly liquidated in extermination camps... But to die (Sterben) means: 
to bear death in one’s own Being. To be able to die means: to be capable of 
this decisive bearing. And we are capable of it only if our Being is capable 
of the Being of death... Everywhere we face the immense misery of innu-
merable, atrocious deaths that have not died (ungestorbener Tode), and yet 
the essence of death is closed off to man.
(Hei degger, 1994, 56)5
Giorgio Agamben, from whose work the above citation is borrowed, points out 
that it does accurately capture the essence of the inhuman way of dying of the millions 
of people in the extermination camps, with “the dignity of death to be so negated for 
them” (Agamben, 1999, 74). At the same time, however, by reading it in the context of the 
distinction between “authentic” and “inauthentic” Being-towards-death which appears in 
Being and Time, he recognizes that when speaking of “inhuman” dying, Hei degger refers 
to the latter way of Being. And this makes Agamben pose the question of whether such 
an approach is justified and appropriate.
It seems, however, that such a reading by the author of Remnants of Auschwitz of 
the above citation is an interpretive misunderstanding. It is based on the fact that in Being 
and Time “inauthentic” Being-towards-death originates from Dasein’s failure to recognize 
death as the deepest possibility of its own Being, reducing it to an experience of anonymous 
death by strangers, to which it may remain indifferent. In other words, it concerns the 
common manner of referring to death, in which the individual tries to marginalize it in 
some way, to treat it merely as an event which concerns others. This approach has nothing 
to do with the way in which millions of people were dying in the extermination camps, 
from whom the “essence of death [was] closed off.” This seems to be yet another way of 
dying, which is not really dying, which would be something that Hei degger had not even 
remotely suspected when he wrote Being and Time. The radical distinction between this 
way of dying and Dasein’s “authentic” / “inauthentic” ways of Being-towards-death lies 
in the fact that – according to this author – it was the system itself that deprived people 
in the camps of the opportunity to “die,” turning it into a mechanical process of human 
elimination, the process of fabrication of corpses.
This statement, with all its brutality, cannot be denied a certain rather striking as-
tuteness, which is admitted in some measure by Agamben. Yet, the truly shocking aspect 
5 Translator’s note: the passage is taken from the English translation of Agamben’s book. One can also consult the 
English edition of Hei degger’s work containing the above passage, translated by Andrew J. Mitchell.
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of this statement which may be held against it, is decidedly not the issue suggested by 
the author of Homo sacer.6 The first shocking aspect is that, according to Hei degger, the 
“fabrication of corpses,” of people who were denied the proper death, is primarily a matter 
of workings of an anonymous system of destruction, the efficiency of which is guaranteed 
by the modern technology, enabling the construction of the “factories” of human death. 
This approach implies, that the heaviest burden of “blame” for this kind of factories lies 
in fact on the modern interpretation of Being, while those who were responsible for the 
appearance of these factories and “run” them were – like soulless cogs in the machine – 
merely the normal outcome, a consequence of this understanding. In other words, it is as 
if everything really happened here, in the space of Being, understood one way or another, 
while the question of responsibility of those who made use of it in a particular way, or 
of those who silently accepted this state of affairs, was quite of secondary importance in 
this perspective. Similarly, neither here nor in any other work does Hei degger mention 
anything about the fact that the unavoidable result of these “factories” was a formation 
of a pathological relationship between the “managers” and the victims, which amounted 
to the total annihilation of human relations in the form they usually take in the social 
sphere, including those that take place at the level of “Being-fallen.” It is as if this annihila-
tion was merely a simple consequence of the development of the contemporary “technical” 
interpretation of Being, the extreme form of “forgetting” the truth of Being. And as if 
it was not something that also took place in the sphere of human relations, representing 
a total obliteration of all forms of social consensus.
Secondly, Hei degger’s statement is shocking also because he seems to write about 
the death camps as if it was something that had no relation to him. As if the fact that in 
the thirties he has joined the party whose leaders made a peculiar “use” of the technical 
understanding of Being had not the slightest significance in this respect. As if it was merely 
a matter of the natural and inevitable consequence of the emergence of this interpreta-
tion, and the degeneration of human relations in the death camps was merely a result of 
its “application.” And nothing more.
The distaste that one feels while reading this statement, however, originates not in 
the fact that it is untrue or hypocritical. On the contrary, this statement with all its brutality 
in a strikingly perceptive way captures the inhuman nature of the process of dying in the 
camps, converging with Agamben’s main thesis in Remnants of Auschwitz. This distaste 
stems largely from the fact that the author of this statement acts as an external commentator 
of those events, as if they had not the least “personal” relevance for him. As if they were 
happening somewhere far away in Europe, while he, like a visitor from another planet, 
only dispassionately examined whatever he was observing.
We may imagine a similar situation, with an intellectual known as one of the 
leading ideologues of the Party in times of People’s Republic of Poland (deriving ben-
efits from his position), who would begin writing in the nineties penetrating critiques 
of that past era, examining in a brilliant analysis the various pathologies of social rela-
tions that emerged during the communist era. Pretending that he never participated in 
6 Translator’s note: for the English text of this work, see G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life, trans. Heller-Roazen. Stanford 1998.
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this process and was not – as the member of PZPR7 – in any way co-responsible for the 
excesses and – indirectly – for all the crimes related to the political tradition which was 
the origin of the Party.
This distaste is compounded by the fact that Hei degger never managed to make 
a thorough and truly honest account of his own Nazi past. Whenever he talked about it, he 
kept stressing that his role in the NSDAP was in fact marginal, and in the forties he was 
actually isolated and boycotted. Naturally, we may fancy that such statements stemmed 
from the simple bourgeois pettiness (surprising in the thinker of his rank) and his rather 
pathetic wish to “white-wash” his political role in the thirties. And even though there might 
be some truth to these speculations, it still seems that at least equally important reason of 
Hei degger’s silence about his own liability in consequence of his political activity in the 
thirties was the described above method of subordinating all issues related to the “inter-
subjectivity” to the contemplation of the “truth of Being.”
In short, we should seek for the origins of his silence not only in the purely 
subjective factors, pathetic and petty as they are, but also in the fundamental “post-
metaphysical” structure of his philosophical thought. It is based on the act of granting 
a fundamental primacy to the question of “the truth of Being,” which represents an 
existentially radicalized form of the question of entity particular for the Western meta-
physics, a primacy in relation to all ethical issues, which deem the issue of I’s relation 
to the Other crucial.
LÉVINAS AND GADAMER. TWO MODELS OF THE I –OTHER RELATION, CONSTITUTIVE  
FOR THE PHENOMENON OF THE ETHICAL
Emmanuel Lévinas pointed out this weakness in Hei degger’s approach, seeing in his 
neglect of the ethical issues the impact of European metaphysical tradition, in which the 
ontological questions were customarily given primacy over any questions related to eth-
ics. The author of Totality and Infinity also believes that the emphasis laid by Hei degger 
in his late works on language, considering it to be the seat of the truth of Being, has 
a special relevance here. Lévinas opposes this view with a statement that, for himself, 
“what is said matters less than the very fact of saying. The act of saying matters to me 
not so much because of its content, but because it is directed towards the other, a partner 
in communication” (Lévinas 1980, 28).
In Lévinas’s view, Hei degger’s focusing in his late works on “what is said” relates 
to what the latter considered to be a kind of “message” of the truth of Being, which man 
is to accept and claim in his own worldly Being. Lévinas suggests that, strictly speaking, 
this truth does not enjoy the status of an “information,” which could be communicated 
to man by Being. This would have presupposed a kind of objectifying distance between 
man and the truth of Being, while in fact, the truth of Being experienced by him in the 
clearing spirits him away, overwhelming him. It is something that imposes itself with the 
irresistible force as a kind of revelation and a message at once. That is why, – since in 
a sense it is a part of his being, of his own experience in the opening to the disclosedness 
(unhiddenness) of Being – it cannot by its very nature become “objectified” by man in 
7 Translator’s note: Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza – Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP).
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any way; it cannot be reduced to the status of an “information” communicated to man by 
Being. As a result, it also cannot be developed conceptually, as philosophers are in the 
habit of doing, but it may be expressed only in the semi-poetic manner.
However, even if we describe the status of Hei degger late semi-poetic “language” 
this way, Lévinas’s criticism still holds: the relation to the other, understood as the partner 
in communication, is entirely ignored by Hei degger. This does not mean that this relation 
is altogether absent here, but that it is assumed to be something obvious, and therefore 
irrelevant for the philosophical thought. Therefore, even if it does appear in some texts – 
for instance, in the form of conversation between a Japanese and an Inquirer, in the essay 
“A dialogue on language” – it appears in a strange and incomplete form (cf. Hei degger, 
1982, 1-56).
However, such an objection to Gadamer’s hermeneutical concept of language would 
be grossly inadequate. The latter clearly assumes that relation to the other, encountered as 
“Thou” is the constitutive element of every act of speaking. And even if that “Thou” is not 
a “live” interlocutor, but an “abstract” author of a text, which we read and which reaches 
us from tradition. As Gadamer writes, “For tradition is a genuine partner in dialogue, and 
we belong to it, as does the I with a Thou” (Gadamer, 2004, 352).
Thus, in the view of the author of Truth and Method, it is not the language of 
Being which overtakes and spirits away the questioning Dasein, demanding its attesta-
tion/claiming through its semi-poetic philosophical language that is man’s main point 
of reference. It is difficult to say of Being which is making itself known to man in such 
manner that it is his “partner” in conversation. The “place” out of which this silent 
“speaking” of Being resonates, contains – and Hei degger seems to tacitly accept this 
fact – something profoundly inhuman, at least in the sense that it is placed outside of 
any sphere in which any kind of “Thou” might speak. Moreover, this applies to “Thou” 
both mortal and divine. It is man / Dasein that may in some measure “domesticate” 
this “inhuman” speech in the language of philosophical metaphors, which resembles 
the speech of the Delphic priests, proclaiming some truth, and yet remaining ignorant 
of its origin.
According to Gadamer on the other hand, it is first and foremost tradition and its 
testimonials, created by man and reaching us from the past, that is our primary partner in 
“communication” about Being. And, it is peculiar partner, who speaks to us in an inaudible 
voice of the authors of the testimonials, whom we encounter as an anonymous “Thou.” This 
view implies that in our historical Being we are from the start implicated in the certain 
human-inhabited space of an “intersubjective” nature, in which we may recognize some 
others “addressing” us. And it is mostly in conversation with them, with what they have 
to say to us through their works, that we shape our self-knowledge.
Gadamer, however, also assumes that in every relation of I to Thou shaped this 
way, the primacy should be granted to what Thou says, that is, to the “object” expressed 
by it, while the purely personal dimension of this relation is of minor significance. 
Strictly speaking, this dimension is relevant only so far as it remains in close imma-
nent relationship with this “object.” This implies that access to Thou, a reference to it, 
is effected through the “object” it articulates. Finally, “Thou” speaking to us from the 
depths of tradition is relevant here only in so far as it utters something related in some 
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way to our self-knowledge. Its specific, individual features which define it as someone 
who is / was a particular person, or as someone who holds/held some specific opinions, 
in this perspective is completely irrelevant: “Rather, I maintain that the understanding 
of tradition does not take the traditionary text as an expression of another person’s life, 
but as meaning that is detached from the person who means it, from an I or a Thou” 
(Gadamer 2004, 352).
For Lévinas, such view of the I – Thou relation, subordinating its personal di-
mension to an “object” they “converse” about, is surely unacceptable. And this view in 
which the speech coming from the other / Thou, or addressed to the other / Thou, does 
not in fact matter in its personal dimension, neglects something very important, which is 
equivalent to the ethical dimension of the relationship. Of course, one may ask whether 
the difference between Lèvinas’s and Gadamer’s positions does not per chance lie in the 
fact that each of them, as a starting point, uses a completely different type of context in 
which the relation between I – Thou (other) is enmeshed. For the first of them, it is the 
context in which the I is related to an Other (Thou) as someone, to whom one must behave 
in a certain way. The I is then linked with an Other through the feeling of responsibility 
for one’s behavior, whatever it may be. In this case, what is being said by an Other, or 
what words are said by the I to an Other is virtually irrelevant. What matters is above 
all the way the I behaves towards an Other in a given situation, for instance, when it 
becomes dangerous for the I.
In the bond that is forged in such a situation between the I and an Other, its purely 
personal dimension gains importance. The I is related to an Other in all the concreteness 
of his individual being. As a result, one must meet the challenge contained in the “face” 
of an Other turned to one. Whereas in a situation which is the starting point for Gadamer, 
the Other is encountered as a co-interlocutor; and thus matters primarily because of what 
he is saying. This does not imply that here too we may not speak of any ethical dimension 
of the situation, but this dimension has an entirely different form than in the first case. 
This dimension is manifested primarily through the I taking a position appropriately 
open to something that is being said by the Other. Thus, the I allows the other to actually 
communicate something:
In human relations the important thing is, as we have seen, to experience 
the Thou truly as a Thou– i.e., not to overlook his claim but to let him really 
say something to us. Here is where openness belongs. But ultimately this 
openness does not exist only for the person who speaks; rather, anyone who 
listens is fundamentally open. Without such openness to one another there 
is no genuine human bond.
(Gadamer, 2004, 355)
The ethical dimension of this situation is rooted in an attitude of intellectual open-
ness to the words of the Other. Significantly, this attitude does not apply to the Other as 
a person, whom the I tries to understand in all the “subjectivity” of his being. It refers 
to what the Other says, and only in the light of this attitude the opening of the I to the 
entire personal dimension of the Other’s being becomes possible. The I should first want 
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to hear something from the Other “in general,” even if this would go beyond the scope 
of its self-knowledge. Only then can the I relate to the Other as a person just as openly.
If, however, the I even before joining the conversation with an Other, already considers it-
self better informed on the “object” that an Other is speaking about, is tantamount to a kind 
of obliteration of the Other as a partner in communication. The I’s attitude towards the 
Other is shaped by a belief that nothing essential can be learned from him. The unethical 
nature of such an attitude is manifested in the demotion of the Other’s meaning before it 
is even pronounced. In this clearly arrogant attitude, the I choses to cling tight to its own 
“prejudices,” not letting them be directly confronted with the “prejudices” motivating the 
speech of the Other.
Their conversation is unilaterally dominated by the scope of the prejudices defining 
the I’s self-knowledge. But what disappears entirely from the view of the speakers in such 
a conversation is not only the scope of the Other’s prejudices, ignored by the I, but even 
the most essential manner of referring to the “object” of their conversation, which figures 
as their joint participation in it (die Teilhabe). The way of reference, in which both equally 
belong to this “object” requires precisely a partnership, equality in their relationship 
to each other. And it is the I’s neglect of this crucial moment in its understanding relation 
to the object of the Other’s speech which makes the I unable to “hear” the Other – to open 
itself to his different opinions and to authentically confront them with its own “prejudices.”
According to Gadamer, this most essential way of relating the I to the “object,” in 
which the Other is being met in the light of their joint participation in it, was best mani-
fested during festivities in ancient Greece, when processions carrying figures of deities 
passed through the streets of the cities. In their presence, all the participants of the pro-
cession fell into a state of ecstasy, enjoying the feeling of joint participation in a common 
truth they shared with each other.
In his line of reasoning, Gadamer emphasizes the morphological form of the Ger-
man word Teilhabe and related words such as Teilnahme and Teilgabe. The pattern of 
semantic affinities between these three words in his view determines the singularity of 
the I – Thou relationship, which is established through their joint participation in logos. 
Teilhabe – the crucial element in that “trinity” – literally means participation as an act of 
taking part (Teilnahme) in something that was granted to all (Teilgabe) and which is shared 
between all as a gift of the holy truth, in which they partake together.8
Here it must be emphasized that this approach is clearly at odds with Hei degger’s 
understanding of the relationship between the “thinker” and the truth of Being/speech 
proclaiming itself to him and reproduced by him in the semi-poetic language. This ap-
proach implies a privileged position of the “thinker’s” I in relation to that truth compared 
with others, to whom he is supposed to announce it and for whom he is to “claim” it. Thus, 
in this case it is difficult to talk of his co-participation in the truth of Being on an equal 
basis with others, and of his sharing it with them in Gadamer’s sense. Furthermore, the 
8 I must refer here to the long conversation I have had with Gadamer at the end of the eighties. He tried to explain 
to me how crucial the relationship between Teilhabe, Teilnahme i Teilgabe is for his idea of ontology of logos itself, 
and how it in the most fundamental way defines the attitude of the speakers to the object they are speaking about.
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latter replaces the notion of the “truth of Being” with “truth” passed on to us by tradition. 
Tradition is the work of others and instead of making itself known out of the murky and 
inaccessible heights of Being, it “addresses” us just through its works.
Ultimately this approach assumes a very different understanding of the concept of 
ethos than that which motivates the author of the “Letter on ‘Humanism’.” For Gadamer, 
ethos is not synonymous with the appropriate “dwelling” of man on earth in accordance 
to the message of Being – thus, it is not originally positioned on the existentially-onto-
logical level. It is not about the proper “dwelling” of man on earth, whatever that word 
could mean. Ethos is primarily a participation along with others in the “object,” to which 
we are open by tradition and its works, and it is also the act of “sharing” it with others 
in conversation. This is a basic ethical requirement imposed on man in his Being-with 
alongside others by logos itself.
The I that adopts such “participating” position towards objects of others’ conver-
sation, opens itself to everything that is alien to it in their speech, allowing something 
to be communicated to it. Yet, it is not the I that consciously imposes this attitude on 
itself by force, as in: “And now try to forget for a moment about your preconceived ideas 
and try to be open to others, listening without prejudice to everything they have to say 
to you.” Apart from the fact that in this attitude there is something profoundly artificial 
and abstract, it contains a requirement virtually impossible to fulfill. Despite his best 
efforts man is never able to simply and absolutely, in a sense, against his own self, get 
rid of his prejudices. In addition, the prejudices that remain virtually inaccessible to him 
are precisely those that have the crucial significance for his understanding of the world, 
himself and others. They are rooted so deeply within him that he is practically oblivious 
to them, treating them as something self-evident and completely obvious. Thus, when he 
attempts to distance himself from these prejudices, his position may be compared to an 
attempt to pull oneself out of the mud by one’s ears.
According to Gadamer the premise of openness to the speech of others must be 
understood quite differently. It does not entail the need to give up all one’s prejudices, 
but merely a willingness to confront them directly with the prejudices of others. And as 
a result, accepting whatever in the prejudices of others gets through to one and where 
one recognizes some hitherto disregarded views, initially fundamentally alien to one’s 
self-understanding.
Such attitude to what others are saying is also naturally rooted in the “intersubjec-
tive” structure of logos mentioned above, which implies joint participation with others in 
the “object” that is being understood, as well as sharing of the object in the conversation. 
This attitude is not superimposed on top of the structure of logos as an ontically secondary 
appendix, but essentially grows out of it, merely enacting what the latter implies.
DIALOGICAL OPENING AND PARTICIPATION IN THE “OBJECT” ACCORDING TO GADAMER 
AND TISCHNER
This was the direction also taken by Józef Tischner in his reflections on the most essential 
dialogic nature of the human relationships ignored by the contemporary metaphysical 
tradition almost in its entirety. According to the author of Philosophy of Drama, any kind 
of human contact, any “meeting” shaped as a dialogue, presupposes some “background,” 
412013
THE QUESTION OF ETHICS IN THE THOUGHT OF HEI DEGGER AND GADAMER  
something shared, which “binds, exposing and imposing at the same time”9 (Tischner, 
2008, 13). Thus understood, the “background” creates a dialogical connection between 
people, relating them to each other in a specific way. And it is because of this bond that 
their “meeting” becomes at all possible. Now they may begin talking with one another, 
no matter if their words communicate some information or take the form of a dispute.
The dialogue’s “background” always possesses a certain structure, called “hierar-
chy” by Tischner. The “hierarchy” is constituted by the matters tacitly accepted by those 
who meet as something obvious, “the world of important and unimportant affairs, momen-
tous and trivial moments, sacred and profane times” (Tischner, 2008, 13). In Gadamer’s 
terms, this refers to the specific “prejudices” which the I shares with an Other (others), its 
partner in the dialogue, and which are rooted in a specific cultural tradition.10
For Tischner, just as for Gadamer, the opening to a “hierarchy” (prejudice) is a form of 
participation, as well as:
a dialogic opening in which the primary data is neither entity nor an object, 
but another person – thou, he, she, we, you, they. It is dialogue, rather than 
observation, that places us at the origins of the world’s hierarchy. Yet, it is 
not as someone looking into the water and seeing the reflection of things 
above and below, but as someone who enters the stream and lets himself 
be carried away by the current of the words spoken, questions asked and 
answers given, invitations, challenges, warnings and so forth.
(Tischner, 2006, 14)
According to Tischner, the I’s bold entry into the “stream” of dialogue represents 
the highest form of its “participation” in logos, in the act of sharing the truth with the 
Other, and it opens a field for understanding between them based on the common point of 
view, worked out by them. Thus, the dialogue is prerequisite for the emergence of the I’s 
identity, on the basis of which the I can at last comprehend itself to be a subject addressing 
some objects encountered out in the world.
9 Translator’s note: all citations from Tischner’s works are by the translator of the essay.
10 However, at this point there may be observed an important distinction between the views of Gadamer and 
Tischner. For the former, the openness to the “object” of conversation in itself is something that creates the bond 
between the speakers, while the level of their prejudices (“hierarchy”), i.e., the specific cultural understanding of 
this “object” is the level of differences which they introduce to the conversation. For Tischner, “the dialogue will 
be fruitful only if our hierarchies will be similar or will manage to become similar” (Tischner, 2008, 14). In other 
words, if for Gadamer the diversity of the prejudices (“hierarchies”) preconditions the fruitfulness of the dialogue, 
by virtue of which each of the speakers has a chance to transform and reevaluate the “hierarchy” that he has so far 
accepted (and thus, to open towards the prejudices of the other), for Tischner the initial similarity of the prejudices 
is the condition of such fruitfulness – at least to the extent of allowing the worlds of the speakers to “resemble each 
other” by the end of the conversation. Thus understood “assimilation”, differs from Gadamer’s figure of “fusion 
of horizons” which lays emphasis on the diversity and variety of prejudices as the most productive aspect in the 
process of understanding taking a form of conversation. According to Gadamer, the more the “hierarchies” of 
prejudices of the speakers differ from each other, the greater is the challenge for the I to understand the meaning of 
the Other. And thus, the greater is the chance of learning something from the other.
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At this point, however, we have to mention again the clear distinction between 
the respective positions of Gadamer and Tischner. The assumption of essentiality of the 
dialogic relation between people, indication of the need for an element of community in 
their vision of the world, necessary to bring about their meeting (despite all the important 
differences in their understanding of the nature of that community), and the idea of par-
ticipation in the truth of logos are shared by both authors. However, in Gadamer’s view, 
the “fused horizon” of self-understanding of the I does not necessary coincide with the 
“fused horizon” of the Other’s self-knowledge. In other words, the end result of a suc-
cessful dialogue is by no means a full concurrence between the subjective identity of the 
I and the Other, but merely their agreement about the “object” of their conversation, which 
still allows their views defined, for instance, by different cultural or religious traditions, 
to remain at variance with each other.
In addition, the very next moment, as a result of new developments, new readings, 
new experiences etc., by both of them, their consensus concerning the “object” may be-
come outdated, requiring yet another conversation about it. By constantly renewing itself, 
human understanding continuously departs from the previously possessed knowledge of 
the “object,” seeking to form new “fused horizons” of this understanding. In this perspec-
tive, the identity of the conscious subjects is not only a minor matter in their dialogical 
relationship, as Tischner claimed, but it is actually something entirely fictional. It is really 
something impossible to realize.
GADAMER AND ARISTOTLE. HERMENEUTIC MODEL OF “PRACTICAL ETHICS”
Paraphrasing Hei degger’d words on human “dwelling” on earth, one can state that for 
Gadamer, the way in which man participates with others in logos, sharing with them 
the truth which “addresses” him through the works of tradition, constitutes ethics. This 
approach implies that there is a profound analogy between the “openness” with which 
we relate to others on the level of our informal contacts, imposed on us by logos, and the 
way in which we encounter things communicated to us by various testimonies of the past. 
Of course, provided that the deep-rooted way of relating to these testimonies will not be 
overwritten by some kind of previously imposed “methodology,” set on various forms of 
objectification of their essential meaning.
To my knowledge, the author of Truth and Method has not written any text in 
which he would undertake an attempt to take a closer look at the assumed by him twist 
of the hermeneutic and the ethical. However, he has produced several works in which he 
seeks to reveal the ethical dimension in the “ontology” of the situation of understanding / 
interpretation of the tradition’s testimonials, arguing that it can be treated as a special 
application of Aristotle’s model of ethics as the “practical knowledge.”
And this is not all. He points to the fact that in the tradition of the eighteenth-
century an understanding of hermeneutics as Kunstlehre was already established, and it 
was not only modeled on the Greek techne, but also referred to the Aristotelian idea of 
“practical philosophy” (Gadamer, 2007, 251). This in turn implied that to be a good herme-
neutics practitioner, one not only needed to possess a purely technical ability to understand 
and interpret texts, but also to have an “understanding approach toward others” (Gadamer, 
2007, 259). To illustrate this view Gadamer cites Johann Peter Hebel, who in a letter 
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to a friend stated that the greatest feature of hermeneutics is an ability “to understand 
and humanely interpret human foibles.” (Gadamer, 2007, 232). According to Aristotle, 
ethics is “the practical knowledge” as determined by prohairesis, particular to man and 
alien to animal bios, that is, man’s ability to model his actions and choices on the basis of 
their “goodness” (which is not “learnable” as one may learn to make pottery). Similarly, 
hermeneutics is not limited to its application in life – in relation to the texts and to others – 
of the purely technical knowledge on the regulations of understanding and interpretation, 
but it also includes the knowledge gained through practical experience.
The above observation of Gadamer harmonizes with a number of his earlier re-
marks, made in other works, in which he refers to the key role of Aristotelian concept 
of “practical knowledge” as phronesis in the process of understanding, in the form it is 
applied in humanities. Thus, this would not be some abstract, detached from situational 
relevance, purely technical knowledge, but the knowledge that comes into force whenever 
it is required for the assessment of the particular context of the given situation.11 Relating 
this model of knowledge to a situation in which human action is ethical, one would have 
to say that the ethical dimension of this action is not construed solely through certain 
preconceived ethical standards and values, but also through the peculiar, singular nature 
of the situation, which confronts these norms and values. The “practical” nature of all 
ethical knowledge and actions is based on this.
This view implies that the concept of ethical standards and values perceived as 
ideal unchanging data of consciousness which can be intuitively identified, regardless of 
the specific context of human action, is a flawed conceptual construct, which does not al-
low one to properly take into account the full ethical dimension of a given situation. The 
primary determinant of the phenomenon of the ethical is the fact that in its deepest form it 
is inextricably bound to the specific situation of action. In this sense, it is the organic part 
of phronesis and may only become a self-contained object of knowledge (i.e. ethics in the 
classical sense) when it is artificially separated from it. And since phronesis as practical 
knowledge according to Gadamer is identical with the intrinsic way understanding occurs, 
in relation to which all its other forms – such as mathematical or scientific understand-
ing – derive from it, this approach implies fundamental, close connection between the 
hermeneutical and the ethical elements. The ethical is already present in phronesis as 
a kind of a priori sensitivity of the acting man to the good and evil. However, whether his 
action can be considered “good” is primarily determined by the way he reacts to a given 
situation, i.e. whether we can call his behavior ethical or not. As a result, as Karl Ineichen 
points out,12 the ethical consciousness pertaining to a particular situation replaces for 
Gadamer the fixed rules and standards.
In our search for the predecessors of the relationship between the hermeneutic 
“practical knowledge” rooted in human self-understanding and the phenomenon of the 
ethical (that is – a sensitivity to the concepts of good and evil), we can descend even 
11 I have written more extensively on the subject of importance of the model of knowledge as phronesis in Gada-
mer’s perception of philosophical hermeneutics in: Granice rozumienia i interpretacji. O hermeneutyce Hansa-
-Georga Gadamera, Cracow 2004.
12 K. Ineichen, Hermeneutik und Inferentialismus, in: Ethik im Lichte der Hermeneutik, ed. A. Przyłębski. Würz-
burg 2010, p. 141-148.
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deeper into the past and point to Socrates’s view of the ethical. One of the fundamental 
assumptions of his philosophical thought was, after all, the belief that the “goodness” 
of life of every individual should be organically connected with his perceptions of good 
and evil. These perceptions should find ample fulfillment in his life, where he is obliged 
to constantly confirm them in each particular situation.
Only in the light of that assumption the famous Socratic formula of ethics, identify-
ing goodness with knowledge and evil with ignorance, becomes fully comprehensible. The 
profound meaning of this formula is not simply a conviction that knowledge of goodness 
in itself induces a person to do “good.” This formula also assumes, that the knowledge of 
what is right is not something given once and for all and self-evident. On the contrary, it 
must be acquired continuously and attested anew, through persistent inquiry into the nature 
of goodness and man’s endorsement of it in his works. Thus, man not only comes closer 
to the true understanding of that which is good, but also is able to better apply it in his life.
If we assume such understanding of the ethics, it becomes difficult to justify the 
ethics in the form it has taken as a separate philosophical discipline, claiming to be appli-
cable to a distinctly specific “subject field.” Thus, all the efforts of the philosophers who, 
embarking from this premise, attempt to formulate a theoretical ontological foundation 
of all ethical standards, on the assumption of their “timelessness,” in an attempt to codify 
these norms, – all these endeavors appear to be limited, to say the least. They do not take 
into account precisely the “practical” nature of the ethical, which is confirmed and gains 
explicit meaning only in the specific practical situation.
The formal ethics of Kant is characterized by a similar reductionism – as Gadamer 
writes, the solution of the question of the moral sense that it proposes is highly unsatis-
factory.13 This is vividly expressed in Kant’s distortion of the Christian commandment 
of love, which is treated as a practical obligation to accomplish good deeds. Meanwhile, 
“love, even viewed in moral terms, is something nobler than the charitable acts that duty 
requires” (Gadamer, 2007, 283).
However, limitations also characterize the material ethics of Max Scheler and 
Nicolai Hartmann, built in opposition to Kant, which create an a priori system of values 
based on the immediate consciousness of the values. This approach assumes that the world 
phenomena that press upon man somehow contain “ethical values” which may be easily 
isolated and identified, timeless and ideal in nature, subject to the general laws which 
are essential and exist a priori. The assumption inherent in this kind of ethics that in its 
conduct it must endlessly engage and elucidate intricate connections between the various 
values – which implies endless advancement and perfection of the ethical consciousness 
– is inconsistent with the above-mentioned presumption of the a priori nature of these 
values: “an ethics of value expressly includes the concept of ethos and the changing forms 
it takes, however, it cannot escape the inherent consequence of its methodological claim 
to intuit a priori systems of value” (Gadamer, 2007, 283).
13 Here my reading of Gadamer’s attitude to Kant’s ethics differs from the views expressed by Andrzej Przyłębski, 
who does not consider this attitude as critical at all. Of course, it is undeniable that Gadamer sees in Kant’s ethics 
various interesting elements, which do not correspond with its formalism. Yet, I believe that the author of Critique 
of Pure Reason is Gadamer’s main antagonist in his reflections on the issue of ethics. Cf. A. Przyłębski, Etyka w 
świetle... op. cit., p. 129.
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Therefore, by assuming that it is possible to “progress” in elucidation of the a priori 
nature of the ethical values, these ethics contradict the initial assumption of the aprioricity 
– that is, the immutability – of that nature. In their view, a priori meaning of the ethical 
values may vary depending on the progressive analysis, because under its influence the 
ethical consciousness itself changes. Meanwhile, according to Gadamer, the ethical phe-
nomenon due to its close relationship with a particular practical situation, has a historical 
quality. It corresponds to the historicity of the human way of Being, therefore any attempt 
to formulate fixed ethical norms and a priori values with a universal status simply ignores 
this initial situation. This aporeia may be avoided only by a concept of ethics which rejects 
such way of proceeding and has a quality of “practical knowledge.”
By abandoning the idea of “ethical values” granted a priori, such ethics assumes 
a circularity of the relationship between ethical consciousness and socio-cultural situation 
which has formed this consciousness. Thus, the ethics has a historical quality, since it is 
determined by the circle of mutual implication between the notions of good and morality 
formed in the cultural tradition of a given community and personal sensitivity of man 
to what is good and decent in life. Gadamer believes that the prototype for the construc-
tion of such model of ethics may be found in the notion of ethos proposed by Aristotle, 
without any a priori concept of value, placing the main emphasis instead on such notions 
as “virtue” and “good.” These concepts, inherited through the cultural traditions and 
instilled in each person by the environment, make up the particular “ethos” that is the 
basis of one’s actions:
The concept of ethos with which he began makes precisely this explicit: 
“virtue” does not consist merely in knowledge, for the possibility of know-
ing depends, to the contrary, on what a person is like, and the being of each 
one is formed beforehand through his or her education and way of life.
(Gadamer, 2007, 284)
In the case of ethical actions, no knowledge about goodness may exist detached 
from one’s upbringing – it is decisively defined by it. This is why Aristotelian concept 
of ethos is more acceptable then the concepts of timeless ethical values created by the 
various theories of the twentieth century ethics. This is because it takes into account 
the “upbringing” of an individual accomplished within the scope of historical tradition, 
when a particular social environment instills in one “prejudices” about the good and evil. 
Compared to this approach, the weakness of the ethics implying a priori nature of ethical 
values and standards lies in the fact that in their ideal generality these concepts have been 
artificially abstracted from the particular historical relationship in which ideas of good 
and evil normally function. Whereas, the Aristotelian concept of ethos implies a kind of 
universality which makes space for such relation, since it is, in a sense, its product. It is 
a universality that is not the product of the theoretical mind, but a sediment of the ancient 
historical experience of a given community, which remains closely connected with the 
tradition which determines it.
The “superiority” of Aristotle’s ethics over a number of nineteenth-century con-
ceptions of ethics, in Gadamer’s view, is based on this fact, whether maintained in the 
46 2013
PAWEł DyBEl
spirit of Kant, or Scheler, or Hartmann. A common feature of the latter ideas – maintained 
despite the profound differences between them – is their disregard of the role of the un-
derstanding of ethos, specific to Aristotle, for the ethical phenomenon. The peculiarity 
of this concept is determined by the fact that for Aristotle it remains closely connected 
with the concept of phronesis:
His [Aristotle’s] analysis of phronesis recognizes that moral knowledge is 
a way of moral being itself, which therefore cannot be prescinded from the 
whole concretion of what he calls ethos. Moral knowledge discerns what 
needs to be done, what a situation requires; and it discerns what is doable 
on the basis of a conviction that the concrete situation is related to what is 
considered right and proper in general.
(Gadamer, 2007, 284)
The advantage of such a “universality” of ethos is its greater “flexibility” and 
openness in facing the specific situation to which it must “relate.” The ethos is substanti-
ated in society only when it accommodates the specific peculiar quality of this situation 
as historically determined. This in turn implies that all particular elements that make 
up this dimension are equally constitutive for the ethical. And ultimately it is these two 
“qualitatively” different moments that constitute the specific model of phronesis: “Moral 
knowledge does not climax in courage, justice, and so on, but rather in the concrete ap-
plication that determines in the light of such knowledge what should be done here and 
now” (Gadamer, 2007, 285).
If, however, Gadamer is just as critical as Hei degger of any attempt to build eth-
ics on the notion of universally valid standards and ethical values, discovered in all their 
ideal alikeness by the philosophical mind through rigorous analysis, at the same time his 
critique is based on a very different kind of argumentation than used by the author of the 
“Letter on ‘Humanism’.” According to the latter, such version of the ethical phenomenon 
was a manifestation of a tendency to objectify Being, characterizing the modern and 
contemporary man. However, in Gadamer’s eyes, this takes place due to a departure from 
the model of knowledge as phronesis, in favor of considering all ethical issues within the 
model of theoretical knowledge. Such “theoretical” approach to ethics is, in his view, not 
only particular to post-ancient times and later periods. It was present already in Plato, who 
– like Kant later – emphasized the authoritarian nature of moral law (“ideas”), imposed 
on the subject with intolerant ruthlessness.
As a result, Gadamer replaces Hei degger’s rather awkward argumentation with 
considerations in which the question of the metaphysical foundation of the “ethical values” 
is not seen within the scheme of sharp dichotomy where one binary consists of meta-
physical concepts of ethics formulated from the perspective of “oblivion of being” and 
the second binary is represented by “ethics” contained in the very contemplation of the 
truth of Being which requires man to properly “dwell” on the earth and testify its truth 
in the semi-poetic words.
Instead, the author of Truth and Method indicates various tensions and divergences 
between the most significant concepts of ethics in the metaphysical tradition, some of 
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which are closer to Aristotle’s model of knowledge as phronesis, while others are nearer 
Plato’s and Kant’s models, albeit considerably reformulating them (e.g. ethics grown out 
of phenomenology and neo-Kantianism). Curiously, Gadamer does not consider these 
models to be mutually exclusive, but sees them as even complementary in some measure.
At the same time, he is clearly much closer to the first model which captures the 
abovementioned doubly circular structure of the ethical phenomenon. In this phenomenon 
on the one hand, “universality” of moral judgments is inseparable from the historical rela-
tion which shaped it (upbringing, tradition), on the other hand it is predetermined to take 
account of the actual circumstances of action. Therefore the motive of an ethical action 
cannot be formulated in advance as some commandment or a standard of behavior with 
discernible “content,” but has a form of a “general” reference point, open to all kinds of 
concretizations:
That which we consider right, which we affirm or reject, follows from our 
general ideas about what is good and right. It achieves its real determinacy, 
nevertheless, only from the concrete reality of the case. This is not a case of 
applying a universal rule. Just the opposite: it is the real thing we are con-
cerned with, and for this the generic forms of the virtues and the structure 
of the “mean” that Aristotle points out in them offer only a vague schema.
(Gadamer, 2007, 285)
This “vague schema,” which determines ethical action is precisely the “general-
ity” mentioned above, impossible to be conceptually identified because of its very nature. 
However, this vagueness or openness allows it to be “relevant” for the concrete situation 
of action (which confirms it in a way), through which it receives finally its particular 
meaning. This meaning becomes a peculiar “synthesis” of the “vaguely” general and the 
particularly defining for a given situation.
Interestingly, this openness or “vagueness” of “universality,” which navigates each 
ethical act, in Gadamer’s view eliminates any difference between the philosopher contem-
plating the ethical phenomenon and the ordinary mortals, who attempt to navigate their 
actions in accordance with ideas of “virtuous” life acquired through education. In this 
aspect as well the approach of the author of Truth and Method to the ethical phenomenon 
considerably diverges from Hei deggerian idea:
Thus it is phronesis – the virtue enabling one to hit upon the mean and 
achieve the concretization – which shows that something can be done, not 
some faculty special to philosophers. On the contrary, those who deliber-
ate on what is good and right in general see themselves as referring to this 
practical logos just like everyone else who has to put their ideas of what is 
good and right into action.
(Gadamer, 2007, 285-286)
Thus, it is not the glorious truth of Being/language revealed to the solitary thinker 
wandering through the paths of Black Forest, but a “practical logos” shared with others 
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that designates the horizon of the ethical phenomenon. This logos in itself is nothing 
extraordinary, but it is something experienced daily and certified through acts of life:
[Ethics] is not at all a knowing in general, a knowing at a distance, which 
would in fact conceal what the concrete situation calls for, like the priest and 
the Levite’s sense of fidelity to the law by contrast to the Good Samaritan’s. 
The universal, the generic, that can be expressed only in a philosophical 
inquiry dedicated to conceptual universality is in fact not essentially dif-
ferent from what guides the usual, completely untheoretical sense of norms 
present in every deliberation on moral practice.
(Gadamer, 2007, 287)
Some may consider Gadamer’s argument in which he blurs the line between ethics 
as a kind of theoretical knowledge, achieved through reflection and analysis of the various 
real-life situations, and the ethical phenomenon as it manifests itself in these situations, 
a scandalous premise. However, it simply represents the hermeneutic development of 
the various implications inherent in Aristotle’s ethics, which was based on the model of 
phronesis. Therefore, its “archetype” appeared at the very roots of European metaphysical 
tradition, even though the approach to ethical issue implicit in it has since been almost 
entirely ignored.
HERMENEUTIC ETHICS AND A SITUATION OF ETHICAL ACTION
This model of ethics, departing from Platonic belief in the authoritarian ideas irresistibly 
imposing themselves on man in their “pure” idealized form, may be called, paraphrasing 
Vattimo’s famous definition, “weak” ethics. Instead of relying on the assumption of a ver-
tical relationship between the ethical world of human activities and ideas that determine 
them (“categorical imperatives,” “values,” “standards,” etc.) which may be identified in 
idealized form, this version of ethics places these “ideas” alongside the human activities 
taking place in a specific cultural and social context. As a result, it resolves that in a practi-
cal situation of action they are just as accessible to philosophers professionally dealing with 
the problem of ethics, as to the little ones often entirely ignorant of ethics thus understood.14
Another important feature of this “weak” ethics is the fact that it resists easy ab-
straction of the ethical phenomenon out of the particular situation of human action, consist-
ing of various components. Naturally a whole range of questions arise with regard to this 
perspective of the ethical phenomenon, which must remain outside the framework of the 
present paper. Therefore, in conclusion of this inquiry I would like to merely indicate the 
astonishing parallelism apparent in Gadamer’s texts between the way in which he treats 
the issue of ethics and his diagnosis of the condition of understanding and interpretation 
of cultural products brought to us by tradition. His use of this analogy is justified by the 
acknowledgement that in both cases the model that best describes the relation between 
14 It is not accidental that Gadamer in the essay cited above criticizes Max Scheler, who, answering a question of 
how he manages to reconcile the lofty ethical slogans with his behavior towards the wives of his colleagues, famo-
usly said that the road sign does not need to go in the direction it indicates.
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particular elements constructing the condition of understanding and interpretation is the 
Aristotelian phronesis. Interpreter’s exigency to make sense of the meaning of cultural 
products passed on by tradition, the strangeness of which he must overcome, is constructed 
in a way similar to the exigency of an individual to make sense of ethical requirements of 
a given situation, when he acts in his specific situation. In this sense, a situation that would 
be typical for a hermeneutic scholar making an attempt to answer in his own interpretation 
questions posted by the testimonials of tradition, has something of a “practical” nature of 
the ethical phenomenon as formulated by the author of Nicomachean Ethics. Thus, accord-
ing to Gadamer, this approach, by virtue of being essentially a response to the question of 
possibility of moral philosophy, applies equally to the key issues faced by hermeneutics. 
To this question he answered that ethics as it is practiced by philosophers
is only a theoretical enterprise, and that anything said by way of a theoretic 
description of the forms of right living can be at best of little help when it 
comes to the concrete application to the human experience of life. And yet 
the universal desire to know does not break off at the point where concrete 
practical discernment is the decisive issue. The connection between the 
universal desire to know and concrete practical discernment is a recipro-
cal one. So it appears to me that heightened theoretic awareness about the 
experience of understanding and the practice of understanding, like philo-
sophical hermeneutics and one’s own self-understanding, are inseparable.
(Gadamer, 2004, 245)
However, the problem is that this “structural” analogy between the typical pro-
cedure of hermeneutic condition of understanding and interpretation of the testimonials 
of the past and the situation of ethical action remains... just that – an analogy. So even if 
the conclusion that the first situation always immanently includes the ethical dimension 
is justified, it does not follow that this dimension is constituted in the same manner as in 
the case of ethical action, in which the main point of reference is benefit of the Other. In 
other words, even if my method of understanding of a cultural product, consistent with the 
requirement of interpretative adequacy imposed on me by the model of phronesis (i.e., the 
requirement of relating to the meaning of this product addressing me), contains a specific 
ethical postulate, it has an entirely different weight and scale compared with the situation 
of my action towards the other, in which his good is at stake.
In the latter case, I must, firstly, conform to certain ethical “universality” shaped by 
tradition, and, secondly, relate in my action to the “living” other, and not to the “virtual” 
author of a text. This gives special ethical importance to my proceedings, substantially 
different compared to a situation when the ethical postulate is strictly limited to the realm 
of hermeneutic understanding and interpretation of what is said by the other. Of course, 
this does not mean that between the two attitudes there are no correlations (for instance, 
the way in which I relate to the meaning of the other’s statement may naturally affect my 
behavior towards him in a particular situation). However, in this case as well these two 
aspects of the ethical phenomenon should be clearly distinguished from each other; that 
is, the strictly hermeneutic aspect related to the condition of understanding of the Other, 
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and the existentially-individual aspect, connected with a particular behavior towards him. 
And if so, the ethical dimension included (undeniably) in the hermeneutic understanding 
of the testimonials of tradition cannot be equated with “weak” ethics of Aristotle’s brand, 
based on knowledge as phronesis. It is, at best, only its very approximate paraphrase.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agamben Giorgio, Remnants of Auschwitz: The witness and the archive. Trans. D. Heller-
Roazen. New York: Zone Books, 1999.
Dybel Paweł, Granice rozumienia i interpretacji. O hermeneutyce Hansa-Georga Gada-
mera, [The Limits of Understanding and Interpretation. On Hermeneutics of 
Hans-George Gadamer]. Cracow: Universitas, 2004.
Gadamer Hans-Georg, The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the Later Writings. Jean 
Grondin, Richard Palmer (eds.). Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2007.
Gadamer Hans-Georg, Truth and Method. 2nd edition. Transl. J. Weinsheimer and 
D. G. Marshall. London, New York: Continuum, 2004.
Hei degger Martin, “Letter on ‘Humanism’” in: Basic Writings: Martin Hei degger. 
D. F. Krell, T. Carman (eds.). New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2008.
Hei degger Martin, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic 
Principles of Thinking (Studies in Continental Thought). Trans. Andrew J. Mitchell, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2012.
Hei degger Martin, Bremer und Freiburger Vortraege, in: Gesamtausgabe, vol. 79. Frank-
furt am Mein: Klostermann, 1994.
Hei degger Martin, On the Way To Language. Trans. Peter D. Herz. San Francisco: Harper 
and Row, 1982.
Ineichen Karl, “Hermeneutik und Inferentialismus“ in: Ethik im Lichte der Hermeneutik, 
Andrzej Przyłębski (ed.). Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2010, p. 141-148.
Lèvinas Emmanuel, Éthique et Infini, Dialogues avec Philippe Nemo. Paris: Fayard, 1982.
Lèvinas Emmanuel, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. 
Dorderecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
Przyłębski Andrzej, Etyka w świetle hermeneutyki [Ethics in the light of hermeneutics]. 
Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 2010.
Schönherr-Mann Hans-Martin, HRSG., Hermeneutik als Ethik. München: Wilhelm Fink 
Verlag, 2004.
Vattimo Gianni, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-modern Cul-
ture. Trans. John R. Snyder. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.
512013
Piotr Augustyniak
“THEOLOGIA GERMANICA” AS 
A CRITIQUE OF THE MODERN 
LIFESTYLE
The subject of this article is Theologia Germanica1, an anonymous mystic treatise of 
extraordinary depth and great importance for the development of the German intellectual 
tradition. The treatise’s argument leads towards two basic conclusions. The first is that 
the recognition of individual human identity as a separate, autonomous, finite being – de-
scribed as the Self or the Me which illegitimately appropriates and spans all – is false and 
synonymous with sin. The second conclusion contrasts this representation with a vision of 
personality rooted in divine being [wesen] (unified, infinite being).2 However, the present 
discussion will not be dealing with these issues, but it will rather focus on what follows 
and becomes apparent from the subsequent part of the treatise. There we find something 
that is the true subject of my interest: a radical critique of a way of life that may be called 
liberal or individualistic and that clearly looks forward to what will become the hallmark 
of the modern self-understanding of the human subject.
The focus of this discussion will therefore be Theologia Germanica seen as one 
of the sources of the modern critique of consumer society centered on self-fulfillment. 
Moreover, I intend to demonstrate that the treatise in no way anticipates the anti-modern 
attitude, but rather it is seeking for an alternative formula for the budding self-awareness 
of the modern subject emerging out of the limitations of the feudal world. This means 
that Theologia Germanica, if I may venture to say so, both criticizes modernity and is 
at the vanguard of modern theory, in a fashion quite characteristic of the German philo-
sophical tradition.
This individualistic, proto-modern way of being is described in Theologia Ger-
manica as a careless dwelling in earthly temporality, characteristic of the adherents of 
a false ontology which believes in multiple autonomous, separate beings. “A life of care-
lessness and freedom is to nature and the Self and the Me, the sweetest and pleasantest 
1 All citations from Theologia Germanica refer to the following edition: Theologia Germanica, Golden Treasury 
Series, ed. D.Peiffer, trans. S. Winkworth, Grand Rapids 1996. The citations will indicate the chapter number in 
this edition.
2 I explain this in more detail in my book: P. Augustyniak, Istnienie jest Bogiem, ja jest grzechem. Theologia 




life.”3 This carefree way of life derives from human complacency, not to say – narcissism. 
It relates to those who consider themselves spiritually accomplished which makes them 
light-hearted and carefree (they uncritically affirm and adore themselves and the world 
in which they are settled so comfortably): “Behold! now it is reported there be some who 
vainly think and say that they are so wholly dead to self and quit of it, as to have reached 
and abide in a state where they suffer nothing and are moved by nothing, (...) thus they 
profess to continue always in an even temper of mind, so that nothing cometh amiss 
to them.”4 As a result, these people take credit for any good that they help to bring about, 
at the same time considering any evil to be alien to themselves, excluding the possibility 
that they may be the cause of it. Therefore, we are dealing here with a type of man who 
“will excuse himself for sin, by refusing to take what is evil unto himself, and laying the 
guilt thereof upon the Evil Spirit.”5 People of this sort believe that even if they still lack 
something in terms of their own perfection, they are nevertheless capable of eventually 
achieving it due to their own efforts, that is – due to their talents and curiosity, or more 
precisely: “by much questioning, or by hearsay, or by reading and study, nor yet by high 
skill and great learning”.6
The author of Theologia Germanica is describing the type of man who “clingeth 
(...) above all to himself, and holdeth converse with [himself],” and therefore “is deceived 
and blinded” because he “perceiveth what is good no further than as it is most convenient 
and pleasant to himself and profitable to his own ends.”7 Every exhortation to rise above 
himself, just as Christ has risen above the vision of the Self, makes such a man feel “a hor-
ror” and therefore he “thinketh it evil.”8 In short, such a person wants to make his / her 
life “comfortable and pleasant (...) and taketh enjoyment in [itself] and [its] own powers, 
and looketh only to [its] own peace and comfort and the like.”9 At the same time such 
a man is convinced of his divine status. “Yea, now I am above all other men, and know 
and understand more than any one in the world; therefore it is certainly just and reason-
able that I should be the lord and commander of all creatures, and that all creatures, and 
especially all men, should serve me and be subject unto me.”10
To demonstrate to what extent this image of a carefree and liberal life anticipates 
the critique of the modern society of self-fulfillment and consumerism, we need to go 
no further than compare it with the assessment of this society by Friedrich Nietzsche, 
probably the most radical of all the nineteenth-century German critics of modernity. The 
excessively worldly way of life described in Theologia Germanica is strongly reminiscent 
of Nietzsche’s vision of “the last man.” To demonstrate this, we must first recapitulate the 
features that characterize this lifestyle according to the author of Theologia Germanica. 
These are as follows: (1) A belief in an individualistic ontology, the essence of which is 
3 Theologia Germanica, p. 18.
4 Ibid., p. 17.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p. 19.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 20.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 25.
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exemplified by the categories of the Self and the Me, or in other words – by the negation 
of the idea of the world as a dynamic embodiment of the all-encompassing Divine Being, 
replaced instead by an image of numerous separate things-in-themselves. The practical 
consequence of this replacement is a perception of oneself as an end in itself, coupled 
with the unawareness of one’s dependencies and of one’s secondary role in relation to the 
dynamism of wesen that surpasses the individual aspect. This in turn is manifested as: 
(2) aspiration to unrestricted freedom in life and carefree pursuit of pleasure and comfort 
in life; (3) an almost boundless faith in one’s own capabilities, skills and talents (and intel-
lectual abilities in particular), as well as in the unlimited power of human knowledge; (4) an 
uncritical attitude towards oneself and narcissistic complacency; (5) a far-reaching inability 
to see anything of value and importance beyond oneself (one’s own good and advantage). 
(6) These opinions result in a conviction that one is at the very heart of the universe, that 
one is entitled to everything (autodeification). Finally, these culminate in (7) a desire and 
a capacity to make oneself securely comfortable in life, mainly by rejecting any difficult 
and unpleasant aspects of life which might make it dangerous and unmanageable.
All these qualities can easily be found in the Nietzschean description of the last 
man. (1) Zarathustra is an “advocate of life,”11 prophesying that the world is immersed in 
a river of becoming. To him life is an all-encompassing ontological dynamism in which 
mutual belonging and unity is prior to any distinctions12: “Everything breaketh, everything 
is integrated anew; eternally buildeth itself the same house of existence.”13 The last men, 
however, deny the truth about this eternal flux. “»What?« say the simpletons, »all in flux? 
Planks and railings are still over the stream!«.” For them, those planks and railings are 
the “heavy words and worths: »good« and »evil«.”14 In the thought of the last man the 
place of dynamic unity is thus usurped by a plurality of separate beings, each of which is 
an autonomous entity, or the Me, which, of course, appalls Zarathustra: “The main idea! 
[Hauptgedanke!] It is not nature that deceives us, the individuals, and furthers her goals 
through deceiving us: rather the individuals explain all of existence according to indi-
vidual, that is false, criteria; we want to be just and consequently »nature« [die Natur] 
must appear as a »deceiver« [die Betrugerin]. In truth there are no individual truths, but 
rather individual errors; the individual itself is an error.”15
Thus, the last man perceives a world in which, as an autonomous entity, he is 
a goal to himself: “All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves: and 
ye want to be the ebb of that great tide”16 and thus (2) one is to seek only one’s own con-
venience and pleasure: the last men “have left the regions where it is hard to live; for they 
need warmth.” At the same time, the last men are (3) full of cynical conceit in their own 
knowledge and wisdom: “They are clever and know all that hath happened: so there is 
no end to their raillery.” They also (4) exhibit a narcissistic complacency and uncritical 
11 F. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zaratustra, ed. J. Manis, trans. T. Common, Hazleton 1999, p. 128.
12 I have written on this aspect more extensively in: P. Augustyniak, Inna Boskość. Mistrz Eck hart, Zaratustra 
i przezwyciężenie metafizyki, Cracow 2009.
13 Ibid., p. 198.
14 Ibid., p. 182, 175.
15 F. Nietzsche, Nietzschean Narratives, trans. G. Shapiro, Indiana 1989, p. 92. 
16 F. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zaratustra, op. cit., p. 22. Unmarked citations further – p. 26-27.
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self-adoration: “»We have discovered happiness« – say the last men, and blink thereby.” 
They are (5) incapable of perceiving anything of consequence beyond themselves: “»What 
is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?« – so asketh the last man and 
blinketh.” And the result of the above is a parody of autodeification (6): “The earth hath 
then become small, and on it there hoppeth the last man who maketh everything small. 
His species is ineradicable like that of the ground-flea; the last man liveth longest.” Not 
surprisingly, the self-proclaimed god, besides seeking pleasure, must above all avoid haz-
ards and tread “warily” (7): “He is a fool who still stumbleth over stones or men!” He 
must exterminate any otherness which may remind him of the uncontrollable element of 
life: “Every one wanteth the same; every one is equal: he who hath other sentiments goeth 
voluntarily into the madhouse.”
This unmistakable similarity between the careless and free life as it is described 
in Theologia Germanica and the Nietzschean image of the last man is both intriguing 
and disturbing, because the people who, according to the author of Theologia Germanica, 
lead such a life are by no means the ordinary citizens of late medieval Rhineland, indif-
ferent to any deeper religious commitment, who might be considered as precursors of the 
modern “middle class,” focused on self-enrichment and worldly pleasures. These were 
the people criticized by Meister Eck hart for their quotidian lifestyle when he wrote that 
they see material goods only: “Alas, how many are there who adore a shoe, a cow, or any 
other creature, and for whom this is their only concern. How foolish they are!”17 However, 
the author of Theologia Germanica does not attribute this manner of thinking and be-
ing to the “regular,” down-to-earth materialists, preoccupied with temporal matters, but 
to the followers of the free spirit heresy, that undeniable (however illegitimate) spiritual 
vanguard of his times.
The fact that they are the main target of Theologia Germanica’s attack can be 
learned already from the preface in which it stated clearly that the enemy to be resisted and 
overcome is the “false and unjust” religion of the free spirits.18 Although the Brethren of the 
free spirit were mostly of secular origin, they were not just ordinary folks of contemporary 
Western Europe, but its spiritual elite. I am talking about the Beghards, semi-monks and 
adherents of radical asceticism – a movement focused on evangelical poverty, and thus by 
definition distancing itself from the attitude of pursuing worldly pleasures – and Beguines, 
their female spiritual counterparts, also secular, and yet leading a similarly ascetic life. 
The author of Theologia Germanica is targeting them, and not the regular non-religious 
or superficially religious secular majority (merely observing external forms), as those 
convinced of their spiritual perfection (equality with God), by which they claimed the 
right to lead a life free from the observance of external laws and regulations, such as the 
sacraments, moral principles, social conventions etc. Unlike them, ordinary laymen were 
incapable of such radical inner emancipation. They regarded outward obedience either 
as a necessary evil, i.e. an unwarranted coercion and burthen to which one must submit 
(most likely, out of fear of punishment after death), or – more positively – as a task to be 
17 Meister Eck hart, Wandering Joy: Meister Eck hart’s Mystical Philosophy, trans. R. Schürmann, Great Barring-
ton 2001, p. 59.
18 Theologia Germanica, “Preface”.
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performed for which the “God-cow” (as Eck hart called their image of God) would grant 
them temporal and later eternal reward. “But ye must mark: There are four sorts of men 
who are concerned with order, laws, and customs. Some keep them neither for God’s sake, 
nor to serve their own ends, but from constraint: these have as little to do with them as may 
be, and find them a burden and heavy yoke. The second sort obey for the sake of reward: 
these are men who know nothing beside, or better than, laws and precepts, and imagine 
that by keeping them they may obtain the kingdom of Heaven and Eternal Life, and not 
otherwise. (...) The third sort are wicked, false-hearted men, who dream and declare that 
they are perfect and need no ordinances, and make a mock of them.”19 (For the moment 
let us not comment on the fourth type of people, as according to the author of Theologia 
Germanica their way of life is a positive alternative to the ways of the Brethren of the Free 
Spirit, and this issue will be discussed in the final section of this paper.)
Free Spirits are those among the Beguines and Beghards who, having rejected the 
attitude of “ordinary” laymen (the first and second group mentioned in the above quotation) 
and having devoted themselves to long-term radical asceticism and evangelical poverty, 
experience some sort of inner illumination which gives them a sense of becoming one 
with God, or even a feeling of “becoming God,”20 and thus a conviction of absolute inner 
freedom and sinlessness, even while they indulge in sexual libertinism and other moral 
transgressions. According to Norman Cohn, it was commonly believed among them that 
“for the »subtle in spirit« sexual intercourse cannot under any circumstances be sinful. 
And it was held that one of the surest marks of the »subtle in spirit« was, precisely, the 
ability to indulge in promiscuity without fear of God or qualms of conscience.”21 This 
attitude led them to believe themselves to be the elite of humanity and feel nothing but 
contempt for the ignorant: “the Free Spirits hold them in derision, and say that they cleave 
unto weak and beggarly elements, and the like.”22 As Cohn writes, the newly enlight-
ened “adept of the Free Spirit (...) felt like some infinitely privileged aristocrat.”23 They 
were transformed – or at least asserted their right to do so – from ascetics to promiscu-
ous epicureans, focusing on consumption and hedonistic self-indulgence. For the newly 
enlightened Free Spirit, “vigils were at an end, it was right to sleep in a soft bed. There 
was no more fasting; henceforth the body must be nourished on the finest meats and 
wines, and no feast was of greater spiritual value than to partake of Eucharist. A golden 
goblet was now a more appropriate gift than a crust of bread. The outward bearing and 
appearance of the heretic was changed. (...) the Brethren of the Free Spirit did in fact 
dress as nobles. (...) a heretic symbolized his transformation from the »lowest of mor-
tals« into a member of an elite which believed itself entitled to dominate the world.”24 
 Cohn argues that the sect of the Brethren of the Free Spirit, called by him “an 
elite of amoral supermen,” clearly prefigured what was to take place in modern society. 
19 Ibid., p. 39.
20 N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle 
Ages, Oxford 1970, p. 181.
21 Ibid., p. 179-180.
22 Theologia Germanica, 39.
23 N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, op. cit., p. 178.
24 Ibid., p. 178-179.
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“They were in fact gnostics intent upon their own individual salvation; but the gnosis at 
which they arrived was a quasi-mystical anarchism – an affirmation of freedom (...) that 
amounted to a total denial of every kind of restraint and limitation.”25 I agree with Cohn 
that this anarchism is to be understood as an extreme form of individualism which is 
easily transformed into a social and moral rebellion. I also concur with his opinion that 
the views of the Free Spirits and “their creed of total emancipation” constituted “the only 
thoroughly revolutionary social doctrine that existed [at the time].” Unlike Cohn, I do not 
think that this rebellion and this emancipation anticipated the reckless desire of a later 
self-proclaimed spiritual elite to negate and revolutionize the philistine society of the last 
men. (That is what Cohn seems to be claiming when he writes that the Brethren of the Free 
Spirit “could be regarded as remote precursors of Bakunin and of Nietzsche – or rather of 
that bohemian intelligentsia which during the last half-century has been living from ideas 
once expressed by Bakunin and Nietzsche in their wilder moments,” therefore considering 
them congenial to those who through their anarchist opposition triggered the revolution of 
the national socialists.) I am convinced that we are dealing here not with an adumbration 
of the Nietzschean idea of the superman, but rather with a prefiguration of the last man 
and, at the same time, with a symbolic description of his origins. The individual, striv-
ing at first for genuine emancipation, is ultimately reduced to a consumerist, hedonistic 
self-indulgence. We may even say that the Free Spirits are the ancestors of the modern, 
rebellious masses which – like the Nietzschean superman – emancipate themselves from 
all social or moral restrictions. However, unlike the superman, they do so not for the sake 
of radical creativity and overcoming the self (after all, as Nietzsche says, the superman 
continually overcomes himself26, becoming a creative child, free of any ressentiment)27, but 
for the sake of vulgar self-deification, or in other words – in order to allow themselves the 
appropriation and unconstrained consumption of all tangible and intangible possessions.
Thus, the paramystical movement of the Free Spirits (which co-existed with Rhine-
land mysticism) heralded the modern inclination towards narcissistic individualism, fo-
cused on self-satisfaction and consumption. (By the way, the general civilizational and 
social processes of the 14th century, which led to the collapse of the feudal system and the 
gradual emancipation of the urban population, confirm that the origins of modernity are 
closely tied with the phenomenon of the Free Spirits). The example of the Brethren of the 
Free Spirit demonstrates that one’s focus on individual religious experience may easily 
turn into individualistic complacency and self-admiration. This occurs when – as a result 
of ignorance or uncontrolled lust – the false ontology of the Self is not conquered. In other 
words, the seeming triumph over the Self and openness to the divine wesen in practice 
leads to such a vision of oneness with God which entails a deification of one’s own mor-
tified and humbled, but still unconquered Self, seeking to be reborn and finally liberated.
It is due to his dispute with the progressivism of the Free Spirits – who are, it seems, 
an anticipation of the Nietzschean “last men” – that the author of Theologia Germanica 
can be viewed as the ancestor of the modern German critique of modernity. Modern not 
25 Ibid., p.148. Unmarked citations further – ibid.
26 Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zaratustra, op.cit., p. 19.
27 Cf. Ibid, p. 20.
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in the sense that it criticizes everything new, but because it attempts to root the (irrevo-
cably) modern individual in the irrevocably modern world in a way that would go beyond 
consumption and superficial “self-fulfillment.” According to the author of Theologia Ger-
manica this may be possible through imitatio Christi.
For those who cultivate the Self and therefore indulge in temporal pleasures the 
life of Christ must seem quite repulsive. It is “to nature and selfishness the bitterest life. 
A life of carelessness and freedom is to nature and the Self and the Me, the sweetest and 
pleasantest life.”28 Meanwhile, Theologia Germanica’s argument suggests that the life of 
Christ, so revolting to the newfangled man, is characterized by features that not only may 
and should be attractive from the point of view of modernity, but – more importantly – can 
be properly understood and fully appreciated only in a world where man’s individuality 
retains a priority over his belonging to a group. They are intended precisely for such 
a world. This is suggested by the fact that it was not a way of life which would demand 
a withdrawal from the world, or contempt for mundane problems and for secular life in 
general. On the contrary, the imitation of Christ entails such behavior which aspires to cope 
with the quotidian, without avoiding its challenges. As radical as this transformation may 
be, “such a man hath liberty as to his outward walk and conversation, so long as they 
consist with what must be or ought to be.”29
The most important thing, however, is that being a disciple of Christ entails chang-
ing entirely our perception of our desires by freeing us from the Self. One may say that 
the modern man is averse to the classic formula of Christian life because it involves sur-
rendering one’s will to the extraneous will of God, represented by the will of the institution 
of the Church, i.e. by the various ritual and behavioral requirements set before man by the 
community to which he belongs. Of course, as long as the pre-modern way of life and its 
understanding was still current, there was no apparent conflict whatsoever. This was be-
cause the individual will was perceived as something profoundly infantile or – if one may 
say so – was entirely suppressed by the collective superego. But when the individual will 
began to free itself from the superego’s influence (in the simultaneous process of eman-
cipation and maturation), signaling the approach of a new era, the conflict became clear 
and confrontation was inevitable. For the modern character any perspective of obedience 
to an external authority, or of a consistent, irreversible and unconditional renunciation of 
one’s own aspirations, must induce a feeling of continuous self-denial, unbearable loss, 
unfair restraint and of being deprived of the rights which are granted to us by the mere 
fact that we are human.
However, the example of Christ demonstrates that obedience, understood as an 
internal act, is something entirely different. It is based not on the relationship of subordi-
nation of the Self to some external power, but on the inner transformation of the former 
(or, more precisely, it is a question not so much of transforming the Self, as of fulfilling 
its secret truth). This in turn leads to a discovery that the seemingly external will of God 
is in fact a more profound dimension of one’s own will. It is a matter of giving oneself 
up to God’s being in such radical devotion that God’s desire becomes synonymous with 
28 Theologia Germanica, p. 18.
29 Ibid., p. 21.
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one’s own desire: “Where the Truth always reigneth, so that true perfect God and true 
perfect man are at one, and man so giveth place to God, that God Himself is there and 
yet the man too, and this same unity worketh continually, and doeth and leaveth undone 
without any I, and Me, and Mine, and the like.”30 This may be all the more appealing 
to modern man, since what is described here is not the inner voice of the father (i.e. the 
internalized will of an external authority), which would be equivalent to the demands of 
the superego, but a more profound dimension of the individual will – it is that to which 
the being-wesen of every man aspires, that to which every man was predisposed: his true, 
more profound selfhood.
The imitation of Christ as an alternative way of being a modern individual is there-
fore based on the belief that what we call “God’s will” is in fact the genuine will of man, 
as well as the collective and single will of being (not a will to be, but the being’s will and 
its very dynamics). Radical self-absorption, however, obscures the fact that anyone who, 
like Christ, is able to find God’s will within himself is not less of a man, but more so, 
precisely because he finally fulfills the essence of his being. Such a man is not stifled in 
his individuality, but is at peace with himself, rooted in the world and able to participate 
fully in every aspect of life: “there is true perfect manhood, so there is a perfect perceiv-
ing and feeling of pleasure and pain, liking and disliking, sweetness and bitterness, joy 
and sorrow, and all that can be perceived and felt within and without. And seeing that 
God is here made man, He is also able to perceive and feel love and hatred, evil and good 
and the like.”31
This aspect of Christ’s humanity should no doubt be seen as something that an-
swers the requirements of modernity. Moreover, it is only within its temporal boundaries, 
within the realm of modern expectations and necessities, that we may comprehend this 
deeply humanizing aspect of submitting to the will of God as to one’s own, inner (true 
and profound) dynamics of desire.
The proto-modern Free Spirits discovered something quite true, namely – that on-
tologically speaking they were all Christs (abiding in ontological unity with God). What 
they could not appreciate was how this being-as-Christ was fulfilled in the life of Jesus.




MATERIALIST HISTORY OF IDEAS. 
WARSAW – FRANKFURT – PARIS
The world of meaning and the world of being are one and the same.
                                                                                       Bruno Latour
1. The list of cities in the title should actually be preceded by Trier, as a presumed birth-
place of the history of ideas interpreted in a specifically materialistic way. However, the 
“materialism” I’m referring to is not an ontic term, that is – it does not refer to some 
characteristic aspect of being, but rather is a logical term – it refers to the historical and 
dialectic aspect of ideas. This materialism states that ideas – not individual ideas, but 
entire constellations of ideas, contradictory, mobile and internally conflicting constel-
lations – are a product, the result of production. Their emergence is based on labor, 
and labor, in one way or another, is connected with the body, and thus it engages in us 
something that is finite, random and incomplete; puts us in touch with a radically het-
erogeneous element, impenetrable by thought. A laboring body is vulnerable to pain and 
this is a factor which puts any project at risk. Thus, the body implies unreliability, fal-
libility, uncertainty – it is the opposite of everything that is calculable more geometrico. 
Embodied labor, the process of material production – understood very broadly as the 
manufacture of the world, life, society and nature – is also the origin of ideas. Therefore, 
ideas do not inhabit some kind of transcendental realm and are not passed on to us in an 
unchanging form; ideas cannot be reached through contemplation – unless we perceive 
contemplation as yet another kind of labor, one that is quite advanced technologically 
and becomes possible only at a higher stage of social development. Ideas emerge due 
to one’s exertion, action, communication, life with and among others. The term “history 
of ideas,” crucial for the line of thought I wish to outline, can be found in its explicit form 
in the Communist Manifesto. It states: “man’s consciousness, changes with every change 
in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life,” 
and further: “what else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production 
changes its character in proportion as material production is changed?”1 
1 K. Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party, trans. S. Moore and F. Engels, 1888. Marxists Internet Archive 
(marxists.org) 1987, 2000, 2010, p. 25.
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2. As the next step, the Manifesto outlines the history of ideas thus understood. First, we 
learn that the ideas which are predominant in a society are always the ideas of the ruling 
classes. However, they undergo disintegration: in an old society the embryo of the new 
one always emerges. “When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions 
were overcome by Christianity. When Christian ideas succumbed in the 18th century 
to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death battle with the then revolutionary bour-
geoisie. The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience merely gave expression 
to the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge.”2 This last comment 
in particular is especially inspiring: the authors of the Manifesto suggest that ideas in 
a free-market society must become “free” in the same sense in which the hired workers 
are “free” – the freedom of both is in fact a necessary aspect of their final transforma-
tion into a commodity. A slave or a serf can afford the luxury of waiting for his master’s 
orders; a free hired worker must himself find a master for himself, must himself ensure 
that he gets his orders, must on his own initiative convert himself into an attractive slave, 
shaping his very thoughts, emotions and his bodily abilities (and even his outward appear-
ance) according to the requirements – otherwise, he will not survive. The same applies 
to ideas in a free-market society: from the very beginning they should take into account 
their marketability, shaping themselves in such a way as to seem attractive, to meet the 
conditions of the marketplace of current ideas. Those who control the market of ideas are 
called by the authors of the Manifesto “the ruling class.”
3. The above version of the history of ideas may of course be read in the spirit of crude 
naturalism: being precedes consciousness, matter precedes idea. Such naturalism, how-
ever – even though Marx seems to lean toward it in some of his later texts – is in fact also 
a kind of idealism, an “ahistorical, abstract point of thought,”3 as Stanislaw Brzozowski 
writes, according to which the things are material in their essence; the real world – as an 
idea – is nature; societies are born on the foundation of processes in the natural world, 
using concepts to establish their domination over nature. Brzozowski attributed this type 
of naturalistic interpretation of the Marxist history of ideas to Engels. Brzozowski himself 
was the author of Anti-Engels – a text which he declared to be the starting point for the 
philosophy of historical maturity – i.e. of a conscious and active attitude to history, achiev-
ing precision unattainable on the basis of modernist critical theories, including Marx’s 
own. Brzozowski’s philosophy, fervent, intense and impassioned, practiced throughout his 
short life, seems to me an anticipation and an unsurpassed model for the historians of the 
Warsaw school of ideas, created at Warsaw University in the critical year of 1956. However, 
I am not talking here about direct historical consequence: the disciples of Kołakowski 
could not be simply assumed to be the followers of Brzozowski, although they often 
expressed respect and admiration for him. What I mean is, rather, that the interpretation 
of the thought of the Warsaw school of the history of ideas in the light of Brzozowski’s 
theoretical intentions seems to be very productive. And I do not only have in mind the 
period in Brzozowski’s thought when he declared his greatest proximity to Marxism 
2 Ibid., p. 25-26
3 S. Brzozowski, Idee. Wstęp do filozofii dojrzałości dziejowej, Cracow 1990, p. 72.
612013
MATERIAlIST HISTORy Of IDEAS. WARSAW – fRANKfuRT – PARIS
(e.g. in Historical Materialism as a Philosophy of Culture) – although it would probably 
be easy to point out similarities between such texts as “Epigenetic Theory of History”4 and 
Kołakowski’s essays included in Culture and Fetishes.5 There are even more interesting 
parallels between Kołakowski’s thought and Brzozowski’s last writings, particularly his 
comments on Catholicism from The Diary.6
4. Seen from the perspective of The Diary, Brzozowski appears to be a post-secular 
thinker: someone who goes beyond the dispute between the Enlightenment and religion 
(without taking sides). To him, Catholicism is the epitome of human culture in general – 
the totality of human culture in its human aspect. In other words, it is directed towards 
liberation, or – as Brzozowski puts it more precisely – towards liberation from fact,7 i.e. 
from the need to submit to any external objective structure which exists independently 
of human action and labor. Labor can be understood here either as collective work, social 
labor, or individual labor. Just before his death, Brzozowski had been emphasizing this last 
aspect in particular: the individual life that is ours while we live from day to day and from 
hour to hour can be seen as an effort to create a free humanity. Herein lies the superiority 
of Catholicism over Marxism in Brzozowski’s view. The latter is insufficient in its attempt 
to salvage that which is connected with human isolation and which becomes most strongly 
felt in illness and death. Catholicism is a kind of Marxism in which a lonely, terminally ill 
man is not excluded from the human community, i.e. from the labor of culture. Or perhaps 
the concept of “the collective,” introduced by the third hero of the present paper, Bruno 
Latour, would be more appropriate here than the term “culture.” Latour’s “collective” is the 
sum of the products – both objective and subjective – of a certain culture-nature. Catholi-
cism, however, would be a very peculiar collective, capable of recognizing its collective 
nature and – at the same time – of transcending it. To put differently, Catholicism would 
represent the earthly (human) truth of man’s unearthly (super-human) calling, ensuring 
that no system of determinants could ultimately be binding to him. This truth is contained, 
according to Brzozowski, in each of the “partial truths” propounded by Catholicism. Un-
like other Christian religions, Catholicism represents the truth of freedom that was made 
flesh, that is – a freedom that transpired through labor, entered into customs, became part 
of the institutions, works of art, merged with the landscape of nations which accepted it. 
Catholicism defines itself as the outcome of the process of the overlaying of traditions; it 
sates that the meaning of every human act is infinite and that it changes the entire world 
from the very moment of its incipience. According to the later Brzozowski, Catholicism is 
the highest freedom combined with the greatest embodiment or “naturalization,” by which 
he meant its functioning in external, objective reality. Catholicism, as Brzozowski states, 
goes beyond thinking about the superhuman (in which Nietzsche’s works find their fulfill-
ment) by “creating superhuman facts.”8 In other words, Catholicism puts great emphasis 
on the requirement most deeply ingrained in culture, namely – to transcend culture; on 
4 S. Brzozowski, “Epigenetic Theory of History” in: Idee. Wstęp do filozofii dojrzałości dziejowej, op. cit.
5 L. Kołakowski, Kultura i fetysze, Warsaw 2009.
6 S. Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, Wrocław 2007.
7 Cf. ibid., p. 93.
8 Ibid., p. 44.
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the ability most profoundly rooted in tradition to break with tradition, and on the habit of 
treating tradition merely as a thin shroud thrown over things, a covering that one must 
tear down in order to find a new beginning. This ability belongs to this, and not the other 
world, but – as Bruno Latour rightly observed – “this world is not of this world!”9 At the 
same time, Brzozowski laments the fact that he cannot believe in the supernatural nature of 
faith, but sees in it merely the greatest achievement of culture. But perhaps this particular 
detail is irrelevant, for it seems that the Christian faith is in principle equivalent to despair 
caused by the impossibility of faith. Without this element of despair faith would become 
knowledge, and therefore – pride, and hence – unbelief. However, another aspect requires 
our attention: Brzozowski as a historian of ideas remains an unwavering materialist. “The 
word does not possess any absolute a-historical meanings. However unique, it is always 
an imperfect and limited creature of life – even if we consider it to be the product of the 
entire species. Human reality is always relative, underdone, unfinished; there is no such 
thing as a complete, finished, sealed reality.”10 I believe that all of Kołakowski’s later 
works dealing with the necessity of myth and the need for religion remain within this 
dualistic perspective: language, culture – the only human reality – is something infinitely 
incomplete; we need God not because we long to close up this openness of language and 
culture as mere products of social life, but rather as a constant reminder that their horizon 
must remain open.
5. We may find similar post-secular themes in the work of the leader of the first Frankfurt 
School, Adorno. We should remember to take into account his principally Jewish / Prot-
estant background, while also keeping in mind that on his mother’s side, and therefore in 
the musical dimension, which is not immaterial, he did have some contact with Catholi-
cism. His mother, an opera singer, introduced him to the world of music; however, it was 
Schoeberg, that Moses of dodecaphony, who presided over his maturity – or, perhaps, his 
immediate teacher, Alban Berg, was also more of a Catholic? Protestantism rejects any 
intermediaries between man and Scripture, Faith and Grace; it rejects institutionalized 
virtue. Auschwitz discredited culture as the sphere of mediation. Yet, as Adorno taught, 
rejecting it now in the name of some unmediated form of experience would be a betrayal: 
a betrayal of the messianic aspects which can live only within cultural frames. One must 
not throw away the broken mirrors of culture – after all, we are obliged to be faithful to the 
hope that springs up even in Beckett’s Endgame. How may Endgame bring hope? By the 
very fact that it is a play, a moment of self-awareness amidst the chaos of culture, arising 
from the will of mimesis, which – having traversed the boundary of cultural awareness 
constituted by Auschwitz – is no longer an imitation of the intelligible essence of nature, 
but rather a shattering of all intelligibility in order to make audible the things silenced 
and denied by the reason – the stone rejected by the builders. For the late Adorno, art is 
a parliament of things that come into their own despite totalizing reductions.
9 B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. C. Porter, Cambridge, MA, 1993, p. 138.
10 S. Brzozowski, Pamiętnik, op. cit., p. 77.
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6. In Prince of Networks Graham Harman wrote of Bruno Latour (whom I had in mind 
mentioning Paris in the title of this article) that his philosophy derives from his strangely 
experienced Catholicism, from his admiration of the richness, diversity and irreducibil-
ity of creation. Such an understanding of Catholicism may be summed up with a motto 
from Thomas Aquinas: concede parum, nega frequenter, distingue semper (rarely affirm, 
seldom deny, always distinguish) – everything that exists is worthy of preservation (it ap-
pears that the same idea somehow guides the intellectual efforts of Aristotle and Hegel; 
and in a sense, the Husserlian call “back to the things themselves” may be understood in 
the same spirit – phenomenology is drawn to Catholicism). Harman cites the magic for-
mula of epiphany conceived by Latour on the road from Dijon: “»Nothing can be reduced 
to anything else, nothing can be deduced from anything else, everything may be allied 
to everything else.« This was like an exorcism that defeated demons one by one. It was 
a wintery sky, and a very blue. I no longer needed to prop it up with cosmology, put it in 
a picture, render it in writing, measure it in a meteorological article, or place it on a Titan 
to prevent it falling on my head... It and me, them and us, we mutually defined ourselves. 
And for the first time in my life I saw things unreduced and set free.”11 Reductionist urges 
create bad philosophy.
7. Modernity is drawn to reduction. That is, it feels obligated to cut off nature from culture. 
However, in order to live it cannot acknowledge the reduction that is its own handiwork 
(this is called by Latour “work of purification”): it must constantly mix together things, 
people and words and then obliterate the traces of this confusion; it lives by constantly 
transcending the boundary which it itself announces to be impenetrable, impassable. Actu-
ally, modernity is a certain state of hysteria – it is a tendency to sense the abyss whenever 
one is treading safe ground; it is an unwarranted fear that the sky will fall on our heads 
unless we somehow uphold it with decontextualized laws of nature or social actions. 
This kind of hysteria has its consequences. In fear of the lethal cold of infinite space into 
which we have supposedly been led by modernity (as we are persuaded by our hysterical 
poets, be it Pascal, Hölderlin, Kafka or Beckett12), we tend to use exaggerated measures of 
remedy. It is in this light that Latour perceives the great crimes of the twentieth century: 
the Bolshevik Revolution and the national-socialist takeover, as well as the totalitarian 
systems which grew out of both. Revolutions, in which the moderns believe, are like treat-
ing a simple cold with chemotherapy – no wonder that after this sort of treatment we do 
not feel well. But does that mean that no one has ever suffered from cancer? Of course 
not, says Latour, but cancer is merely a kind of a very bad cold. This is precisely where 
Latour’s argument becomes implausible: when he insists that “the differences are sizeable 
[i.e. the differences between modernity and the premodern period], but they are only of 
size.”13 This sounds more like self-soothing rhetoric.
11 B. Latour, Irreductions, cited in: G. Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics, Melbourne 
2009, p. 13.
12 For instance, Latour’s comment: “A Kafkaesque society cannot be renegotiated” (B. Latour, We Have Never 
Been Modern, op. cit., p. 125) – and therefore we may assume that Latour would exclude Kafka from his collective!
13 Ibid., p. 108.
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8. We have never been modern, Latour says. Both supporters of modernity and its antago-
nists, for example Hei degger, exaggerate, vexing hysterical: “And yet – »here too the gods 
are present«: in a hydroelectric plant on the banks of the Rhine, in subatomic particles, 
in Adidas shoes as well as in the old wooden clogs hollowed out by hand, in agribusiness 
as well as in timeworn landscapes, in shopkeepers’ calculations as well as in Holderlin’s 
heartrending verse.”14 If our creations, just as the creations of the premoderns, always 
come into existence through a confusion of the natural and the social; in other words, 
if we constantly cogenerate nature and culture, then this also means that we, just as the 
premoderns, cannot in fact distinguish signs from things. “For Them [the premoderns], 
Nature and Society, signs and things are virtually coextensive. For Us they should never 
be.”15 It is thus that Friedrich Schiller in his essay “On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry” 
(a text central to modern self-knowledge), separates the naivety of the ancients from the 
sentimentality of the new poetry: Homer does not differentiate between the sign and 
the thing, and where Homer walks with self-confidence over safe ground, the new poets 
perceive a chasm between the sign and its meaning.16 We have never been modern – does 
that mean that we have never been sentimental in Schiller’s sense of the word? Is senti-
mentalism only a kind of hysteria which leads to the treating colds with chemotherapy?
9. The abyss that the modern (sentimental) poets see between the sign and the meaning is 
understood by Schiller to be identical with the gap between reality and the ideal. An abil-
ity to perceive this abyss – which swallows up all our words – is also the most important 
feature of Hei degger’s theory of “the oblivion of Being.”17 This idea, as it has been often 
noted, responds in a certain way to the Marxist idea of alienation (especially in Lukács’s 
version). Alienation is not only the feeling that we’ve been deprived of something that is 
ours: for example, that our ideas are not free, or rather – that their freedom is reduced to the 
most absolute necessity of adapting them in advance to the requirements of the market. 
Underlying this concept is a more complex theological structure, crucial to a certain type 
of temporal sensitivity, which in turn allows for a particular kind of historical experi-
ence. The experience of alienation is conditioned by faith (the Christian pistis as opposed 
to pagan episteme), the belief that beyond the current shape of the world there may be – in 
the horizontal or historical order, in the future which awaits us in this world – another 
world, one in which all that has been taken away from us may be recovered; a world in 
which our true identity is situated; where words such as “we” and “us” no longer need 
inverted commas.
10. In his interpretation of “history as a history of fulfillment and salvation”18 Karl Löwith 
said that it was Joachim of Fiore (Gioacchino da Fiore) who placed the Christian ideal of 
14 Ibid., p. 66.
15 Ibid., p. 100.
16 F. Shiller, “On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry,” in: The Aesthetical Essays, eds. T. Riikonen and D. Widger, 
Project Gutenberg, November 2012.
17 M. Hei degger, “Letter on Humanism”, trans. F. A Capuzzi and J. G. Gray, in: D. F. Krell (ed.) Martin Hei degger: 
Basic Writings, revised and expanded edition, London, 1993, p. 242.
18 K. Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History, Chicago 1957, p. 1.
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another world within history, thus replacing the vertical order of official Church teach-
ing, and leading to a gradual fading of apocalyptic expectations by the horizontal order.
11. Joachim of Fiore considers any interpretation of sacred texts possible only within 
the framework of prophecy. Just as the meaning of the Old Testament was revealed in 
the New, so the meaning of the New Testament will be revealed only through the events 
foreseen by St. John’s Revelation. Löwith suggests that this is a consequence of Joachim’s 
peculiar mystical materialism, namely – his consistent concern with the dogma of the 
Church as the body of Christ. In such a case, the death and resurrection of Christ occur in 
the historical order, not only vertically, but also horizontally. Löwith is horrified by this 
transformation. He sees parallels between the Third Age prophesied by the Joachimites and 
the Third International or the Third Reich. Yet, he does not reject the idea of alienation – 
to the contrary, the Third International and the Third Reich are, after all, the culminating 
points of alienation.
15. The myth of the Christian eschaton, however, differs from other myths. Yes, we may 
agree with Latour that those myths live with us and ensure that we have never been, 
or can ever be modern. They are part of the myth of eternal return, and reappear with 
it. However, the Christian myth is something that opens our eyes to the abyss. Yet, the 
abyss may be perceived either in the vertical order (the tension between the top and the 
bottom, heaven and earth, spirit and body) or the horizontal one (the difference between 
the future and the past).
16. If the eschaton is transcendent – if it may be fulfilled only in the vertical order – the 
horizontal order remains in the realm of the myth of eternal return. In that case, humanity 
lacks the capacity to make great, and always risky, historical changes. If, however, the 
eschaton is placed within the horizontal order, the eschatological fever rises and the third 
age – the era of the Holy Spirit – is just a shot away, as Mick Jagger sings, from the era of 
the Third Reich and the Third International.
17. One may come to a seemingly simple conclusion that when dealing with the question 
of the eschaton the best thing would be to stick to the principle of the golden mean. Yet, 
the point is that we are dealing with processes over which man has never had and never 
will have any control. In this respect, Hei degger is probably quite right: it is Geschick des 
Seins. Or, as pious Christians, Jews and Muslims say – it is God and not man who is the 
master of history.
18. One might think that this conclusion does not go along with our interest in the ma-
terialist history of ideas pioneered by Marx, as avowed in the title of this article. This is 
not so. Whether it is God who is the Master of history, or whether history is governed 
by the contingency of being, one thing remains true: it is not possible to confine history 
within a system, as if it was already created, waiting to be expressed and fulfilled. There 
is a factor independent of all thinking which precedes all thought and inhibits its total-
izing tendencies; a factor which prevents us from thinking geometrically of history – it is 
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human corporeality. Man produces history, yet not arbitrarily, freely, but in a continuous 
struggle with everything that is other. And in the spectacle that this struggle affords us, 
we are given the role of Jacob: we cannot rest until we tear ourselves away from history, 
until we gain the right to say “we” without inverted commas.
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THE POLISH DIALECTIC OF 
ENLIGHTENMENT. LEGENDS 
OF MODERNITY
Czesław Miłosz’s Legends of Modernity and Dialectic of Enlightenment by Adorno and 
Horkheimer – these two books, conceived at the same time and born out of the same pas-
sion, though on two different continents, have so much in common that one can properly 
compare them only by pointing to the differences between them. It is indeed surprising 
that they have not been read side by side before. The Frankfurt exiles’ initial diagnosis 
reads: “Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity,”1 which can 
be complemented with Miłosz’s statement that “scientifically and soberly, working from 
the standpoint of biology, did they [those currents that are hostile to reason ] look at the 
life of the human animal, agitating for a planned animality (...). The right to murder the 
weak, to establish state slavery, to conduct breeding experiments with people, had been 
proved.”2 Thus, “hell is ourselves” – the catastrophe we witness did not come from the 
outside; its unique character, whose systemic totality arouses fear, had originated from the 
ideas constituting the foundation of modern civilization rather than from some peripheral 
relics of defeated prehistory. The possibility of catastrophe was conditioned by the ideas 
of empirical science, logical rationality, self-conscious subjectivity and the enlightened 
confidence in knowledge which used the concept of demythologization to eliminate the 
beliefs it considered superstitious (especially the moral ones) and incapable of being logi-
cally derived from experience or the observation of nature. How is it possible that the 
enlightenment turns into its opposite at the climax of its own actualization, while “human-
ity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism”?3 
Why does “the subjugation of everything natural to the sovereign subject culminate in 
the domination of what is blindly objective and natural”?4 Adorno poses these questions 
as a man of the Enlightenment in order to shield them from self-destruction. He is trying 
to reverse the process of transformation of critical thinking into the mindless procedure of 
1 M. Horkheimer, T.W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments. Ed. Gunzelin Schmid No-
err. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford, California, 2002. p. 1.
2 Cz. Miłosz, Legends of Modernity. Essays and Letters from Occupied Poland, 1942-1943. Trans. Madeline 
G. Levine. New York, 2005. p. 139.
3 Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. xiv.
4 Ibid., p. xviii.
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mastering objectivity – a procedure which styled itself “instrumental reason” and which 
underwent secondary mythologization due to the fact that it absolutized its own mastery.
Miłosz poses his questions about the origins of catastrophe from a very similar 
perspective, as indicated by the book’s title. The apparent contradiction which it expresses 
is full of significance. “The legend of modernity” means as much as “the myth of the 
enlightenment,” a petitio principii unaware of itself (though constituting the foundation 
of self-awareness) and presupposed unreflectively (though in the name of critical rational-
ity). Writing about the legends of modernity, Miłosz did not have in mind any ideological 
substitutes for faith, fabricated for the purpose of political control over the masses, even if 
Alfred Rosenberg’s Myth of the Twentieth Century appears here and there in the book as an 
example of “the rational exploitation of irrationality” (especially in Miłosz’s correspond-
ence with Jerzy Andrzejewski which comes from roughly the same time as Rosenberg’s 
book.) It seems that Miłosz would have acknowledged his affinity with Adorno’s statement 
“that the cause of enlightenment’s relapse into mythology is to be sought not so much in 
the nationalist, pagan, or other modern mythologies concocted specifically to cause such 
a relapse, as in the fear of truth which petrifies enlightenment itself.”5
Nietzsche’s cry: Pereat veritas, fiat vita – “let truth die, let life begin”6 – appears 
in Miłosz’s book as an obituary on the demise of reason, a collective label for all kinds 
of “irrationalisms” which prepare ground for a future disaster and which constitute the 
major target of his attacks. It is precisely the attitude towards Nietzsche that reveals the 
difference between Miłosz and the authors of Dialectic of Enlightenment. The task that 
Miłosz assigned to himself was to unfold a set of influential ideas developed within the 
paradigm of modernity, but eventually turning against its fundamental message. Thus, 
apart from the idea of “natural man” who needs to be “freed” from the fetters of civiliza-
tion, Miłosz points to the conjecture that the concept of truth has its deeper “substratum.” 
This conjecture led to the relativization of the idea of truth in concepts such as “the will of 
might,” “naked life,” psychological “unconsciousness,” or the pragmatic “interest in life.” 
Miłosz refers to it using a rather general and misleading term – “irrationalism.” He sees 
the history of modernity as a history of a struggle between “good” Europe and its “evil” 
alter ego – the centrifugal, decadent and destructive forces that carry it into the unknown. 
In the rich gallery of the representatives of the latter, a special place has been reserved for 
Friedrich Nietzsche, alongside Rousseau, Bergson, James and Freud.
The authors of Dialectic of Enlightenment did not draw a distinction between 
a “good” and a ”bad” Enlightenment. The process of absolutizing instrumental reason is 
continuous and directly proportional to the gradual disenchantment of the world and the 
growing domination of the forces of scientific progress. Considered from this perspec-
tive, Marquis de Sade and Nietzsche appear to be allies of the Frankfurt School in that 
they bring the mindless enlightenment to its extreme consequences, thus allowing its 
radical critique. We owe to them the unashamed sharpness of vision that anticipates the 
future catastrophe and denounces the poisoned source of progress. As Adorno puts it: “It 
is because they did not hush up the impossibility of deriving from reason a fundamental 
5 Ibid., p. xvi.
6 Legends of Modernity. “The Legend of the Will,” p. 46.
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argument against murder, but proclaimed it from the rooftops, that Sade and Nietzsche 
are still vilified, above all by progressive thinkers.”7 Miłosz might seem such an outraged 
“progressive thinker,” hurling thunderbolts at Nietzsche, cursing the messenger for bearing 
the bad news. But this would be a simplification. His “irrationalism,” which seeks “the 
substratum of ideas,” praises the “arbitrariness of will” and as such is embodied in the 
figures of a “superman filled with resentment,” an “emancipated peasant,” a “rebel of the 
disenchanted anthill” (Julien Sorel), or a “tourist in Hell,” a “bourgeois pseudo-Commu-
nist” who with a “humanitarian” grimace inspects plantations in Congo and kolkhozes 
in the Soviet Union (André Gide in his Journals) – this kind of “irrationalism” echoes 
what Adorno refers to with disgust as “positivism” or “mindless enlightenment.” In other 
words, it is an ethically blind practical application of falsifying procedures, directed at 
the objectified world in order to effectively take control over it. They are simply two sides 
of the same coin: the modern awareness of the “un-foundedness” of one own’s thinking. 
Or a nihilistic self-consciousness, to follow the terminology of German Romanticism. As 
Richard Rorty convincingly argued, the Nietzschean slogan: “Truth is a kind of error” 
does not come into conflict with the self-preservation instinct of the knowing subject. 
Quite the contrary, it is a condition for the effectiveness of the pragmatic “schematization 
of chaos.” The most lapidary way of expressing this thought is Paul Feyerabend’s joyous 
slogan: “anything goes!”
Miłosz was not a philosopher, a fact which he himself fiercely stressed, and which 
generates some obvious differences between his Legends and the work of the Frank-
furt philosophers. These differences are most visible in Miłosz’s language which shuns 
excessive terminology, as well as in his literary set of references which give additional 
forcefulness to his line of argumentation. Yet both the diagnosis that he formulated and 
the conclusions that he aimed at are philosophical in nature. What is more, emerging 
from his proposal is an intellectual project whose main points correspond with Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s message. It can be summarized in one phrase: “to enlighten enlight-
enment,” a travesty of the Fichtean imperative: to “think thinking” which, in turn, was 
to influence instrumental reason’s self-critical reflection – to turn thinking against itself, 
starting with itself. As a result, “enlightenment itself, having mastered itself and assumed 
its own power, could break through the limits of enlightenment,”8 thus becoming “the 
opposite of mastery” and enabling reconciliation between subject and nature. This might 
come into effect through negative dialectics – a theory developed by Adorno. In his letter 
to Andrzejewski, Miłosz states that “all my effort turns (...) to a new systematic doubting 
that might be capable of unearthing the few values worthy of rescue and development.”9 
And further on: “I am seeking a philosopher’s stone.”10 The aim of this quest and of these 
verifications was an anthropological project, a model of subjectivity which could stand 
the test of “war experience.” Miłosz considered this experience as a kind of existential 
experiment that enabled the distillation of what might be called “the human element”: 
7 Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 93.
8 Ibid., p. 172.
9 See: Legends of Modernity. “Letter Essays of Jerzy Andrzejewski and Czesław Miłosz” (Letter dated August 
22, 1942), pp. 150-151.
10 Ibid., p. 157. 
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“So perhaps there dwells inside man some kind of intercessor that those currents [i.e. 
Communism and Nazism] do not consider, an intercessor that proclaims its veto against 
so-called unassailable arguments.”11 He then goes on to confess: “I desire only one thing: 
to be a man.”12 Thus, it is for his own sake that the thinker sets in motion the machine of 
“systematic doubting.” He speaks from the position of an eyewitness to an idea in action, 
a participant in the events, rather than that of a speculatively distant, trans-Atlantic mentor.
With great wit and ease Miłosz reconstructs before our eyes the various heroes 
of modernity, only to severely test them against the requirements that the experience of 
Warsaw in 1942 and 1943 poses to a thinking subject. Some of the most impressive literary 
constructions of the last few centuries fail the humanity exam, among them – Robinson 
Crusoe who constitutes an illustration of a “noble savage” that lurks in all of us beneath 
the crust of social and cultural automatisms. Or the characters from Balzac’s Human 
Comedy – the Hobbesian-Darwinian reverse of Rousseau’s idyllic version of the “natural 
man” popularized by Defoe. For Miłosz, the latter is closer to truth as it takes into ac-
count the vastness of nature’s suffering and human participation in it. Still, he considers it 
unacceptable because of its positivist reductionism. The Nietzschean concept of a strong 
subjectivity, in turn, based on the absolute affirmation of one’s will to live and illustrated 
by the Stendhalian figure of Julien Sorel, is deconstructed by the arguments of Zarathus-
tra’s author himself. With much bravado, Miłosz points to the ressentiment underlying the 
motivation of the supposedly sovereign Superman: the driving force on the peasants’ way 
to emancipation is their hatred for the crowd which they have emerged from.
What seems a real tour de force, however, is the confrontation with André Gide 
who is treated by Miłosz as both a literary hero and this hero’s creator. Gide is an illustra-
tion of what might be referred to, after Miłosz, as a depraved subject, i.e. proclaiming and 
pursuing the idea of freedom at all costs, regardless of the consequences: “Gide’s chief 
theme is the rapture of self-liberation (...) and destruction. Self-liberation to what end? 
To crime and slavery. Farther down the road, that is what awaits all these people possessed 
by a Dionysian frenzy.”13 A serious accusation follows: “The delicate hands of intellectuals 
are stained with blood from the moment a death-bearing word emerges from them, even 
if they saw that word as a word of life. Perhaps their books are not read by the masses, but 
the journalist who writes articles for the daily press reads them. These articles are read 
by the tribune of the people, the teacher, the man in the street. And so the coin of ideas, of 
thoughts, starts rolling; along the way its more subtle letters are rubbed out until, smooth 
and simplified, it reaches the masses in the form of a single motto, a cheap slogan.”14 Gide’s 
intellectual celebration of radical freedom, practiced for the purpose of his private writing, 
reveals its true essence when the writer goes on a journey to the Congo and the Soviet 
Union, which Miłosz describes as a tourist trip to a concentration camp. Gide’s writing, 
full of humanitarian sympathy, turns out to be intellectually helpless in the face of the 
new reality emerging at that time, in which the author had his share: “a certain insectivity 
11 Ibid., p. 154.
12 Ibid.
13 Legends of Modernity. “Absolute Freedom,” pp. 59, 61.
14 Ibid., p. 60.
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of life and death,”15 as Miłosz phrased it in one of his letters to Andrzejewski. The result 
of that new anthropology is “the mass extermination of people, akin to the extermination 
of bedbugs and flies.”16 Man becomes deprived of the “ceremoniousness of death” for he 
himself has reduced his subjectivity to biological corporeality in the process of escaping 
from metaphysics. For Adorno, this is the ultimate result of the objectification of the world: 
“In humanity’s self-abasement to the corpus nature takes its revenge for the debasement 
of the human being to an object of power, to raw material. (...) The body cannot be turned 
back into the envelope of the soul. It remains a cadaver, no matter how trained and fit it 
may be. The transformation into dead matter, indicated by the affinity of corpus to corpse, 
was a part of the perennial process which turned nature into stuff, material.”17 This is the 
central problem in Miłosz’s work – his fear of nature’s blind objectivity which is devoid 
of a telos and immersed in meaningless suffering, stripped of its tragic dimension, which 
can swallow up the human world, transforming it into a universum of insects. The problem 
is discussed most comprehensively in The Land of Ulro, but it is already signaled here, in 
the figure of Robinson Crusoe imagining himself as a spider, or in the image of the city 
as an anthill, a distant prefiguration of a concentration camp.
What remains in this pile of rubble? The voice of a thirty-year-old writing these 
superb essays: calm, unyieldingly inquisitive, focused on his task, renouncing easy exulta-
tion. It is the voice of a witness as defined by Giorgio Agamben, and therefore someone 
for whom his experience weighs so much that he cannot limit himself to declaiming bril-
liant conceptualizations.18 Miłosz’s voice in these essays can be best described as that of 
a “poor man,” a phrase which appears in a cycle of poems written shortly after Legends of 
Modernity. “Poor” means here threatened by annihilation, but full of persistence (i.e. not 
becoming a “Muselmann”)19 and most importantly – bringing before the tribunal of his 
own judgment the whole European civilization of the time. Unlike the authors of Dialectic 
of Enlightenment, that “poor man,” the inhabitant of “bloodlands,”20 formulated a proposal 
that was positive after all. In the final essay on Witkacy, Miłosz outlines his project of 
“poetic reason” which is in contrast to “dialectical reason” – the latter being an affirmation 
of negativity, a perpetual negation of negation. He refuses to accept the alternative between 
the “pure poetry” of Mallarmé, Paul Valéry or Father Brémond – praising the ineffable 
and, after Hegel, freed of all that is “finite and particular” – and the “practical poetry” of 
Tolstoy and Zhdanov – both in the service of practical ideology. This refusal has its origins 
not only in aesthetic taste, but also in the impulse to defend literature’s, or more broadly 
– art’s claim to truth. According to Miłosz, poetry should be able to “dance, laugh, and 
weep in answer to arguments” because it “lives precisely by what is finite, particular, real, 
animal, fleeting, and transitory. Brightness and knowledge destroy it. Ignorance, darkness, 
15 See: Legends of Modernity. “Letter Essays of Jerzy Andrzejewski and Czesław Miłosz,” p. 176.
16 Ibid.
17 Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 193-194.
18 G. Agamben, “The Witness.” Remnants of Auschwitz. The Witness and the Archive. Trans. Daniel Heller-Ro-
azen. New York, 1999. pp. 15-39.
19 See: “The Muselmann.” Remnants of Auschwitz. The Witness and the Archive, pp. 41-86.
20 T. Snyder, Bloodlands. Europe Between Hitler and Stalin. New York, 2010. 
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fables, and mystery nourish it.”21 And it should be allowed to continue this way, because 
“The civilizing form that emerges from a line of verse (...) awakens hope, averts doubt.”22 
The legend of poetry is perhaps the only myth of modernity that Miłosz wholeheartedly 
defends. Which is where his vision most radically departs from that of Adorno’s. In Minima 
Moralia, written simultaneously with Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno states: “The idea 
that after this war life will continue »normally« or even that culture might be »rebuilt« 
– as if the rebuilding of culture were not already its negation – is idiotic.”23 In Dialectic 
of Enlightenment he adds that “All post-Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, 
is garbage.”24 Here I would put my trust in the calm voice of the eyewitness – the “poor 
man,” searching through the ruins of the Staszic Palace for charred remains of books, and 
composing his “naïve poems” for “poor men.”
* * *
Fate treated Legends of Modernity unfairly. Some essays appeared after the war on sev-
eral occasions, but the whole that reveals Miłosz’s impressive intellectual project did not 
appear for more than fifty years. And what does this book mean today? Is it a curiosity? 
A monument? A contribution to intellectual biography? We have far too much to lose 
to treat it as such. If Miłosz returned in the 1970s to his wartime reflections on modernity 
(its mature fruit being The Land of Urlo), perhaps we should also return to that special 
period in Polish literature – when it knew how to formulate thoughts in a sovereign way; 
thoughts that were new, revealing, touching upon the most important human experience 
of the twentieth century. These essays were written by a “pre-war man” who could not 
yet come to terms with the annihilation of the old world. It was probably the “pre-war,” 
“hesitating” tone of these essays, their “silences, blank spots, question marks,” that in-
fluenced Miłosz’s decision not to publish the book at a time when he already experienced 
a radical breakthrough and thus acknowledged the superiority of historical necessity and 
the prevalence of facts over thinking (the breakthrough was largely influenced by Tadeusz 
Kroński). Our interaction with texts which derive their vitality from this clash of “pre-
war” sensitivity and the cataclysm of the German and Soviet occupation, seems to be the 
prerequisite for describing the intellectual condition of today. Therefore I place Legends 
of Modernity alongside the first concentration camp stories by Tadeusz Borowski, Kazi-
mierz Wyka’s Życie na niby [A Make-Believe Life], Andrzej Bobkowski’s Szkice piórkiem 
[Sketches in Pen and Ink], or the slightly later ones – Gustaw Herling-Grudziński’s World 
Apart or Józef Mackiewcz’s Road to Nowhere.
21 Legends of Modernity. “The Boundries of Art (Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz from the Perspective of Wartime 
Changes)”, p. 138.
22 Ibid., p. 143.
23 T.W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life. Trans.  E. F. N. Jephcott. London – New York, 
2005, p. 55.





The present study is an attempt to examine August Cieszkowski’s (1814-1894) philoso-
phy of history in the context of its holistic theoretical assumptions. The historiosophical 
proposal put forth by the leading representative of Polish nineteenth-century thought 
of the inter-uprising period, originally formulated in the Prolegomena to a Historioso-
phy1, postulates that to adequately express the essence of the historical process one needs 
to adopt a radically holistic approach.2 The meaning of this wholeness and, what follows, 
the adequate general sense of history is not, according to this view, a given. It emerges 
only at a certain stage of history and from this perspective appears rather as a peculiar 
task to fulfill – an ideal project carried out in the course of the objective development of 
the human spirit. According to Cieszkowski, not only the historical events themselves, i.e. 
the specific facts, are subject to change over time, but also the fundamental conceptual 
interpretation of these facts. Thus, what is perceived by Hegel as a definite independence 
of world history’s objective dynamics from subjective human will, and what he treats 
as the absolute limit of philosophical understanding in this area, for Cieszkowski is not 
a constant parameter of history but a transitory feature of the evolution of human histori-
cal self-knowledge, subject to fundamental transformations and relative in its importance 
to a specific period. According to the Polish philosopher, Hegel’s definition of historical 
dynamics as “the progress of the consciousness of freedom” reveals a fractional and im-
perfect understanding of the nature of the historical process.3 It indicates that Hegelian-
ism at some point encounters the impassable limits of its own discourse, unwarrantably 
extrapolates them and redefines them as the objective boundaries of human knowledge 
in general. Cieszkowski believes that Hegel’s philosophy of history leads to two possible 
conclusions: either the full historical self-knowledge of philosophy, i.e. a complete com-
prehension of the historical dialectic, is impossible, in which case Hegel’s speculative 
philosophy of history is a mystification, or an adequate understanding of this totality is 
1 A. Cieszkowski, Prolegomena do historiozofii, trans. A. Cieszkowski junior, in: idem, Prolegomena do histo-
riozofii. Bóg i palingeneza oraz mniejsze pisma filozoficzne z lat 1838‑1842, ed. J. Garewicz, A. Walicki. Warsaw 
1972, pp. 1-105.
2 Cf. ibid., p. 4; A. Cieszkowski, Ojcze nasz, vol. I, Poznań 1922, p. 118 and following.
3 The peculiarity of the Hegelian view of philosophy as  “a speculative system” is discussed by Światosław 
F. Nowicki – cf. Ś. F. Nowicki, Przedmowa tłumacza, in: G.W.F. Hegel, Encyklopedia nauk filozoficznych, trans. 
Ś. F. Nowicki, Warsaw 1990, p. XXI and following.
74 2013
ANDRzEJ WAWRzyNOWICz
still out of theoretical reach for Hegel’s system itself. In both cases panlogistic aspirations 
of Hegelianism appear to be unfounded. The Polish philosopher eventually opts for the 
latter supposition, justifying it at length in his largely competitive historiosophic project, 
implicitly applying Hegel’s speculative logic for his purpose. Thus, he undertakes an at-
tempt, unprecedented in the history of philosophy, to overcome Hege’s philosophy from 
within by positively developing its own assumptions.
The initial idea of “historiosophy” as a philosophical perspective capturing the 
dialectic entirety of history4 represents an aspect of Cieszkowski’s thought that has not 
suffered, it seems, any substantial injury in the course of the final ideological erosion of 
Marxism, as diagnosed by the Western history of ideas within the last quarter of the twen-
tieth century.5 However, due to certain factors this may not be said about the key features 
of Cieszkowski’s philosophical activism. His entire project of philosophy of action belongs 
to that movement in European thought which, though originally quite diverse, represents 
the broadly understood paradigm of practical philosophy. Its classic representatives can 
be found both in nineteenth-century German thought, including the leftist members of 
the Hegelian school, as well as within the circle of French thought, especially among 
the utopian socialists. The historical trend of practical philosophy in nineteenth-century 
European thought may, however, be also treated as a relatively uniform developmental 
sequence, especially when we take into account, for instance, Cieszkowski’s influence (and 
through him, the impact of French utopian socialism) on Marx (exerted through such think-
ers as M. Hess), which is the view most Western historians of Marxist philosophy appear 
to take in the works published in the second half of the twentieth century.6 However, this 
leads to a number of oversimplifications.7 A large number of theoretical affiliations and 
a wide range of receptive attitudes to historical materialism in twentieth-century Western 
thought have a peculiar negative effect: these approaches inevitably relegate any alterna-
tive concepts of practical philosophy to the margins of philosophical reflection. Thus, 
indirectly (and even more strongly than through its direct impact), Marxism has absorbed 
to some extent the theoretical content of these approaches, thus limiting their importance 
to the role of non-autonomous, secondary elements in its own genesis. Such a fate has also 
befallen Cieszkowski’s ideas which, considered as one of the historical forms of practical 
philosophy, commonly function in Western theoretical studies as merely a transitional 
link in the evolution of European thought leading from Hegel to Marx.
4 Cf. A. Cieszkowski, Prolegomena do historiozofii, op. cit., pp. 13-15.
5 Cf. L. Kołakowski, Główne nurty marksizmu. Powstanie – rozwój – rozkład, London 1988, p. 789 and following.
6 Cf. A. Cornu, Karol Marks i Fryderyk Engels. Życie i dzieło, v. 1, 1818/1820-1842, trans. and ed. M. Żurawski, 
Warsaw 1958, p. 137-139, 221; G. Lichtheim, Marxism: an Historical and Critical Study, New York 1961, p. 7; 
N. Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice. History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx, Notre Dame – London 1967, p. 
193-206; S. Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, Cambridge 1968, p. 124-131; D. McLellan, 
The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, London 1969, p. 9-11; G. Lichtheim, From Marx to Hegel, New York 1971, 
p. 8, 10-12; W. Breckman, Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory: Dethroning the 
Self,Cambridge 1999, pp. 184-187.
7 Certain myths regarding the author of Prolegomena contained in the mentioned above study by Auguste Cornu, 
are revealed in the relatively extensive analysis of Cieszkowski’s thought by Horst Stuke – cf. H. Stuke, Philoso-
phie der Tat: Studien zur Verwirklichung der Philosophie bei den Junghegelianern und den Wahren Sozialisten, 
Stuttgart 1963, p. 86 and following.
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An attempt to perceive Cieszkowski as an independent thinker was first made 
by Andrzej Walicki in the early seventies. Of crucial importance in this respect are the 
following essays: “French Inspirations behind August Cieszkowski’s Philosophical and 
Religious Thought”8 and “The Philosophy and Messianism. Studies in the History of 
Philosophy and the Social and Religious Thought of Polish Romanticism.”9 These studies 
also play an important polemical role in exposing the unilateral form in which the Hege-
lian interpretative tendency, common in the pre-war works of philosophical historians, 
is continued in post-war Polish Hegelian Marxism, especially in the views of Tadeusz 
Kroński.10 Kroński projects the extremely negative image of Cieszkowski as a representa-
tive of “the national-Catholic reaction” which supposedly separated Polish nineteenth-
century philosophy from the influence of progressive European thought, shutting it within 
the hermetic boundaries of political and religious irrationalism or even obscurantism.11 
The weaknesses of Kroński’s view become apparent when Walicki places the philosophy 
of the author of Our Father in a broader ideological context, displaying the influence of 
nineteenth-century French thought on Cieszkowski’s views.12 Kroński ignores historical 
studies already present in pre-war literature of the subject13 and overlooks the fact that 
the system created by the author of Our Father was strongly influenced both by classical 
German philosophy and French social thought.
Multiple direct and indirect references to the concepts of Saint-Simon and his fol-
lowers, to the ideas of Fourier and P. Leroux, as well as evidence of the intellectual connec-
tions and of the works read and studied by Cieszkowski, documented in his private notes14, 
make it impossible to marginalize the French influences on Cieszkowski’s ideas. Walicki 
also postulates that this context is crucial for the proper understanding of the causes that 
make it difficult to unequivocally place Cieszkowski’s concepts on one or the other side 
of the ongoing disputes between the left and the right over Hegel’s philosophical legacy.15
8 A. Walicki, “Francuskie inspiracje myśli filozoficzno-religijnej Augusta Cieszkowskiego”, Archiwum Historii 
Filozofii i Myśli Społecznej, 16 (1970): pp. 127-171.
9 A. Walicki, Filozofia a mesjanizm. Studia z dziejów filozofii i myśli społeczno‑religijnej romantyzmu polskiego, 
Warsaw 1970.
10 Cf. T. Kroński, “Koncepcje filozoficzne mesjanistów polskich w połowie XIX wieku”, Archiwum Historii Fi-
lozofii i Myśli Społecznej 2 (1957): pp. 81-123; idem, “Reakcja mesjanistyczna i katolicka w Polsce połowy XIX 
w.”, in: Z dziejów polskiej myśli filozoficznej i społecznej, vol. 3, eds. B. Baczko, N. Assorodobraj, Warsaw 1957, p. 
271-304.
11 T. Kroński, “Filozofia mesjanistyczna i katolicka w Polsce połowy XIX wieku”, in: idem, Rozważania wokół 
Hegla, Warsaw 1960, p. 161, 200, 203. See also: B. Baczko, “Niektóre węzłowe problemy rozwoju polskiej myśli 
społeczno-politycznej i filozoficznej XIX w. (do lat siedemdziesiątych)”, in: Z dziejów polskiej myśli filozoficznej 
i społecznej, vol. 3, op. cit., p. 10; A. Śladkowska, “Stosunek polskiej filozofii połowy XIX wieku do klasycznej 
filozofii niemieckiej”, Myśl Filozoficzna, 4:14 (1954): pp. 111-113.
12 Walicki refers directly to Kronksi’s views in his text written in 1972, stating his own opinion on the question of 
Cieszkowski’s place in the disputes on Hegel’s intellectual inheritance, criticizing the interpretative one-sidedness 
of both Cornu and Kroński – cf. A. Walicki, “Pisma filozoficzne Cieszkowskiego z lat 1838-1842 w kontekstach 
intelektualnych epoki”, in: A. Cieszkowski, Prolegomena do historiozofii, op. cit., p. XXV.
13 Extensive analysis of Cieszkowski’s connections with the nineteenth-century French thought may be found, for 
instance, in: A. Roszkowski, Poglądy społeczne i ekonomiczne Augusta Cieszkowskiego. Poznań 1923.
14 Cf. Papiery Augusta Cieszkowskiego, Manuscript nr 153.IV/1 and 153.IV/2, University Library in Poznan. 
15 Cf. A. Walicki, “Pisma filozoficzne Cieszkowskiego...” op. cit., p. XXVIII-XXXVI. See also: J. Garewicz, “Au-
gust Cieszkowski w oczach Niemców w latach trzydziestych-czterdziestych XIX wieku”, in: Polskie spory o He-
gla 1830-1860, Warsaw 1966, p. 209 and following; R. Panasiuk, Lewica heglowska, Warsaw 1969, p. 61; idem, 
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However, this does not change the fact that the “holistic” aspect of Cieszkowski’s 
historiosophy16 discussed in this study, closely connected with the issue of philosophi-
cal method, has its roots primarily in Hegelian idealism.17 Thus, for Cieszkowski, the 
main point of reference is not Hegel’s philosophy of the objective spirit – the constitutive 
elements of which are, on the one hand, the philosophy of the state and law, and on the 
other the philosophy of history – but speculative logic.18 Walicki seems to share to some 
extent the conviction of Hegel’s significant influence on the development of Cieszkowski’s 
philosophical method:
Władysław Tatarkiewicz in his general characterization of the Polish ide-
alist philosophy of the forties has expressed the view that Hegel’s influ-
ence had some impact on its “form and philosophical method,” but “in its 
general attitude, atmosphere and aspirations, Polish philosophy had taken 
more from France.” This generalization cannot, in my opinion, be applied 
to Trentowski or to Libelt, but is entirely correct in Cieszkowski’s case.19
Walicki’s analyses of the key components of the origins of Cieszkowski’s philoso-
phy are more balanced than those which we find in pre-war Polish history of philosophy or 
in the works of post-war Marxists. Despite being clearly dedicated to the study of “French” 
context, Walicki’s texts finally restore the right proportions in the assessment of the actual 
“Cieszkowski i lewica heglowska”, in: Przyroda, człowiek, polityka. Z dziejów filozofii niemieckiej XVIII/XIX wie-
ku, Warsaw 2002, pp. 198-212; Z. Kuderowicz, Hegel i jego uczniowie, Warsaw 1984, pp. 205-209; K. L. Michelet, 
“Szkoła heglowska i jej zróżnicowanie”, trans. J. Prokopiuk, in: Z. Kuderowicz, Hegel i jego uczniowie, op. cit., p. 
322.
16 I have outlined the basic overview of this issue in: A. Wawrzynowicz, “Elementy holizmu historiozoficznego 
w filozofii Augusta Cieszkowskiego”, Zeszyty Filozoficzne IF UAM, 12-13 (2006): pp. 157-162. Marek. N. Jaku-
bowski has earlier indicated the holistic aspect of Cieszkowski’s historiosophical proposal – cf. M.N. Jakubowski, 
“Krytyka rzeczywistości i ideał społeczny w twórczości Augusta Cieszkowskiego”, in: Studia z dziejów polskiej 
myśli politycznej: II – Polska myśl polityczna w dzielnicy pruskiej w XIX w., ed. S. Kalembka, Toruń 1990, pp. 
125-126. Zbigniew Kuderowicz discusses in more detail the question of the holistic nature of the theoretical so-
lutions of the problems of historical accuracy in contemporary thought, as well as the well-known polemic with 
these approaches undertaken in the twentieth century by Karl R. Popper – see Z. Kuderowicz, “Prawidłowości 
historyczne”, in: J. Skoczyński,  Koneczny, Teoria cywilizacji, Warsaw 2003, p. 225-242. See also: K. R. Popper, 
Nędza historycyzmu, ed. S. Amsterdamski, Warsaw 1999, pp. 9-12, 28-33, 76-96, 156-157; idem, Społeczeństwo 
otwarte i jego wrogowie: (2) Wysoka fala proroctw: Hegel, Marks i następstwa, trans. H. Krahelska, Warsaw 1993, 
pp. 272-293.
17 Cf. H. Schnädelbach, Filozofia w Niemczech 1831‑1933, trans. K. Krzemieniowa, Warszawa 1992, p. 80; J. To-
polski, Metodologia historii, Warsaw 1973, p. 100. Jerzy Szacki presents Hegel’s entire social philosophy as an 
example of “radically holistic” concept, defining holism in the social theory as “an assumption that to be able 
to understand anything in the social life one must approach it as a totality, in which one may see various “aspects” 
or “moments”, yet one must not assign to any of these an ability to autonomous existence” – J. Szacki, Historia 
myśli socjologicznej (New edition), Warsaw 2005, p. 208. See also K. Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social 
Psychology, London 1953, p. 188.
18 H. Schnädelbach writes that Hegel does not construct any bridge connecting the pre-philosophical approach 
with the speculative (and thus, properly philosophical), because Hegelian philosophy is founded on the “holistic 
concept of consciousness” – cf. H. Schnädelbach, Hegel. Wprowadzenie, trans. A.J. Noras, Warsaw 2006, p. 161, 
167. A. Synowiecki emphasizes the ontological and methodological nature of Hegelian holism, indicating its ori-
gins precisely in Hegel’s logic, in the concept of dialectical unity of being and thinking – cf. A. Synowiecki, Byt 
i myślenie: U źródeł marksistowskiej ontologii i logiki dialektycznej, Warsaw 1980, p. 74, 134, 164.
19 A. Walicki, “Francuskie inspiracje myśli filozoficzno-religijnej Augusta Cieszkowskiego”, op. cit., v. 16, p. 129.
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extent of the German and French influences on the final shape of Cieszkowski’s philo-
sophical standpoint.20 Cieszkowski builds his philosophical theory in the middle ground 
“between” Berlin and Paris, and the intensity of these influences is changing over time. The 
German aspect, dominant in the initial stage of the development of Cieszkowski’s system, 
gradually loses its importance, giving way to a stronger French influence. Even as early 
as the Prolegomena, while forming the idea of “historiosophy,” Cieszkowski refers to the 
French inspirations mainly to explode the rigid framework of orthodox Hegelianism, be-
cause he is primarily interested in the philosophical “method” and “means.” We may trace 
how, during the ten years separating the respective publications of the Prolegomena and 
the first volume of Our Father, this initial priority of the method (i.e. Hegelian dialectic) in 
Cieszkowski’s philosophy gives way to a peculiar priority of the philosophical “purpose.” 
It is worth noting that these two dimensions were never clearly separate for the Polish 
philosopher (in accord with the general intention of Hegel’s dialectical method). In the 
late forties of the nineteenth century the belief that the goals of philosophy determine its 
methods, and not vice versa, clearly gains precedence in Cieszkowski’s thought. It seems 
that this aspect ultimately determined his formal separation from the Hegelian philosophi-
cal method, as well as his final subordination of it (in Our Father) to the perspective of 
religious philosophy.21
Direct postulates of Hegel’s political philosophy, pronounced in the Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right22, as well as the basic method of employing these postulates in Hegel’s 
reflections on universal history, do not provide Cieszkowski with an effective philosophical 
apparatus for describing the present situation. Hegel’s historiosophical reflection presented 
in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History23 certainly does not allow for a theoreti-
cal problematization of the issue of national aspirations of political communities, such as 
Poles in the nineteenth century, deprived of sovereign statehood.24 For instance, Hegel’s 
history of philosophy sets a framework which, on the one hand, supports the historical 
consciousness of the Polish national community. This framework enables Polish intel-
lectuals of the period to go beyond the (“irrational”) hopes of national revival grounded 
in religion and supported by the Messianic message of Romantic literature. Hegelian 
historiosophical thought, with its central idea of historical logic, in this case paradoxically 
reinforces faith in the “rationality” of the historical process. On the other hand, however, 
Hegel first of all limits the scope of the historical rationale to a narrow circle of historical 
20 It is worth noting the difference of the publishing location (corresponding to the difference in the “target” au-
dience) of Cieszkowski’s most important philosophical works, quite symbolic in this context: – Prolegomena do 
historiozofii was originally published in Berlin, in German (cf. A. Cieszkowski, Prolegomena zur Historiosophie, 
Berlin 1838), while the first volume of Our Father, the only one published during the author’s life, was released ten 
years later in Paris, in Polish (cf. A. Cieszkowski, Ojcze-Nasz, v. I., Paris 1848).
21 However, this is in no way a “break up” from Hegel. Walter Kühne, who studied Cieszkowski’s private library 
containing ca. 40 000 volumes, writes that in the collections made available to him French literature, though plen-
tiful, was not as well represented as the German literature. Cieszkowski owned the full works of Hegel (in multiple 
copies) in each of his properties in Poland. See W. Kühne, “Die Bibliothek des Grafen August Cieszkowski, ” 
Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen 1933:415-416.
22 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet,  ed. A. W. Wood, Cambridge 1991.
23 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, trans. R. Alvarado, Aalten 2011.




nations, from which the Slavs (Cieszkowski’s main interest) are excluded, and secondly 
he presents universal history as a closed process, thus excluding not only the possibility 
of learning the future, but in a sense also the very possibility of a future history as such, 
namely – a historical future as a process that might bring to the current dynamics of the 
human spirit new creative ideas.25 In fact, further historical progress may be considered, 
in the orthodox Hegelian perspective, only as a progress into infinity, contributing nothing 
essentially creative to the former development. In this sense, the Hegelian view of history 
can be seen as a prefiguration of the idea of “post-history” promoted by the postmodernists 
of the late twentieth century.26 Even though the latter usually try in their official standpoints 
to locate themselves on the antipodes of Hegelianism, the case of Francis Fukuyama, who 
builds a kind of philosophical bridge between postmodernism and Hegelianism, indicates 
that there is a deep-seated ideological point of contact between these seemingly opposing 
visions of reality.27 This connecting point is the idea of “the end of history.”
This issue is complex and ambiguous already in Hegelianism itself. If we read 
Hegel’s historiosophical statement as faithfully as possible, i.e. according to the declara-
tions of its author, we must perceive it not only as a diagnosis of the end of history of 
philosophy, supposedly fulfilled by the establishment of the system of absolute idealism, 
but also as the end of political history, after which there may only be (in contemporary 
terms) a “post-history” – a mechanical repetition of the past in various configurations, 
a replication of whatever has already (creatively) taken place in the past. In this sense, 
Hegel’s postmodern critics should be, paradoxically, counted among the advocates of 
a more orthodox interpretation of his philosophy of history. In contrast, Cieszkowski’s 
“historiosophy” represents a clearly heterodox approach to Hegel’s conception of history.28 
From this point of view it is of particular interest today and – given the lack of a wider 
historical theoretical response to this proposal at the time of its creation in the first half 
of the nineteenth century – seems quite innovative. Shlomo Avineri, one of the leading 
representatives of contemporary political philosophy, wrote the following about Ciesz-
kowski in the introduction to the Polish edition of his classic book Hegel’s Theory of the 
Modern State29:
Count August Cieszkowski was one of the first Polish interpreters of Hegel’s 
thought. His two opera magna – Prolegomena zur Historiosophie (1938) 
and Our Father (1848) – while very different in their political and religious 
orientations, make a very original use of Hegelian metaphysics, surpass-
ing the limitations of Hegelian philosophy of history. In the Prolegomena 
we find for the first time a criticism of Hegel’s anti-futurological attitude, 
25 Cf. M. N. Jakubowski, Narodowe i uniwersalne: Cztery studia o polskiej filozofii politycznej doby romantyzmu, 
Toruń 2002, p. 26 and following.
26 Cf. T. Buksiński, “Postmodernistyczna historia, czyli koniec rozumu i wolności”, in: Wolność a racjonalność, 
ed. T. Buksiński, Poznań 1993, p. 69-98.
27 Cf. ibidem, p. 96. See also: E. Angehrn, Filozofia dziejów, trans. J. Marzęcki, Kęty 2007, p. 176.
28 Cf. M. N. Jakubowski, Narodowe i uniwersalne: Cztery studia o polskiej filozofii politycznej doby romantyzmu, 
op. cit., p. 15.
29 S. Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, Cambridge 1972.
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as well as a project of philosophy which goes beyond the limitations of 
its own time, leading humanity towards a society that would be based on 
social solidarity of non-alienated individuals. In Our Father – a much later 
work – Cieszkowski turns to philosophical mysticism, future-oriented, yet 
at the same time rooted in Catholicism and faith in the historic mission of 
the regenerated Polish nation. In both of these books Cieszkowski attempts 
a kind of Copernican revolution, dialectically removing the conservative 
aspects of Hegelian philosophy of history and politics.30
The major prewar monographs devoted to the concepts developed by the author 
of Our Father, starting with Adam Żółtowski’s Graf August Cieszkowski’s “Philosophie 
der Tat”31, through Walter Kühne’s Graf August Cieszkowski – ein Schüler Hegels und 
des deutschen Geistes32, and ending with Philosophie der Freiheit bei Graf August Ciesz-
kowski by Albert Wojtaczak33, all integrally connect Cieszkowski’s philosophical project 
with the religious character of Polish national thought, though at the same time they all 
maintain a critical distance from any attempt to unilaterally blur the boundary between 
theological and philosophical interpretations of the system developed by the author of the 
Prolegomena.34 It seems that one may, even today, defend the “German” line of interpre-
tation in the studies of Cieszkowski’s philosophy, avoiding on the one hand the danger 
of unwarranted alignment with the Catholic-nationalist interpretation of this philosophy, 
and – on the other – the one-sidedness of the evaluations made from the Marxist point of 
view (including Hegelian Marxism). However, apart from the question of direct or indirect 
influences on the genesis of Cieszkowski’s ideas (which generates a potentially endless 
dispute among the historians of ideas on the preeminence of one or another inspiration 
30 S. Avineri, Hegla teoria nowoczesnego państwa, trans.T. Rosiński, Warsaw 2009, p. 14.
31 A. Żółtowski, Graf August Cieszkowski‘s Philosophie der Tat: Die Grundzüge seiner Lehre und der Aufbau 
seines Systems, Poznań 1904.
32 W. Kühne, Graf August Cieszkowski ein Schüler Hegels und des deutschen Geistes: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte 
des deutschen Geisteseinflusses auf die Polen, Leipzig 1938.
33 A. Wojtczak, Philosophie der Freiheit bei Graf August Cieszkowski: Eine spiritualische Lösung des Freiheit-
sproblems, Niepokalanów 1933.
34 It appears that the tendency to partially eliminate the difference between Cieszkowski’s mature philosophy, 
fully represented in the multi-volume edition of Our Father, published posthumously, and the theological position 
of the Catholic Church, was a peculiar echo of Cieszkowski’s intellectual testament, given just before his death 
to his son, together with the entire legacy of manuscripts. August Cieszkowski junior, the direct executor of the 
philosopher’s spiritual testament who was also the editor of the posthumous edition of Our Father, has successfully 
fulfilled the “task” entrusted to him, which was in fact the result of his father’s anxieties about the reaction of the 
Catholic public opinion in Poland to a publication of the full version of his opus magnum. This fact did not escape 
the attention of some of the scholars who analyze the history of reception of Cieszkowski’s thought. In this context 
André Liebich writes about the myth of Cieszkowski as an impeccable, orthodox Catholic, deliberately sustained 
by the son of the philosopher, while Walter Kühne in his relation of the visits to Wierzenica in the twenties and 
his personal contacts with August Cieszkowski junior, casts the philosopher’s son as a tragic figure, crushed by 
the weight of having to execute his father’s intellectual testament – cf. A. Liebich, Between Ideology and Utopia: 
The Politics and Philosophy of August Cieszkowski, Dordrecht 1979, p. 6; W. Kühne, Erlebnisse eines Polonisten: 
Die Besuche des Slawisten Walter Kühne bei Graf August Cieszkowski dem Jüngeren auf Schloß Wierzenica bei 
Posen in den Jahren 1924 und 1929: Zur Verständigung der Völker, hrsg. H. Ehret. Rendsburg 1995, p. 12. See also: 




or connection with certain trends emerging in the historical development of European 
thought), there remains the question of an adequate account of the philosophical content 
of the proposal under consideration. This is what is most essential here. An analysis of the 
differences and similarities between Cieszkowski’s ideas and other theoretical projects 
does not sufficiently explicate the philosophical significance of his conceptions and does 
not explain why the modern reader should bother himself with the thoughts of the author 
of Our Father.
It is undeniable that Cieszkowski’s system did not simply appear out of nowhere, 
in a historic void; that it was subject to certain external influences and internal changes 
resulting from its evolution over time. However, the philosophical significance of this sys-
tem is determined neither exclusively by the number of ideological relationships with other 
doctrines which may be identified, nor by the lack of such relationships (although this latter 
aspect may be considered as a mark of originality and even, in some cases, as evidence 
of the thinker’s intellectual genius). The presence of such influences may also be treated 
as a sign of sterile eclecticism, while the lack of theoretical correspondences with other 
historical doctrines may in turn indicate pretentiousness and false originality. Thus, when 
we analyze a given philosophical system, we are first and foremost looking for an adequate 
interpretative key that will allow us to understand the system in its main structural elements 
as a meaningful whole – a totality that will turn out to be not only formally consistent, but 
will also in its general content and meaning appear to be properly philosophical.35 There-
fore, what is important is not solely the fact that in someone’s mind, in a given historical 
moment a certain idea was born, bearing a number of similarities and differences in rela-
tion to analogous ideas appearing in a different place and time. The history of philosophy 
is not limited to the study of a specific philosophical position understood as a set of ideas 
emerging mechanically over time and assigned to a specific individual or a group of peo-
ple. The true subject of study is never a given and this concerns both philosophy and the 
subject of the history of philosophy. Philosophical and historiosophical analysis does not 
have a distinct field which would determine in advance the essential purpose and the target 
range of the theoretical exploration of the sources. In each case, the analysis of the sources 
is rather a means to a synthesis of resource materials. In our case, it is the spiritual factor 
itself that is the true subject and source, and it is never entirely separated from the spiritual 
self-knowledge of the scholar. The initial isolation of the object of analysis is therefore purely 
relative and temporary, and must be abolished in creating the final understanding of the 
source analyzed as a certain spiritual whole. The unconditional separation of the subject 
and object of research may in this case be merely a function of the subjective inflexibility 
of the scholar who persists in remaining in opposition to the source, or in other words – 
a function of the unbending antagonism to the particular philosophical view which is being 
examined, and of the inability to cross over to the other side, i.e. to the initial point of view. 
Thus, the source of the problem is that in philosophical or historiosophical research we are 
not dealing, in the end, with a fixed object – as we would be in standard scientific research. 
The object of the study is always the free subjectivity of the philosopher: spiritual creativ-
ity revolving within the sphere of autonomous self-knowledge – the active human spirit. 
35 Cf. S. Pieróg, “Rozdroża historii filozofii,” Rocznik Historii Filozofii Polskiej 1(2008): p. 107 and following.
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A purely object-oriented (instrumental) treatment of such an object of research turns out 
to be a distortion, a violation of the object’s freedom and, indirectly, a self-abuse on the part 
of the scholar. And yet, to cut across the immediate boundaries of one’s own self-knowledge 
in one’s analysis of a given attitude, to be able to set oneself in the position of the analyzed 
philosophical object, i.e. the original self-knowledge of the creator of a system – all this for 
the historian of philosophy is a necessity and not a matter of random decision. It is, we must 
conclude, the very condition of reaching the object of study in its undistorted form. The 
method of analytical research is not a goal in itself in the process of reconstructing a given 
philosophical doctrine, but it is a means to an end – to a goal that is beyond the immediate 
boundaries of a purely formal theoretical analysis. That goal is to attain a synthetic unity 
with the source material on the basis of the historian’s own (philosophical) self-knowledge. 
Therefore, the historian never makes his analysis of the various philosophical concepts in 
a purely formal (instrumental) way, but always with a specific purpose in mind, because 
these essential concepts have a specific meaning for him36. Thus, he selects them out of 
a range of other views, leaving these other concepts temporarily or permanently out of his 
field of vision, or simply ignoring them (as irrelevant), precisely because he himself chooses 
out of the never-ending variety of historical doctrines which aspire to the status of philoso-
phy those that seem relevant to him. Therefore, it is the philosophical self-knowledge of the 
historian of philosophy that is decisive in the initial selection and the ultimate sanctioning 
of that which is considered philosophically substantial. We find this sort of a general at-
titude to the object of philosophy and history of philosophy already in the earliest works of 
Cieszkowski, originally written as a doctorate thesis defended in 1838 in Hei delberg and 
published in 1841 in a revised Polish version under the title Reflections on Ionian Philosophy 
as an Introduction to the History of Philosophy.37 According to Cieszkowski, there is no 
definite borderline between the object of philosophy, or the history of philosophy, and the 
(philosophical) idea of – respectively – philosophy and the history of philosophy.38 On this 
conviction (Hegelian in its origin39) the author of the Prolegomena to a Historiosophy bases 
his entire conception of history as an evolving (spiritual) whole which at its highest level of 
generalization turns out to be a process of enacting humanity’s self-knowledge.40 This initial 
point of view on the nature of the history of philosophy41 determines the methodology of 
36 Cf. ibid., p. 110.
37 A. Cieszkowski, “Rzecz o filozofii jońskiej jako wstęp do historyi filozofii,” Biblioteka Warszawska 1 (1841): 
pp. 287-306, 536-561; new edition of the text: idem, “Rzecz o filozofii jońskiej jako wstęp do historii filozofii”, 
in: idem, Prolegomena do historiozofii... op. cit., pp. 245-290. This work is published in an unfinished form: the 
exegesis is interrupted on Anaksymander’s view. In Walter Kühne’s monograph dedicated to Cieszkowski we also 
find a few pages in German transcribed from the manuscript of Cieszkowski’s doctoral dissertation, which is the 
original version of the discourse on the Ionian philosophy. This passage does not have the full equivalent in Polish 
edition – cf. [A. Cieszkowski], “S. 9-16 des deutschen Manuskriptes für die Dissertation ‘De philosophiae ionicae 
ingenio, vi, loco‘”, in:  W. Kühne, Graf August Cieszkowski... op. cit., pp. 431-440. The full version of the disserta-
tion has been lost – cf. W. Kühne, Die Polen und die Philosophie Hegels, in: Hegel bei den Slaven, D. Tschižewskij 
(hrsg.), Darmstadt: 1961, p. 53.
38 Cf. A. Cieszkowski, “Rzecz o filozofii jońskiej jako wstęp do historii filozofii”, op. cit., pp. 247-251.
39 Cf. T. Buksiński, Rozumność filozofii i historii filozofii, in: Hegel a współczesność, ed. R. Kozłowski, Poznań 
1997, p. 75.
40 A. Cieszkowski, Prolegomena do historiozofii, op. cit., p. 16.
41 Cf. A. Wawrzynowicz, “Augusta Cieszkowskiego próba eksplikacji heglowskiego pojęcia historii filozofii”, 
Rocznik Historii Filozofii Polskiej, I (2008): pp. 121-140.
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finding a solution to the problem of the philosophy of history. Cieszkowski manages to go 
beyond the limitations of Hegelian philosophy of history because he is able to consistently 
join together those aspects which Hegel ends up separating, i.e. a reflection on the history of 
philosophy and a reflection on the philosophy of history. And precisely this ability to form 
a homogeneous view of the social, political and philosophical aspects of the historical 
process allows Cieszkowski to formulate a general thesis that history is a united whole. 
Adam Żółtowski in the aforementioned monograph on Cieszkowski already indicated this 
historical quality of Cieszkowski’s historiosophical reflection, although he did not fully 
explain its theoretical pedigree:
For Cieszkowski, history in general is not only the sum of human lives and 
products, experiences and actions, but a homogeneous whole comprising 
all these aspects, a living organism, a transcendental unity. It is a unity of 
development and a development of unity; a totality of infinite variety and 
diversity; an “embodiment of the concept of humanity.”42
Thus, regardless of the weight assigned by Żółtowski to the idea of “philosophy 
of action” in his interpretation of Cieszkowski’s system, he does not leave out the key 
role which the speculative idea of “historiosophy” plays in that system. This is confirmed 
by one of the most important theses of his monographs, namely – that “Cieszkowski’s 
philosophy is basically a philosophy of history.”43 However, this still leaves open the task 
of substantiating this belief through a comprehensive explication of the philosophical 
premises of Cieszkowski’s historiosophical holism.44
42 A. Żółtowski, Graf August Cieszkowski‘s “Philosophie der Tat“... op. cit., p. 11; in the original version: „Die 
Weltgeschichte ist also für Cieszkowski nicht bloss die Summe menschlichen Lebens und Webens, menschlicher 
Erlebnisse und Taten, sondern ihr einheitliches Ganze, ihr, lebendiger Organismus, ihre transcendente Einheit. Sie 
ist die Einheit der Entwickelung und die Entwickelung der Einheit, sie ist das Ganze der unendlichen Differenzie-
rung und Mannigfaltigkeit, sie ist die »Realisierung des Begriffes der Menschheit«.”
43 Ibid., p. 66; in the original version: “(...) im Grunde die ganze Philosophie Cieszkowskis Geschichtsphilosophie 
ist (...)”. Żółtowski adds a more extensive commentary to his thesis, suggesting the need to clearly distinguish 
between the perspective of the “philosophy of history” as the groundwork on which Cieszkowski’s entire system is 
based, and the perspective of “futuristic philosophy” initially projected in Prolegomena to a Historiosophy, which 
according to Żółtowski may be most fittingly described using Cieszkowski’s own definition of “philosophy of 
action” from his Bóg i palingeneza. The project of this future “philosophy of action” may be considered to be “the 
highest, most essential and ultimate result” of the philosophical reflection of Our Father’s author, if we retain the 
awareness of the key importance in this project of the “philosophy of history”. In Żółtowski’s opinion, Cieszkow-
ski’s thought never quite abandons this foundation – cf. ibid., p. 66-67.
44 This text is the English translation of the “Introduction”, originally published in: A. Wawrzynowicz, Filozoficz-
ne przesłanki holizmu historiozoficznego w myśli Augusta Cieszkowskiego, Poznań 2010.
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APOCALYPSE AND POLITICS. 
SOME REMARKS ON THE POLITICAL 
THEOLOGY OF JACOB TAUBES
Rabbi Ben Levi, on the Sabbath, read
A volume of the Law, in which it said,
“No man shall look upon my face and live.”
And as he read, he prayed that God would give
His faithful servant grace with mortal eye
To look upon His face and yet not die.
                                                H.W. Longfellow1
Poseur, scribbler, provocateur, seducer, trifler, uncompromising theologian, thinker of such 
broad scope that the shrewdest rabbis of his time could not follow – these are all masks, 
costumes in which Jacob Taubes chose to dress up his uninhibited thought, his unique way 
of being. A little kitschy, always provocative, undoubtedly a genius, he saw everywhere 
“signs of the approaching End”; at the same time, as one can tell from his chaotic writing, 
he wanted – like Rabbi Ben Levi – to capture the first moment of the apocalypse, to spot 
the rising tide and even to outstrip it.
CURRICULUM VITAE
He was born in 1923 in Vienna into a rabbinical family. In 1936 the whole family moved 
to politically neutral Switzerland where Taubes’s father was appointed chief rabbi. He 
completed his education in Basel and Zurich. In 1947 in Zurich he defended a doctoral 
thesis on Messianic ideas in Western culture (Abendländische Eschatologie), which he 
then published as a book – the only one published in his lifetime. He became friends with 
Armin Mohler, the author of the term “conservative revolution,” a would-be SS man (they 
did not want him), later the secretary of Ernst Jünger. At the same time he maintained close 
intellectual ties with the Protestant theologian Karl Barth and with Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
the influential Catholic priest and prominent theologian. In 1949 he was employed at the 
Jewish Theological Seminary in New York. He attended Leo Strauss’s seminar held at 
1 H.W. Longfellow, “The Spanish Jew’s Tale. The Legend of Rabbi Ben Levi”, in: idem, The Poetical Works of 
Longfellow. London – New York – Toronto: Oxford University Press 1906, p. 358. 
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the New School for Social Research. While in the States, he also met Hannah Arendt and 
Paul Tillich. It’s a small world.
In 1951 Taubes was awarded the Warburg scholarship and went to work at the 
university in Jerusalem. He was admitted by the rector of the Hebrew University, Hugo 
Bergman, who would later describe Taubes’s intellectual abilities as “absolutely excep-
tional,” while pointing to his characteristic “disreputable behavior (...) his chutzpah and 
his verve.”2 The Israeli episode is particularly interesting for it was then that Taubes began 
his study of the Apostle Paul’s epistolography, which brought him posthumous fame when 
published in 1993 as four lectures on Pauline political theology.3 His efforts focused on 
the creative application of some conceptual solutions to biblical issues, as developed by 
Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin. Interpreted anew, Paul, the apostle of the state of 
emergency is presented as a follower of Isaac, Moses’s rival in the creation of a spiritual 
community ab ovo, and finally as an uncompromising enemy of Jews who are “kept in 
captivity under the law,” and hence someone who is both outside and inside the law. It 
is possible that Taubes saw himself as such a border figure, moving between these two 
areas: of law and of lawlessness, of convention and of ridiculing all conventions. Suffice 
it to say that Gershom Scholem, who had invited Taubes to come to Israel, one day told 
him to pack up and go back where he came from. And the otherwise outstanding student 
and scholar was bid farewell with a rather unrefined word – Verräter (traitor).4
In Israel, Taubes became friends with Geulah Cohen, Bergman’s M.A. student and 
activist of the Lechi extremist military organization that strived to actualize by force Jew-
ish Messianic ideas. She later recalled: “When I joined the boys for one of their missions, 
I felt the spark of primordial fire, the same spark that would burn in me years later on 
giving birth.”5 And thus the end is the beginning, killing inspires the thought of the birth 
of a new life, a new world rises from the ruins of the old one. I think that Taubes must have 
had an extraordinary ear for this kind of radicalism. Taubes’s letter addressed to Berg-
man sheds an interesting light on the relations between himself and Cohen: “Yesterday 
I postponed my study of ontology and went to see Geulah (so you see I took your advice 
finally), eventually finding her. We sat together till after midnight, and I came to see that 
her nationalist thinking is full of truly messianic yearning. I said, »The goal should not 
be to reach the kingdom [Malchut], but first to produce a man worthy of it.« (...) Geulah 
answered, »The empty vessel is ready to accept the wealth of sacredness [Shefa Kodesh]«.”6 
Partly a soldier and partly a radio journalist, in her journalistic activity Cohen made use 
of something that might be called “antinormative messianic discourse” which Taubes 
greatly admired. Using Schmitt’s language, she voiced the rights and interests of the ma-
jority of Jewish settlers: “There is no hatred between me and the Palestinians,” she would 
emphasize. “They are the enemy in a legitimate struggle over land.”7 Cohen’s opinion was 
that the legitimacy of the Arab-Jewish confrontation was due to its political-theological 
2 N. Lebovic, “The Jerusalem School: The Theopolitical Hour”, in: New German Critique, 3-4: 2008, p. 107.
3 J. Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, trans. D. Hollander. Stanford: Stanford University Press 1993.  
4 B. Babich, “Ad Jacob Taubes”, in: New Nietzsche Studies, 3-4: 2008, p. vi.
5 N. Lebovic, “The Jerusalem School”, op. cit., p. 110.
6 Ibid., p. 111.
7 Ibid.
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character. “Cohen is a nonpracticing Jew,” to cite Nitzan Lebovic, “and she does not see 
her messianic perspective as in any way religious. Her politics ascribes sacredness to the 
Zionist enterprise without appealing to divine law.”8 The very right to free life and the 
freedom to determine one’s own fate seemed “holy” enough.
At the time of its formation Israel was a country in a state of emergency. It strug-
gled for existence and its own substance using all means available and all possible forces. 
Jews would find some surprisingly good solutions to crisis situations in the writings of 
Carl Schmitt, which Taubes noted – with considerable amusement – in his famous essay 
on this German political theologian:
Not only was Jerusalem a divided city in the 1940s and 1950s, but the He-
brew University had been exiled from Mount Scopus and was located in 
a monastery in the city center. The great library was locked up on Mount 
Scopus, where an Israeli guard changed every fortnight under the supervi-
sion of the United Nations.
Contrary to the terms of the official truce, which said that nothing could be 
taken from Mount Scopus into the city, and nothing from the city to Mount 
Scopus, the decree was circumvented with the help of members of the guard 
who, when they came back to the city, filled their trousers and bags with 
books that the university library had labeled “urgent.”
So it came about that, as a novice, I was to give lectures on the philosophy 
of the seventeenth century. I went to the library director and told him of my 
problem. For a lecture on Descartes I needed a historical and philosophical 
sketch of the term law in both its natural scientific and juridico-theological 
senses.
The differing conceptions that came together in the term Gesetz had to be 
identified more exactly. The only source that could help me deal with this 
problem was Carl Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre, which dealt with the problem 
of nomos / lex / Gesetz.
The chief librarian listened carefully, but explained that he was powerless 
to speed the book ordering process. It could take two or three months be-
fore I got hold of the book. This was little help, since in three months the 
semester would be over.
You can imagine how surprised I was when, three weeks later, just before 
the beginning of the semester, I was called to the library and was able to 
pick up a copy of Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre. The chief librarian quickly 
explained that I should not get any big ideas; the day after I had put in 
a request for the Verfassungslehre they had received an urgent call from 
the Ministry of Justice: the minister of justice, Pinchas Rosen (formerly 
Rosenblüth), needed Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre so that he could deal with 
some difficult problems in the drafting of a constitution for the state of Israel. 




now arrived in the library on its return journey, where my urgent request 
had been kept against an “opportune moment.”
There is a subsequent European and American history to this. I must admit 
to being more bemused than taken with the idea that the constitution of the 
State of Israel (a constitution which fortunately still does not exist) would 
be drafted using Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre as a guide.
I wrote about this to my “Swiss” school friend Armin Mohler and added to it 
a reflection on the problem of the Fascist intelligentsia. I wrote something 
like: for me, Martin Hei degger and Carl Schmitt are the most significant 
exponents of German intellect from the later 1920s and early 1930s. That 
both involved themselves with the Hitler regime presents me with a problem 
that I cannot resolve by appealing to the inner bastard of Nazism. I men-
tioned also that both came from a Catholic background, just like Hitler and 
Goebbels actually.9
Martin Buber, Hugo Bergman, Geulah Cohen, Jacob Taubes – these are the four 
names of the most prominent representatives of Jewish political theology of that time. In 
that minefield, that reality which was unfavorable to Jews, the contestants’ political colors 
ceased to be of much importance. They shared hostility towards “the world as it is,” the 
world that pushed against them from all sides. But one more thing brought them close 
together. It was a liking for the books of Carl Schmitt whose theory provided them with 
a basis for their actions, resulting in very specific political and theological outcomes. They 
agreed with the German constitutionalist as to the fact that the basic theological concepts 
and terms became secularized, i.e. misrepresented, thus losing their divine power and 
sanction, and gaining an impure power, a “devilish,” “infernal” one. As Taubes puts it: 
“Secularization is thus not a positive concept for Schmitt. On the contrary, to him it is the 
devil.”10 Under the new conditions, God is no longer the source of the supernatural, nor is 
it Him who suspends the laws of nature for “a certain time.” Sovereign is he who decides 
on the state of exception, who has the authority to determine exceptions. A sovereign deci-
sion constitutes all possible relations, including the most important one which defines the 
difference between an enemy and a friend, between the unfriendly time of the past and 
the future time that is filled with hope. “The present becomes an unreal boundary between 
the »no-longer« of the past and the »not-yet« of the future. Time is not the place of life, but 
contains the pestilential smell of death, and plunges life into the Sheol of the past. Not until 
the End Time, at the end of time, when transience itself passes away, will eternity triumph 
over the deadly principle of time. It is the work of magic.”11 Neither of magic, nor of art, but 
politics, as Taubes would modify his view while in Jerusalem. If, whether one wants it or 
not, one abides in a place where the substance of time and the substance of eternity, death 
and life, intersect, one must – for some pious reason, in the name of the “not-yet-existing” 
God – turn to the means of destruction, the means that are used to carry out a massacre. 
9 J. Taubes, “Carl Schmitt: Apocalyptic Prophet of the Counterrevolution”, in: idem, To Carl Schmitt. Letters and 
Reflections, trans. K. Tribe. New York: Columbia University Press 2013, pp. 9-11.  
10 J. Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, op. cit., p. 66.
11 J. Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, trans. D. Ratmoko. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2009, p. 8.
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“God,” Taubes writes, “will annihilate the world and then appear in his might. (...) If the 
demonic, destructive element is missing, the petrified order, the prevailing positivity of 
the world cannot be overcome.”12 (I will return to this issue later on.)
The above quoted words seemed to Geulah Cohen to theologically support the 
fight against the Arabs, while both Hugo Bergman and Martin Buber, in their political 
calculations, regarded Zionism as “a mistake”: “I have a bad feeling,” Buber wrote to Berg-
man in 1927, “because we came here without asking permission from those populating 
the land.”13 Taubes’s attitude to Zionism was also critical, but out of different, not quite 
sentimental reasons. He believed that the attempt to transform the movement into politi-
cal messianism ended in complete failure. Israel was created in the shape and likeness of 
a nineteenth-century nation-state. Thus, the cardinal and most significant sin of Zionism 
was its “negation of Jewish avant-garde” – Jewish spirituality was reduced by the Zionists 
to “normal existence.”14
Having returned to the United States from Isreal, Taubes found a job at Beacon 
Press, where he was asked to supervise a series on “radical philosophy.” And thus he com-
missioned books from Schmitt and Buber. The former refused politely, the latter published 
his famous Paths in Utopia.15
Starting in 1949, Taubes lectured in philosophy of religion in New York, then in 
Jerusalem between 1951-1953, and then, by a symptomatic stroke of luck, at Harvard, 
Princeton and Columbia University. In 1996 he became professor at the Freie Universität 
in Berlin. Almost everybody in Germany agreed with Gadamer when he said that Taubes 
was “a wastrel of his talents.”16
Taubes’s first wife, Susan (primo voto Feldman, 1928-1969), the writer and cultural 
anthropologist, described the nightmare of their relationship in her novel titled Divorcing. 
Their toxic entanglements are best illustrated in a passage at the beginning of the novel 
in which Sophie (Susan) vivisects the confrontational personality of her husband Ezra 
(Taubes):
Ezra began with a very small point. So small that Sophie didn’t realize at all 
that he was starting a quarrel. A little thing that can be settled in a minute, 
she thought, or a little thing there’s nothing to be done about that can be 
dismissed in a minute. Then as Ezra went on developing his point for an 
immoderately long time, it dawned on Sophie that the issue wasn’t simply 
a particular tie he couldn’t locate and blamed her for failing to pack, or her 
having failed to pack other items on other occasions, or her disregard for 
his appearance, or for her own appearance – her disregard for appearances 
12 Ibid., p. 10.
13 N. Lebovic, “The Jerusalem School”, op. cit., p. 114.
14 An undated letter from Jacob Taubes to Hugo Bergman (early 1952), in: N. Lebovic, “The Jerusalem School”, 
op. cit., p. 117.
15 From Taubes’s letter to Schmitt, dated August 2, 1955, it can be inferred that the book in question is The Conse-
rvative Tradition, an anthology of texts by authors such as Schmitt, Bonald, Donoso Cortes, and even Pope Pius IX.
16 B. Babich, “Ad Jacob Taubes”, op. cit., p. viii. 
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in general. The issue was really all the consequences this had on their lives 
and would continue to accumulate. The issue was enormous.17
She committed suicide when she discovered that Taubes had left her and their two 
children for Margherita von Brentano, the Kant specialist at Freie Universität. The pre-
sumption is, though, that the reason behind Taubes’s second marriage was other than love. 
“Von Brentano,” as Taubes would always address his new wife, was to him the embodiment 
of the highest virtues and values of the German spirit, which is possibly why he decided 
to marry her, thus breaking the law that had been in force in Germany thirty years earlier18.
Jacob Taubes was a great womanizer, a fact which in itself would not be worth 
dwelling on were it not that he himself, like a Don Juan, was keen on communicating his 
sexual conquests to a broad audience. “If you sleep with the same woman twice, you’ve 
joined the establishment,” he liked to repeat the famous 1960s slogan. Whenever he went 
to Rome with Ingeborg Bachmann, he would always assume a false identity, in case 
someone was following in his footsteps.
He was famous for his lack of tact and his untidiness. He always wore black, did not 
change his clothes for weeks. He was a messy eater. He was always in a hurry. He made 
free use of other people’s belongings (his writings are mostly made up of cryptoquota-
tions, verging on plagiarism) and attributed to others that which was his (he considered 
his thoughts to be some foreign secretion which he must get rid of as soon as possible). 
I will now try to relate one more scene (after Babette Babich whose memoir I am relying 
on here), a very revealing one in which they both took part.
When in Paris, Taubes took her to a synagogue. It was shrouded in darkness. 
Being a woman, Babich could only take her seat in the balcony, nowhere else. Taubes 
sat below, in the immediate vicinity of the sanctuary. She looked at him as if he con-
tained within himself the entire history of the Jewish nation. She saw in him at once 
a man and a prophet. Next to her, was an old Jewish woman, focused on her prayer, 
the mother of a little girl who was carelessly running around the balcony. The exalted 
mood was suddenly interrupted by Taubes’s monotonous snore. But it was not only the 
synagogue’s dead silence that would put him in the mood for an afternoon nap; he was 
in the habit of falling asleep almost everywhere – at countless conferences he attended 
in his lifetime, or even during his own seminars. “The contrast between the dark bal-
cony above and the dull daylight of the sanctuary below wrenched in my throat and 
I found my face wet with tears. Surprised because I was not sure whether I was crying 
for my own lack, for the beauty of her faith or else for the contrast between the worlds 
of prayer, above and below.”19
It was February 1986. Despite his advanced disease, Taubes continued teaching, 
in a lying position, his last seminar on the political theology of the Apostle Paul. He died 
seven weeks later.
17 S. Taubes, Divorcing. New York: Random House 1969, p. 12.
18 B. Babich, “Ad Jacob Taubes”, op. cit., p. viii.
19 Ibid., pp. ix-x.
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THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL OF TARSUS
The main intention of Taubes’s lectures on Paul, and their central meaning, was “gather-
ing the heretic back into the fold,” that is – returning Paul to the Jewish community. The 
Christianity of the Apostle Paul corresponded with the Jewish apocalyptic experience. 
The universalism of this religious movement, which today is so eagerly pointed to,20 was 
conceived not only as a means of incorporating the Gentiles into the circle of the Jewish 
perception of the world, but rather as a means of converting the Jews to the right path 
to salvation – a path which they either abandoned themselves or were coerced to aban-
don. The dramatic circumstances on his way to Damascus made Paul break with the 
Old Faith, with the Law, with the Mosaic religion, and establish a new people and a new 
faith based on a new kind of covenant, focused around a new center – similarly to Moses 
who had formed an entirely new nation of the faithful. The critical point, namely – that 
which makes it possible to distinguish the new chosen ones from the usurpers, is neither 
a hastily enacted law, nor any rule that is of this world and that aims to organize it anew, 
but the death and resurrection of the Crucified One. “It isn’t nomos but rather the one 
who was nailed to the cross by nomos who is the imperator!”21 From now on it is spiritual 
kinship (“by way of faith”), and not corporeal kinship, that constitutes the foundation of 
the community of believers. “For they are not all Israel, which are of Israel” – this means 
that salvation is to be salvation “according to the promise” and not “according to the 
blood.”22 Salvation will depend upon whether one is a member of the new community. The 
old people of God are to immerse, to “dissolve” in a newly engendered people of God.23 
Taubes suggests that the relationship of Jews and early Christians (even though they did 
not call themselves so24) before A.D. 70 (the destruction of the Second Temple) should be 
contrasted with what happened later. In other words, the strictly apostolic period should be 
contrasted with the folly of Christian proselytism, every manifestation of which resulted 
in anti-Semitism.25 It would be a mistake to see Paul as an irreconcilable enemy of the 
Synagogue, or to see the Synagogue as a generalized enemy of Judeo-Christians or the 
Judeo-Christian spirit. Everything was intertwined and quite muddled in the fluid real-
ity of the Roman Empire. Christians were spiritually restless Jews, Jewish antinomians 
who from time to time radicalized the vapid message of the Torah. Therefore, as Paul 
intuited, the most interesting questions were born not in the Synagogue, but in the course 
of contact with the external environment – with the Gentiles converted to Christianity 
20 A. Badiou, Saint Paul. The Foundation of Universalism, trans. R. Brassier. Stanford: Stanford University Press 
2003.
21 J. Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, op. cit., p. 24. 
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 19.
25 There is nothing surprising in it, argues Carl Schmitt. Anti-Semitism, or rather anti-Judaism, is intrinsic to the 
new situation from the outset. It is either we, Christians, or you, Jews, who are right as to final matters. There is no 
room for deliberating, one needs to take a stand, make a decision of fundamental importance (to salvation). This 
world is thus organized, Taubes echoes Schmitt – it is filled with either Jews or Christians, and no conciliatory 
gestures will ever change it. “You” versus “we” is the true face of political theology. In other words, there is no 
room for neutrality in the theological-political argument. In the reality contemporary to Paul, it was a matter of 




(proto-Judaism!). What determined their inclusion in the economy of salvation was not 
law – any law – but their belief in Christ’s resurrection. Questions would arise as to what 
it really meant to be a Jew in those conditions. Does it make any sense to destabilize the 
fragile political balance based on respect for positive law? And finally – what is positive 
law when confronted with messianic hope? Taubes argues that in order to grasp the mean-
ing of these questions more fully one has to bear in mind the fact that early Christians 
(“new Jews”) were possessed by the eschatological longing for the Second Coming which 
was “at hand”; that their faith was fueled by visions of an imminent apocalypse. Thus, 
Paul’s theology seems to express the collective longings; his politico-theological calcula-
tions are oriented towards legitimizing a political community and do not focus on the 
inner life of its members. For Jews always consider faith – emuna – to reach far beyond 
the horizon of individual experience; it constitutes the basis of the whole nation’s exist-
ence and creates its history.
Apocalypse is a miracle of humanity’s deliverance from the slavery of death – 
through death – as well as from the oppression of necessity, from the cycle of natural 
transformation. “Consequently, Taubes argues that apocalypse must guard against its own 
destructive impulses without relinquishing its antagonism towards profane authority”26. 
Its impetus is directed against the law which glues together the loosened structures of 
temporal reality (the structures of meaning and power). On the one hand, there is the 
apocalyptic understanding of time as delay – as a respite or reprieve (“everything has its 
end”); on the other – in case the former vision is negated, there is simple metabolism, an 
endless and senseless natural repetition.27 Therefore, if man wants to break away from the 
inhuman rhythm of experiencing the world, to grow independent of the pulse of biological 
transformation (“the pulse of life”), he must be prepared, at any time, to confront the dark, 
unknown, uncontrollable and untamable forces. This precisely is history. It is a field of ac-
tion for some undefined powers, but also an arena where man’s character is being forged, 
a place of humanization and – at the end of time – of deification (“to look upon His face and 
yet not die”). Nature poses a natural threat to this type of vocation due to its dehumanizing 
force and its gradual naturalization of all symptoms of human life. Faced with this breach 
– between the order created by man and the chaos which he yields to, between history and 
nature – man must decide what is closer to him: he himself or the murmur of a stream and 
the flight of birds. “Endless infinity,” Taubes writes, “characterizes indifferent happening 
[das gleich-gültige Geschehen] that does not call for decision. History separates itself from 
this indifferent happening by placing one into the decision for truth.”28 Apocalypse, that 
unhistorical element of history, abolishes chronology, undermines the concept of progress 
and even of evolution: everything advances towards its end that gives meaning to his-
tory. By posing the question of the Eschaton, history surpasses its limitations, it becomes 
visible and sensible to itself. However, for the naturalized hyletics there is always “time” 
to decide; they are not in any hurry. For cyclicality changes decision into an empty ges-
ture. Immersed in the natural sequence of events (Thursday-weekend- Monday), they are 
26 J.R. Gold, “Jacob Taubes: »Apocalypse From Below«”, in: Telos, 134: 2006, p. 142.
27 This is Alexandre Kojève’s post-historical vision of the world, criticized by Taubes in his essay “Asthetisierung 
der Wahrheit im Posthistoire”.
28 J. Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, op. cit., p. 5.
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completely indifferent as to the act of decision and as to history. They do not – in a sense, it 
is not even possible – take responsibility for anything. Ethics is replaced with law that tells 
them what one must not do and what goes unpunished. In this seemingly living, restless 
world everybody is at once dead and rejected by death. “Creation,” to cite Taubes again, 
is “decay (...) without hope.”29 Those, in turn, who feel the course of human history, are 
urged for decision by every historical occurrence, including the final and most important 
one. So haste is very advisable. Historical time is running out and coming to an end, as 
opposed to the barren μεταβολή; the need to decide is growing more and more urgent day 
by day: be as little children no longer! As Taubes once noted of apocalypse: “Whether one 
knows it or not is entirely irrelevant, whether one takes it for fancy or sees it as dangerous 
is completely uninteresting in view of the intellectual breakthrough and experience of time 
as respite (...). There is no eternal return, time does not enable nonchalance; rather, it is 
distress”30. And further on in the interview: “But from a Christian perspective one has no 
time, because God’s Kingdom is at hand. It is not important for me what God’s Kingdom 
expresses in the assumption »God’s Kingdom is at hand«. What matters is the plausibility 
of its being close [Nah-Sein]. Whoever presumes to think in a Christian way, but refuses 
to think of respite, is mentally deficient.”31 Law of whatever kind: positive, given (to Jews) 
by God, or natural – law as κατέχον – turns out to be faulty in the context of a “reprieve”; 
something groundless, arbitrary and inoperative. “This is the secret knowledge promised 
by apocalyptic thought that worldly authority would prefer to pass over in silence.”32 Taubes 
sees apocalypse as the abolition of all law, including the natural one: the world ends, death 
ceases to exist (or only it “exists”). “Paul defines the time between the death of Jesus and 
the Parousia of Christ as the kairos, which is characterized by the crossing over of the still 
natural and the already supernatural states of the world. With the death and resurrection of 
Jesus, the turning point [Wende] is reached: the fashion [das Wesen] of this world will pass 
away.”33 Since it always arrives from the future, apocalypse is an empty, unwritten “story” 
– an event devoid of any traces or memories whatsoever. Its unstoppable, destructive move-
ment, its progression towards the catastrophe of the world – pregnant with memories and 
full of traces of past events – is due to the emptiness that draws everything in. At the mo-
ment of catastrophe, impatience interweaves with the hope that the apocalyptic fire, though 
it engulfs everything, does not incinerate everything; that it contains within itself “the time 
that remains.” As in César Vallejo’s poem about a house that is brimming with absence:
– No one lives in the house anymore – you tell me –; all have gone. The liv-
ing room, the bedroom, the patio, are deserted. No one remains any longer, 
since everyone has departed.
29 J.R. Gold, “Jacob Taubes: »Apocalypse From Below«”, op. cit., p. 155. 
30 Interview with Jacob Taubes, in: Denken, das an der Zeit ist, ed. F. Roetzer. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
1987, qtd. in: J. Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, op. cit., p. xiii. 
31 Interview with Jacob Taubes, in: Denken, das an der Zeit ist, op. cit., p. 318. Unless otherwise stated, the cita-
tions are given in a translation prepared for the purpose of this publication.
32 J.R. Gold, “Jacob Taubes: »Apocalypse From Below«”, op. cit., p. 156.
33 J. Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, op. cit., p.68. If there is no hope for love, then the last sentence of this passage 
has very little to do with common sense and becomes somewhat nihilistic in its tone. (See also: J.R. Gold, “Jacob 
Taubes: »Apocalypse From Below«”, op. cit., p. 156; and: J. Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, op. cit., p. 72.)
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And I say to you: When someone leaves, someone remains. The point 
through which a man passed, is no longer empty. The only place that is 
empty, with human solitude, is that through which no man has passed. New 
houses are deader than old ones, for their walls are of stone or steel, but not 
of men. A house comes into the world, not when people finish building it, 
but when they begin to inhabit it. A house lives only off men, like a tomb. 
That is why there is an irresistible resemblance between a house and a tomb. 
Except that the house is nourished by the life of man, while the tomb is 
nourished by the death of man. That is why the first is standing, while the 
second is laid out.
Everyone has departed from the house, in reality, but all have remained in 
truth. And it is not their memory that remains, but they themselves. Nor 
is it that they remain in the house, but that they continue about the house. 
Functions and acts leave the house by train or by plane or on horseback, 
walking or crawling. What continues in the house is the organ, the agent in 
gerund and in circle. The steps have left, the kisses, the pardons, the crimes. 
What continues in the house are the foot, the lips, the eyes, the heart. Ne-
gations and affirmations, good and evil, have dispersed. What continues in 
the house, is the subject of the act.34
MARCION, OUR CONTEMPORARY
Over two thousand years have passed since the Lord promised man the Second Coming, 
and he has not kept his promise. Jews, who have already had many messiahs, such as 
Jesus or Sabbatai Zevi, have been awaiting salvation even longer. One might ask, what is 
it that has made them wait – in vain, or so it seems. Perhaps the messianic idea itself has 
been misread from the start? Perhaps the message containing the idea of the parousia has 
been intentionally misinterpreted – by conservative rabbinic Judaism on the one side, and 
by Christian orthodoxy on the other? All the sources have been distorted and thus, when 
reading them, one should reverse the perspective – as Overbeck suggests.35
The first to venture to do this was Marcion. He came to Rome from Asia Minor 
when the last members of the Bar Kokhba revolt were being executed. Marcion – the self-
appointed successor of the Apostle Paul – followed the spirit of the time and began purging 
the Christian canon of Jewish traces and influences. First, he threw out the Old Testament, 
a useless thing, then purged the New Testament of the Gospels, except for Luke (from 
which he still cut out the first chapters devoted to the childhood of Jesus), and finally he 
got rid of the letters (three out of thirteen) he considered to be Jewish “interpolations.”36
At the root of his religious doctrine was the crisis of the Messianic idea. It influ-
enced the early Christians’ will to escape from the mainstream of history, which was 
connected with their interiorization of the hope for the coming of the Messiah, who, 
34 C. Vallejo, “No One Lives in the House Anymore...”, in: idem, The Complete Posthumous Poetry, trans. C. Esh-
leman, J.R. Barcia. Berkeley: University of California Press 1980, pp. 26-27.
35 J. Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, op. cit., p. 20.
36 Apokryfy Nowego Testamentu. Ewangelie apokryficzne [The Apocrypha of the New Testament. Apocryphal 
Gospels]. Vol. 1, ed. M. Starowieyski. Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM 2003, p. 125. 
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this time, was to come – if he comes at all – from the inside, from within, and not, as 
it was expected, from the outside world. They assumed that the temporal world is ruled 
by a Demiurge who is just but who knows no pity. This God is just as imperfect as the 
world he had created. He knows neither love nor compassion – the Messiah cannot reveal 
himself in such conditions, and if he does, he will perish as Christ did. At the antipodes 
of the Creator-God is the Deus alienus, “the alien God.” He has no direct contact with 
his creation, with life. He is the “black sun” whose light makes all living things wither. 
He is characterized by infinite, unworldly love and compassion for man. Marcion only 
presumes him to possess these traits. But he must possess them, just like his Son who 
was sent to the people as Jesus Christ to tell them about the paradoxical existence of his 
“non-existent” father.
Marcion’s doctrine should not be identified with Gnosticism, as Harnack stresses37. 
Gnosticism teaches the doctrine of two gods in terms of a struggle between good and evil, 
a battle to the death between two antagonistic principles. According to Marcion, the just 
Lord of creation does not enter into any relation with the Deus alienus – as if they did not 
know each other. However, both are interested in man who seems to be a curious com-
modity to “haggle over.” In fact, every part of him needs mending – not only the body is 
bad, but also the soul which is tied to the body. One solution is to destroy both these areas, 
as postulated by the Encratites (ἐγκρατίται means “abstinent,” “renouncing all worldly 
goods”), or to radically withdraw from the world (ἀναχώρησις is “an ebb,” “a shelter,” but 
also “a return”). “Marcion places the redeemed soul on one side and the existing society 
on the other, and on the improvement of the latter no thought is to be wasted. The Church 
did not follow Marcion. It knew that by »tearing apart creation and salvation its author-
ity to influence the order of this world would be lost«.”38 However, although it rejected 
Marcion’s theology, the Church “recompensed him” with the celibacy of the priests and 
the elitism of the Jansenists. By doing so it colluded with him against life.
How is it that twentieth-century culture, so stirred up by life, had so much rever-
ence for Marcion’s anti-vitalistic speculation? This can be partly explained by its anti-
Judaism which is always in demand.39 According to Taubes, the main cause of the revival 
of Marcion’s doctrine is to be sought in the belief that something important, some precious 
knowledge, has been concealed from man, for example that “the sense of the world must 
be outside the world” (Wittgenstein). What has proved to be of particular value in this 
respect is the message about the radically transcendent God who sent his Son to the world 
so that people could be saved through Him. God’s voluntary self-degradation, the fact 
that He humiliated and humbled himself by incarnation, would bring to mind the idea of 
God who is “weak” and just as powerless as we are in the face of the demonic powers of 
37 K. Rudolph, Gnosis. The Nature & History of Gnosticism, trans. R. McL. Wilson. Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1998, 
p. 313.
38 J. Taubes, “Das stählerne Gehäuse und der Exodus daraus oder Ein Streit um Marcion, einst und jetzt”, in: idem, 
Vom Kult zur Kultur: Bausteine zu einer Kritik der historischen Vernunft. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religions und 
Geistesgeschichte. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag 1996, p. 177.
39 Hence Buber’s remark: “Harnack died in 1930, three years later his thought, the thought of Marcion, was put into 




history. Despite the vagueness of such images, one can find some consolation in them, 
some hope for the return to a changed world that will be our common home rather than 
a cage in which people are imprisoned.
“In the apocalypses no one »acts« but rather everything »happens«,”40 writes 
Taubes. One is overwhelmed by passivity. “The drawbridge comes from the other side,” 
so there is no point striving for salvation41. But the Marcionic separation of “the alien 
God” and creation forecloses the possibility of apocalypse: the sacred will not – it is not 
able to – cope with the profane, justice will triumph over love, the inertia of legalistic 
structures will withstand the pressure of inertness and the loss of meaning. The Marcionic 
version of Gnosticism is thus a misguided response to the apocalyptic crisis, to a situa-
tion when apocalypse refuses to come, especially if its arrival is not a question of “some 
indeterminate future but [is] entirely proximate.”
CONCLUSION
For the Jews revelation has a public dimension – its arena is human history: God is coming 
from the direction of their history. Revelation is always connected with that which already 
came to pass. For Christians, however, it is a spiritual event which wholly belongs to their 
private, apolitical world. But the Messiah does not come simply in order to change the 
hearts of individual sinful beings. Revelation does not relate only to the sphere of pure 
spirit. Its power must encompass the whole sublunary world and cause the miracle of its 
successful re-creation. The salvation of the visible world is at the same time the end of 
its previous form – the Parousia occurs in the form of apocalypse. Thus, “every moment 
must be ready to receive the plenitude of eternity, the furthest distance is that which is 
expected at the nearest moment.”42 Theology, being an attempt to rationally speak of final 
matters, interweaves with politics which administers the impermanent form of this world.
The venerable kings, David and Solomon, the biblical prophets, and also one Greek 
astronomer, placed God at the very top of the hierarchy of being, pictured as a vertical 
axis of the universe. God, who previously had a sacrificial table and his tent among the 
people, was deprived of his body and then banished to heaven. He became a subject of faith, 
a “symbol,” that is – someone who is believed in (πείθω, πίστις), but who is not trusted. 
For hierarchies weaken religious instinct and openness. Aristarchus of Samos, the first 
“heliocentrist,” tried to change this, but it was only Copernicus who managed to refute 
the bipolar reality of the Ptolemaic cave. In his view, the temporal order is no longer an 
emanation of heaven’s perfection, because there is no heaven. There is – which in fact is 
good news – no hell either (in its place we have the nightmare of history). Strictly speaking, 
one is confused as to what is above, what is below, what revolves around what (allegedly 
the Sun is in the center, but how much longer?). Modern cosmology has destroyed not 
only the prevailing hierarchical system, but any possibility of any hierarchy, including 
the difference between what is natural and what is supernatural. Ethics and her younger 
(and uglier) sister, political correctness, are perched on the peg of the historical moment; 
40 J. Taubes, Occidental Eschatology, op. cit., p. 34. (See also: J.R. Gold, “Jacob Taubes: »Apocalypse From Be-
low«”, op. cit., p. 148.)
41 J. Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, op. cit., p. 76.
42 F. Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. B.E. Galli. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 2005, p. 245.
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they constitute a desacralized form of religion, they are temporary and to a great extent – 
revocable. In his letter to Armin Mohler, Taubes asks: “How does a system of law [Recht] 
look, given that atheism is our fate?”43 Thus, ethics and law, along with the whole sphere 
of contemporary politics, might have, and indeed do have, only so much to do with religion 
that they are its degenerate, late forms. While relying solely on their own efforts, they do 
not believe in “ghosts” or “miracles” and thus capitulate before any state of emergency 
any thought they find “unthinkable” and can neither interpret nor make lucid. A planetary 
ban on political power is being introduced, the legitimacy of its acts is being revoked. The 
world is ruled by foppish lookalikes. Yet no one seems to mind, for it makes no difference.
The Copernican revolution caused yet another “salutary” effect. Cast down from 
heaven, “the Lord” found himself among people again, though no one noticed it. “His” 
presence today can be felt by the effects of “a transcendental dynamic discharge,” as 
Oskar Goldberg claimed at the beginning of the last century. We know neither who nor 
where “He” is; we cannot tell the course that he is set for. Surely he is not Marcion’s Deus 
alienus as there is no such God, or at least – he is beyond any possible, human experience. 
Even the Son, whom he sent to save mankind, did not die because he had never lived. His 
“body” was fashioned out of foam, out of something “phantasmal,” hallucinatory (δόξα 
derives from δοκείν – “to appear,” “to seem”), some pseudo-matter in which he had 
to clothe himself so that he could seem to suffer. Man is thus to take comfort from God 
who does not exist, from meaning which does not exist either, and from novelty that does 
not have to justify itself: its advantage over traditional values consists in the fact that it 
is fresh, brand-new. Success proves the usefulness of novelty; it is its legitimacy. What is 
venerable is not taken into account, but simply destroyed. In other words, tradition is not 
even hostile, it is not to be combated; it simply is not taken into account in discussing the 
future shape of the human world.44
In the twentieth century we experienced the presence of “the other god.” Every-
where around the world “He” manifested himself in spasmodic convulsions, in “His” 
successive, though gradually less and less successful incarnations. The Shoah, world wars, 
global dehumanization, Tutsi-Hutu – all this is “Yahweh’s” delirious dance. In “His” song 
he promises: “This is the final struggle” – it is in fact a promise of an apocalypse which 
will not be followed by any other struggle, because there will be no world worth fighting 
for, not even a cracked shell of it. Ultimately, sociology and political science provide no 
explanations, so one needs to dig deeper, into theology – political theology.
If called by the right name, “He” will supposedly come, although it is not certain 
as whom: an enemy or a friend. Perhaps it would be better not to summon “God” at all. 
Yet this is impossible, argues Taubes, for today every gesture, even the least spectacular 
one, turns out to be theology, “invoking” God, summoning Him.45 “On such a day the 
Messiah advances to the edge of the horizon and looks down on the earth. And when He 
43 J. Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, op. cit., p. 109.
44 M. Terpstra, “»God’s Love for his Enemies« Jacob Taubes’ Conversation with Carl Schmitt on Paul”, in: Inter-
national Journal in Philosophy and Theology, 70: 2009, p. 202.
45 “Taubes is right: today everything is theology, with the exception of what the theologians talk about...” 
C. Schmitt, “Four Passages From Letters of Carl Schmitt to Armin Mohler”, in: J. Taubes, To Carl Schmitt. Letters 
and Reflections, op. cit., p. 26.
96 2013
PIOTR NOWAK
sees it, white, silent, surrounded by azure and contemplation, He may lose sight of the 
boundary of clouds that arrange themselves into a passage, and, not knowing what He is 
doing, He may descend upon earth. And in its reverie the earth won’t even notice Him, 
who has descended onto its roads, and people will wake up from their afternoon nap re-
membering nothing. The whole event will be rubbed out, and everything will be as it has 
been for centuries, as it was before history began.”46




Censorship is a terrible word. It is rough and crude. It cuts like a sharp-edged stone 
thrown at a blasphemer. It suffocates with its burden even the most durable individu-
als. It echoes with the clinging of chains, reeks with the damp stone walls of a dungeon, 
penetrates with the chill of sterile prison cells, or burns with the unbearable heat of stake 
flames. Censorship is often, too often, soaked in man’s blood. It isolates with a barbed 
wire of prohibitions and purges with a burning acid of “editorial amendments.” It breaks 
lives, it breaks characters, it breaks peoples’ souls. In its less violent instances it limits 
individuals by means of legal regulations, or even by less explicit but equally, if not more, 
effective tools of authorities, hierarchies, traditions, habits and customs, since to prevent 
is its main aim. Its oppressive character, however, fosters opposition. In its cruel image an 
individual sees himself in an inverted reflection. He becomes terribly aware of himself, 
because as himself, and not anyone else, he is being limited. He realizes that he is being 
limited in his choices, in his words and in his actions and suddenly he faces the most hor-
rid conclusion – that each and every of the limiting acts of the censor is an attempt on his 
fundamental trait as a human being, on his freedom. Realizing that, as soon as he manages 
to repulse immediate danger, he undertakes a vehement counterattack, tracking, hunting 
and disabling any potential threat – the more hidden and inexplicit, the more dangerous 
it is. A peculiar witch-hunt begins, for the witches, self-conscious and eager to do battle, 
fight the inquisition, their former oppressors joined in an unwritten alliance with new 
ones. The fight is difficult, because only the ghosts of the ancient enemies remain on the 
battlefield and the new ones are camouflaged. But the fight is crucial, for it provides foun-
dations, however shaky, of the identities of both sides of the conflict, of the rulers and the 
ruled. A vicious circle has been set in motion. Constant tension, self-perpetuating tragic 
conflict binds opponents in an unbreakable bond of mutual interdependence. Censorship 
is a truly demonic device. It seems that once we acknowledge this eternal conflict, all is 
left for us to do is to put censorship under the microscope of theoretical investigation in 
order to reveal and analyze its nature as a phenomenon, if not for the sake of knowledge 
itself, then at least in order to provide us with some understanding of it that would enable 
us to control the conflict within a certain framework that will keep us away from violence.
There are a number of examples that we could look into, but there is one excep-
tionally interesting, namely – the trial of Socrates, the account of which we are given in 
Plato’s Apology. The unique character of the ancient Greek polis, which did not distinguish 
between social, political and religious spheres, makes Socrates’ case almost a paradigmatic 
instance of a censorship trial, where religious accusations of Socrates for impiety inter-
twine with allegations of him causing social disruption by corrupting the youth, and meet 
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in the court of law of the democratic legal system of Athens which, by means of a public 
accusation, proposes the most extreme censoring measure – capital punishment. But the 
most extraordinary element of that trial is the form of Socrates’ defense speech which does 
not follow the customary path of legal disputes. We can hear that in the very first words of 
his speech when Socrates admits that he was almost persuaded by persecution that he is 
not who he thought he was and expresses his fear that many might indeed be seduced by 
virulent tongues of preceding speakers, but not him. He refuses to accept the label that the 
censor wished to mark him with. Moreover, he rejects the language that his accusers tried 
to impose, saying that he is not acquainted with such a manner of talking. And when we 
notice here who his accusers are – Anytus, attacking Socrates on behalf of politicians and 
artisans, Meletus, who joined the accusation on behalf of poets, and Lycon, who represented 
the rhetoricians – we realize the gravity of Socrates’ refutation. He does not do this just 
because of some personal inconvenience forced on him by the circumstances of the lawsuit 
he is facing, he rejects the language of his contemporary wizards of arguments, virtuosos 
of words and architects of speech, and he does that, as he admits, to be able to speak in the 
language of truth. In fact, he entreaties his judges to treat him as a guest from a different 
city, a foreigner, just as if truth was foreign to his accusers’ language. Socrates refused 
to take hold of the eristic line of arguments that his persecutors wrapped around his neck. It 
did not save his life, but it surely saved his speech. One might be tempted to see Socrates as 
a victim of the system, a lonely martyr crushed under the collective force of the polis. And 
his refusal to speak the language of the city-makers might confirm this temptation, but it is 
rather doubtful that Socrates himself considered his polis as a factio in this confrontation, 
for we would have to disregard true respect and devotion that Socrates presented throughout 
his life, which, as Xenophon says in his version of Socrates’ apology, stands alone as proof 
of his innocence. Socrates wasn’t afraid of the death sentence just as he wasn’t afraid of 
death when he fought his city’s wars, shoulder to shoulder with his Athenian brethren, as 
he called his fellow citizens. We would also have to ignore the fact that if Socrates urged 
anyone to do anything, it was to consider the city’s interests before their own. And it is 
highly doubtful that these words are Socrates’ attempt to cajole the judges, for his speech 
contains a fair amount of criticism of the Athenian polis, both under its democratic as well 
as oligarchic governments. Socrates does not contradict his polis. He obeys its laws and 
fulfills its commands, to say the least, for he understood the importance of the city and 
political matters better than any of his contemporaries.
Moreover, he understood that his trial was not a case concerning transgression 
of certain religious and social rules, as the prosecutors tried to present it. For him it was 
a judgment of malice and anger over the noblest of pursuits, the pursuit of wisdom and 
truth. This anger and this malice was a result of the prosecutors’ contradiction in their 
allegation of Socrates’ impiety, and of their ignorance with regards to what is good and 
what is bad for the Athenian youth. Or rather, to be more precise, the anger and malice 
were the result of Socrates laying bare their ignorance, just as he was in the habit of doing 
whenever he met anyone who claimed any pretense to wisdom.
And this struggle, with truth as its ultimate goal, was the reason why Socrates 
not only could, but felt compelled to dismiss his accusation altogether as false and did 
not engage in a rhetorical battle of persuasion, for adopting his accusers’ manner of 
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argumentation would mean, as he points out, admitting that he in fact does not believe in 
gods, which was untrue. Socrates did not undermine the authority of his polis. He proved 
his loyalty on many occasions, serving his citizens in the best way he thought possible. 
He disagreed to acknowledge the authority of his accusers whom he thought ignorant. 
Socrates acknowledged a different authority more valid, an authority that he listened 
to with a pious reverence. It was an authority which never told him what to do or to say, 
but resounded in his head every time he was about to do or say something wrong, it was 
his inner voice, his inner censor, his daimonion. Socrates mentions the importance of this 
divine being throughout his life several times during his speech. Once, recalling how he 
was close to death at the hands of his fellow citizens when, while holding a public office 
in Athens, he obeyed his inner voice and opposed an unjust sentence that the majority 
was about to give. The second time he mentions his daimonion is when he refers to his 
own defense speech saying that the voice remained silent, just as if it preferred him to die 
rather than to preserve his life at the price of dishonoring himself with a false account.
These Demons which occupy the middle ground between gods and humans play the 
role of messengers, as we learn from Plato’s Symposium, carrying human prayers to the 
gods and the gods’ commands to men. The daimonion, receiving the knowledge of the 
good directly from the gods, prevents Socrates from doing or saying anything bad. Thus, 
demonic intervention depends on the knowledge of good, the aim of a Socratic philosopher. 
Since this knowledge is reserved to the gods, Socrates depends on the daimonion when 
good and bad deeds, good and bad speeches are to be recognized. It is significant that both 
vicious acts and bad words are being censored. Just as not everything that can be done is 
good, not everything that can possibly be uttered, should be. Some things are unworthy 
to be spoken, like persuading orations and cries and pleas for mercy in the case of Socrates 
during his trial. As he said, lack of words was not the reason of his condemnation. But 
the words that Socrates refuses to speak are the words of falsehood. And the obligation 
that he feels is great. Nobody, not even by a threat of death, could force him to say things 
which the demon disapproved of. Paradoxically, seen in this light, Socrates’ censorship 
trial seems like an attempt to make Socrates break the obligation, a test of his endurance 
and persistence in obeying his inner censor. And the obligation might be seen as a specific 
kind of right, a peculiar understanding of freedom of speech, namely – the ultimate right 
to keep silent about things that are not true, a right that Socrates considered more valuable 
than life, for, as he says, the difficulty is not to preserve your life, but to live a righteously.
A censor prevents and guards. The demonic censor keeps guard at the borders of 
the human realm, reminding Socrates that only gods are wise, that he is nothing but a man 
and that acting in the world with claims to wisdom is to challenge the gods, it is to commit 
hubris. Yet, the daimonion cannot stop anybody from trespassing, and to listen to him 
is Socrates’ own choice, and he does not make it not because of the fear of divine wrath 
that might follow, but because he believed that saving his life by doing injustice is much 
worse than being unjustly condemned to death. One might avoid the wrath of gods, but 
one cannot escape his own, inner judgment.
Yet, the injustice has to be recognized in the first place. Socrates is warned by his 
daimonion who helps him and warns about the danger. But what if we are not as lucky as he 
was and we do not have a demonic inner voice? It is a wrong question to ask, for it implies 
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that we may know that it is possible not to have it. But we cannot come to such a conclu-
sion simply because we do not hear the daimonion’s voice. It is a question of belief, and 
Socrates, as we know, did believe. But even if we do not believe now, we surely used to, 
for all children believe. Perhaps then, just like Socrates whose daimonion began to speak 
to him when he was a child, we still have a vague memory of a demonic voice that resounded 
within us a long time ago. And perhaps our inner voice still speaks within us, though we 
might hear less distinctly, or not hear it at all, when we grow up and when our ears are 
filled with the noise of arguments around us – a noise so great that we can’t hear our own 
thoughts. However that might be, in this respect Socrates, being able to hear his daimonion, 
seems to be luckier not only than we are, but also luckier than his contemporaries. Indeed, 
he was blessed with divine voices, for he claimed to have heard one more – the voice of 
the Delphic oracle. And her words might spark some hope also in our less fortunate souls. 
The oracle, when asked by Socrates’ friend, whether there was anyone wiser than Socrates, 
replied that there was no one. Her words perplexed Socrates greatly because he did not 
think himself wise. This oracle was the cause of his main occupation – the search for a man 
who would be wiser than him. By keeping the oracle’s words in mind, Socrates invoked the 
gods to bear witness to his efforts. Thus, Socrates was constantly accompanied by divine 
forces – when they did not appear by themselves, he recalled them in his mind. “Where is 
the spark?” – one might ask, for it seems that since being less fortunate then Socrates and 
not hearing the voice of our daimonion, the path to wisdom is closed off from us. But if we 
treat the oracle like a riddle, which it is, and – in the manner of treasure hunters standing 
at the mysterious gates that block their way to great riches – try to decipher her words, we 
might finally discover the spell opening the sealed portal, and we just might see that the 
oracle does not limit wisdom to Socrates by saying that there is no one wiser than him. 
There is nothing that can possibly prevent us from being as wise as Socrates. And Socrates 
seems to be aware of that as well, for he admits that even though only gods can be truly 
wise, he might be as wise as a man – that is to say: any man – can, because he acknowledges 
the impossibility of bringing true wisdom from the heavens down to earth. Nevertheless, 
whoever considers himself wise simply because he knows this, must be ignorant. There is 
no short-cut to wisdom. A true friend of wisdom, like a real, passionate treasure hunter, 
never stops in his quest, for the quest can never be complete.
Censorship is bound up with knowledge and ignorance. When misused by usurp-
ers of wisdom and aimed at those whom they perceive as ignorant, it becomes a violent 
form of persuasion and coercion; an attempt to teach others to think. As a result, those 
who represent other opinions will fight back because they feel oppressed. Yet, they might 
easily get trapped in a vicious circle, unwillingly joining the battle on their opponent’s 
terms, actually inheriting their techniques of persuasion. Demonic censorship is driven 
by a different motivation. It is guided by truth and in the human realm manifests itself 
through our choices to restrain oneself from doing wrong, from challenging the gods 




A PHILOSOPHICAL READING 
OF CIARAN CARSON’S 
ON THE NIGHT WATCH
Enlarge art? No. On the contrary, take art with you into your innermost narrowness.
And set yourself free.
Paul Celan
He who, having entered the first night, seeks intrepidly to go toward its profoundest 
intimacy, toward the essential, hears at a certain moment the other night – hears 
himself, hears the eternally reverberating echo of his own step, a step toward si-
lence, toward the void. But the echo sends this step back to him as the whispering 
immensity, and the void is now a presence coming toward him.
Maurice Blanchot
What does it mean to be “on the night watch”? It might be conceived of as a patient and 
diligent meditation that leads toward the question of temporality. The small hours are 
a time when the night itself takes over, not the night of sleep and oblivion, but the “other 
night” – to use Maurice Blanchot’s term – the arid desert of death and impotence where 
the clocks begin to behave in a strange way and time plays tricks on us, opening up an 
abyss of loneliness and discomfort. As Blanchot puts it “it is repetition that will not leave 
off, satiety that has nothing, the sparkle of something baseless and without depth.”1 Thus, 
it may be explained as the uncomplaining observation of how all forms dissolve, including 
perhaps one’s own sense of subjectivity, whose emergence certain philosophers align with 
the appearance of a sense of time. The moment when subjectivity is liquefied, however, 
has also been considered as the instant when literature is born.
In her article on Maurice Blanchot, Agata Bielik-Robson remarks that literature 
is conscious of the fact that its deathly space allows words to become material, freeing 
them from their meaning. However, as she wittingly points out, we cannot claim that 
1 M. Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. A. Smock. Lincoln 1989, p. 167.
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words live their life in that sphere, but that they all die their own death. To each word its 
own death.2 The same goes for the shifter “I,” which signifies the melting of all identity 
in language. The fear of an anonymous death by drowning in the ocean of dead words 
provokes a strange game that is played in language. The “I” drives round that forbidden 
place, the void that would swallow it, postponing each sentence and withholding – for 
some time at least – death by writhing, slithering, i.e. weaving round that empty hole, 
un-weaving oneself into nothing.3
There is no knowledge of death without words, but the darkness obliterates them 
and unravels our textual labyrinths. I would claim that only certain linguistic constructs 
are able to put up a resistance against that process and defer it, making it perceptible for 
us – these are poems whose materiality resists the absolution in non-being. Hanging on 
a rope over the abyss is what poetry offers – a dangerous jaunt on top of a mountain made 
from words. Swinging on the line of the poem is thus elevated to the position of a central 
metaphor which captures the movement of life on the thread of the story. In this way, the 
poetic line is the tie with which man “ties himself tight to his death with a tie of which he 
is the judge. He makes his death; he makes himself mortal and in this way gives himself 
the power of a maker and gives to what he makes its meaning and its truth.”4 The poetic 
line is also what links the writer’s pen to the paper, making him the “master of his pen,” 
but this mastery serves only one purpose: “keeping him in contact with the fundamental 
passivity where the word, no longer anything but its appearance – the shadow of a word 
– can never be mastered or even grasped.”5
“Write to be able to die,” explains Blanchot, “die to be able to write.”6 Writing is 
a risky business for it lures us into a territory where words take over and death reigns 
supreme, erasing and overwriting our stories. Still, we have to produce our narrative in 
order to survive, just like Scheherazade did. According to Blanchot, the author’s aim is 
not only to postpone death, or secure immortal fame, but also to
make perceptible (...) the uninterrupted affirmation, the giant murmuring 
upon which language opens and thus becomes image, becomes imaginary, 
becomes a speaking depth, an indistinct plenitude which is empty.7
The acknowledging of the nothingness which breeds all possibility and the imagi-
nary reckoning of that giant murmuring is at the same time an introspective travel and 
a probing of the boundaries of humanity. This is the highest work of self-consciousness, 
which thus becomes able to confront the interminable flow of language, the dark spring of 
time and subjectivity. This is both a way forward towards death, accepting it, and a road 
back along the linguistic steps of the words that have shaped us into what we are.
2 A. Bielik-Robson, “Faux-pas albo błąd życia: Blanchot między Hei deggerem a Freudem”, in: Maurice Blanchot. 
Literatura ekstremalna, ed. P. Mościcki. Warsaw 2007, pp. 146-147.
3 Ibid., pp. 147-14
4 M. Blanchot, The Space of Literature, op. cit., p. 95.
5 Ibid., p. 24.
6 Ibid., p. 93.
7 Ibid., p. 26.
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Emmanuel Lévinas, a friend to Maurice Blanchot, observed that literature allows 
putting into the foreground that ceaseless tolling of the bell which calls what is no longer 
the world, but the being of being. It finds fulfilment in presenting its disappearing.8 By 
negating the world, poetic language allows that infinite murmur to emerge, bringing us 
closer to death, because this is what it ultimately entails; the poem allows the murmur 
to echo in its lines.9 In this sense, literature does not hide anything inside, for it is consti-
tutes radical exteriority and expulsion.10 This diminishing and retracting turns out to be 
the necessary step in order to make space – via the poem – for “the neutral, indistinct 
word which is speaking’s being.”11 According to Lévinas, this step is taken by way of ad-
dressing and advancing towards “you” – the other. This “you” is a cipher, as is the case 
with Paul Celan’s poems, because the implied person can be interpreted as consciousness 
come back on itself, a process wherein a certain satisfaction is found by locating “in 
extreme negativity – in death become possibility, project, and time – the measure of the 
absolutely positive.”12 This is the self-knowledge achieved by subordinating to the “you” 
and answering to its call. It is not only the high point in an auto-poetic philosophical 
venture and an ethical turn, but also a distinguished artistic achievement. This is where, 
as Blanchot claims, being, art and desire converge, for “[u]nder a name that hides her and 
a veil that covers her, she is the profoundly obscure point toward which art and desire, 
death and night, seem to tend.”13 The figure of a woman looming in Blanchot’s argument 
may be interpreted as a metaphorical, liminal figure, like Eurydice, who is sought by the 
poet. They cannot meet, at least not in the poem or song, but Ciaran Carson – a remarkable 
Northern Irish poet – has proved to be able to uncover ever deeper layers of that mythical 
narrative. He turns that journey toward his lover into a quest during which he reveals the 
non-language that serves as the basis for all possible languages. It is a void that hums, 
or the murmur of Being as it unfolds itself in flashes of insight. This is what he has been 
listening to while being “on the night watch,” measuring out the time during the small 
hours. He stepped into the night and found within it, as Orpheus did, the other night, where 
the other language reveals itself in the space of the poem.
*
Ciaran Carson was born in 1948 in Belfast, where he lives to this day. He is a poet, musi-
cian, novelist, columnist, translator and Professor at Queen’s University Belfast, where he 
is also the Director of The Seamus Heaney Centre for Poetry. His diverse oeuvre is marked 
by a significant, unique turn. Although his first poetry collection New Estate (1976) was 
well-received, he remained silent until 1987, when he published the ground-breaking book 
The Irish for No. This unusual period of quietude is all the more extraordinary because the 
latter collection brought about a radical change in his poetic diction and thus constituted 
8 E. Lévinas, “Spojrzenie poety”, trans. M.P. Markowski, in: Literatura na Świecie 10 (1996), p. 72.
9 Ibid., p. 73.
10 Ibid., p. 74
11 M. Blanchot, The Space of Literature, op. cit., p. 180.
12 Ibid., p. 90.
13 Ibid., p. 170, emphasis added.
104 2013
GRzEGORz CzEMIEL
a “second debut.” This pregnant silence was a period during which Carson became – 
to employ his own phrase – “dissatisfied with poetry for some time.”14
From this first silence emerges a poet who is pregnant with ideas and is ready 
to reinvent himself, as if awakened by the breath of a muse. However, after For All We 
Know (2008), he came to another halt. At this second turning point another great shift 
began, leading him towards the questions of being and death, which he openly confronts 
in On The Night Watch (2009), a book of scarce, condensed and stripped poems that are 
composed of terse couplets and display an unusually short number of words per line: 
usually no more than three or four. What also draws immediate attention is the deceptive 
simplicity of their language. The poems, usually conjured out of thirty or forty words, do 
not go far as to the choice of their vocabulary, relying primarily on the most basic verbs 
and nouns, giving at the same time a good amount of space for prepositions and articles. 
The smallest particles are in this way elevated to the level of independent poetic devices, 
as Carson plays with their positioning, exploiting their often ambiguous semantic char-
acter. He seems to explore the innermost basic units or building blocks of language. This 
intuition remains in accord with the general idea of the book, since it can be read as a kind 
of an egological contraction or a purification of the self. One could risk a claim that it is 
a kind of a linguistic epoché – a phenomenological reduction of all contextual matters, so 
as to grant access to the workings of the pure transcendental ego.
Carson begins his new poetic venture from a zero-degree level. It might seem that 
adding simple words to each other, like adding the basic natural numbers, cannot lead 
to a serious aesthetic deliberation and should eventually lack evocative power. However, 
Carson picks up the little pieces and tries to examine how they fit with other linguistic 
shreds, which is reminiscent of assembling a puzzle or stained glass which had been broken 
into a myriad of smithereens. In the speech delivered upon receiving the Georg Büchner 
Prize, Paul Celan alluded to an “absolute poem” which certainly cannot exist. However, he 
claims that “in every real poem (...) there is this ineluctable question, this exorbitant claim.”15 
Carson’s shattered, fragmented poems can be regarded as pieces of that impossible great 
work – fragments that are arranged in a cubist manner, an idea reinforced by the Georges 
Braque painting on the cover of On The Night Watch. Its title – Woman Reading – can be 
thus read as a suggestion that it is not only the poetic work but also the interpretative act that 
is in pieces, implying the impossibility of any discursive totality. Timothy Clark argues in 
his book on Martin Hei degger that such a poetic dispersion is one way “to bring the power 
of language itself to word,” which should not be perceived in purely nihilistic terms as “an 
infinite regress but something as elusive and yet fundamental as trying to see, not any thing, 
but sight itself.”16 Hei degger himself defends such procedures – in “Letter on Humanism” – 
as phenomenologically valid, because a poetics that enacts an epistemological reduction of 
this kind achieves the task of a “liberation of language from grammar into a more original 
essential framework” which is traditionally “reserved for thought and poetic creation.”17
14 F. Ormsby interviews Ciaran Carson, in: Linen Hall Review (April 1991) (available online).
15 P. Celan, “Meridian”, in: Collected Prose, trans. R. Waldrop. New York 2003, p. 51.
16 T. Clark, Martin Hei degger (Routledge Critical Thinkers). New York 2002, p. 107.
17 M. Hei degger, “Letter on Humanism”, trans. F. A. Capuzzi & J. G. Gray, in: Basic Writings: from Being and 
Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), ed. D. F. Krell. New York 1977, p. 194.
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The dregs and leftovers Carson employs in his poems seem to be remains of a lost 
civilization, or archaeological excavations from a different era. Such an approach might 
also be a symptom of a serious traumatic experience, a premonition of which can be 
found in the work of such poets as Paul Celan or Tadeusz Różewicz, both of whom seem 
to loom somewhere in the background. There is a strong sense of discontinuation, or 
distrust of a language that we find in pieces. Carson assumes the position of a careful and 
patient philosopher, who sifts the plethora of dictionaries to find “what will suffice.” In 
Hei degger’s terms, this undertaking is an attempt at rethinking Being itself. “As the des-
tiny that sends truth,” the philosopher writes, “Being remains concealed. But the world’s 
destiny is heralded in poetry, without yet becoming manifest as the history of Being.”18 
In this sense, poetry is an original way of rethinking Being.
The final effect is a rubble of wrecked words, arranged into sonnet-like piles. Car-
son is reminiscent of a Kabbalist who is gathering broken vessels – Klippot – and putting 
them carefully back together, so as to restore “God’s grandeur” in the deepest recesses of 
the material world, where the light of the divine being does no longer reach. From such 
a perspective, the slim 14-line-long poems resemble Jacob’s ladders, propped up against 
the blank of the page, which symbolizes the open but also frighteningly unguided ocean of 
possibilities that makes up human life. Of course, a strictly religious interpretation would 
only point toward a metaphysical or theological reading of the collection, but I would ar-
gue in favour of an interpretation venturing far into the basic tenets of human existence, 
probing the relationship between – on the one hand – writing and language, and on the 
other – Being and death. The eternal task of poetry and serious thought is to return to this 
relationship and make sense of it from our limited, historical perspective. “To bring to lan-
guage ever and again this advent of Being which remains, and in its remaining waits for 
man,” claims Hei degger, “is the sole matter of thinking.”19 This is an arduous and humble 
task – one that brings to mind associations with works by Samuel Beckett. Terry Eagleton 
aptly remarked that “Beckett’s works take a few sparse elements and permutate them with 
Irish-scholastic ingenuity into slightly altered patterns.” In this way, “[c]omplete dramas 
are conjured out of reshuffled arrangements of the same few scraps and leavings.”20 Carson 
seems to follow suit; he has also learned the lesson of “scrupulous meanness” and achieved 
a “secret compact with failure.”21
The narrow stanzas of On The Night Watch wind their way down the page in ver-
sus, finally dissolving in the blankness of white space – the silence of the poem’s ending. 
In this way, poetry offers special insight: “a «poetic» knowing that brings nearer but by 
allowing distance, joins together by acknowledging separateness and «understands» in 
yet holding a reserve of the non-intelligible.”22 Thus, we constantly “tra-verse” ourselves 
in our reaching beyond, both as humans who locate their goals in the future and orient 
themselves always by what is in view, and as readers who are looking over to the next 
18 Ibid., p. 219.
19 Ibid., p. 241.
20 T. Eagleton, “Determinacy Kills” (review of Theodor Adorno: One Last Genius by Detlev Claussen), in: London 
Review of Books 12 (19 June 2008), pp. 9-10.
21 Ibid.
22 T. Clark, Martin Hei degger, op. cit., p. 106.
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line to find the meaning of the previous. Notably, this effect, which it might be fruitful 
to read alongside Edmund Husserl’s analysis of the structure of time, is underlined and 
strengthened by the way Carson built his poems. His enjambments frequently require 
a meticulous analysis of both the coming and preceding lines, locking the reader in stasis, 
playing with the way we form expectations of meaning and arrive at our understanding 
of the poem on the basis of what we have already read. This syntactic labyrinth, elegantly 
phrased in the dynamic form of a sonnet, produces a meaning effect that both exposes the 
finitude (death aspect) of poetry and life, and puts to work the transitoriness (time aspect) 
of the poetic line and our winding passage through the world. This, I would argue, is the 
ultimate meaning of being “on the nightwatch.”
THE LANGUAGE OF BEING
When Hei degger comments on Georg Trakl’s poetry in the essay “Language,” he under-
lines the close relation between pain and threshold – a place where pure light explodes 
and we are reminded of what and how we are:
What is pain? Pain rends. It is the rift. But it does not tear apart into dis-
persive fragments. Pain indeed tears asunder, it separates, yet so that at the 
same time it draws everything to itself, gathers it to itself. Its rending, as 
a separating that gathers, is at the same time that drawing which, like the 
pen-drawing of a plan or sketch, draws and joins together what is held apart 
in separation. (...) The joining is the threshold.23
The motif of a threshold, or aperture, runs strongly throughout Carson’s book. In 
“Between,” this theme returns as “an aperture / of silence” (ONW 16), in “Were I to Add” 
as the “steps between / the cracks” (ONW 18) and in “Beware” as “the slip // betwixt this / 
split chink // & the next” (ONW 19).24 These excerpts suggest that being on the verge, on 
the threshold itself, is a painful experience that beckons us and seems to reveal something 
of great importance.
The poem “Come In” extends this subject, positioning the reader again in front of 
a door which reveals “from behind / a crack // of light in / the blackout” – there is “some-
one / gesturing beyond // the vestibule / a presence // offering a pact” (ONW 36). The play 
of light and darkness, the beckoning of the unknown and the desire to look through the 
door return in “Still Trembling,” where “the slits / of each shutter” are “resounding with 
// divided darkness.” “I peep through / to see the outside” (ONW 55), the narrator of the 
poem says and these words conclude the poem, as if that secret “pact” (or “compact”) 
could be valid only as long as an oath of silence is preserved. Other poems also rely on the 
metaphor of dwelling on the threshold, such as “Mining,” in which “the seam” is visual-
ized as “a deep / vein reached // by shaft or adit,” where it is possible to encounter that 
“which bears what / you seek” (ONW 128). The flickering light that is guiding towards 
23 M. Hei degger, “Language”, in: idem, Poetry, language, thought, trans. A. Hofstadter. New York 1971, p. 204.
24 C. Carson, On The Night Watch. Loughcrew 2009. Hereinafter referred to in an abbreviated form as ONW with 
the appropriate page number.
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some kind of darkness finally returns in the poem “Bells Sound,” where “against the / 
blinding light // I look into / the absolute // darkness of / an open aperture” (ONW 100). 
The oscillation between darkness and light is a fundamental metaphor for Hei degger, for 
whom Lichtung – clearing – is the mode in which things are perceived. Every revelation, 
however, involves a process of covering up, concealing, so whenever we are on the brink 
of knowing what stands before us, it flickers away into the darkness which bred it. The 
task assigned to the one who is “on the night watch” rests in the probing of the emptiness 
into which everything recedes. The disappearance of the subject back into the white page 
turns out to be the deathly condition of writing and knowledge. Thus, as much as On The 
Night Watch is about death, it is also about revelations of Being, with language, especially 
poetic one, transporting us deeper into the home of Being, a place we inhabit but are not 
always aware of, as we are constantly reminded by the fact that the history of our Being 
is at the same time the history of forgetfulness.
In the poem “It Is” we learn that it is the “small hours” that especially inspire 
such recollections of Being. This part of the night is the period when hours “grow / into 
decades // measuring / eternity” (ONW 15). Time stretches both ways – it almost comes 
to a standstill, but only to procure a void in which the whole past and future can be con-
tained in a single stroke of thought. Waiting is a meditation on aperture: a “chink” of light 
or the “chink / of the first bird.” The dialectical movement of time, similar to breathing 
or some grand cosmic movement – contraction and expansion – finally opens up a space 
where a ray of light may shine through, or a bird (traditionally associated with a muse-
like quality) can accentuate its presence. Then, the poems enter into silence, a space of 
in-betweenness, where the wandering mind is haunted by an “afterthought” marked by 
the “blue / of night // becoming morning” (ONW 16). It often gives the poems an anxious 
ending, evoking a primordial fear of nothingness, a dread of the terrible void that is her-
alded by sudden breaks with which many poems end: “beware,” “what now,” “on what,” 
“another &,” “trembling,” etc., to quote only some examples. However, as Hei degger 
reminds us in “Language,” where he discusses Trakl’s threshold, such a seeming destruc-
tion is an essential expansion of this aperture, as it allows the true light to shine through. 
This is a moment when things receive their full names and become harmonious, while 
the fugue of their “final fitting-in” is pain. As Paul Celan put it in “Meridian,” this “[p]
ain, which is not exactly suffering, affects and touches man’s «heart»; it is what is most 
intimate in him; the extreme interior where, in his almost absolute singularity, man – and 
not the subject – is pure waiting-for-an-other.”25 This pain, however, demands a revision 
of our attitude towards language.
Carson consequently codes those small hours in a language that could be called, 
to use his own expression from “Beware,” “Braille / or Morse” (ONW 19). Indeed, the 
short line and regularity of these poems evokes a sense of a coded cipher, the short words 
being the dots and long ones the dashes. These sonnets are thus silently “crackling on” in 
the darkness, their long and slender shapes reminding of “the ticker tape / punched out” 
on the white page. Obviously, there is no hermetic message contained in those poems. On 
the contrary, their slow, stubborn movement is drawing our attention to their materiality. 
25 P. Celan, “Meridian”, op. cit., p. 31.
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Words become ticks of the clock, or drops falling on the parapet, as “the rain beats / on 
the rain // noise beats on noise” (ONW 51). Reading them is like “listening to the drip / 
drip // measuring / the silence” (ONW 23).
The last phrase comes from a notable poem “Remembering Being.” Although its 
title is a run-on-line and is interlocked meaningfully with the first lines of the poem, in-
viting a reading that would form a syntactical unit “remembering being hunkered under 
the sink,” it also invites a special reading – one that would stress the importance of the 
poem’s title on its own. Such an interpretation would turn this particular sonnet into an 
interesting instance of those Hei deggerian overtones I wish to emphasize here. The inti-
mate relationship between being and time forms the foundation of Hei degger’s account 
of human subjectivity, which he reformulates as Dasein. The act of “remembering being” 
can be equalled with the gesture of “measuring / the silence.” The final rhetorical question 
with which the poem ends: “how many times / (...) have I / remembered this” reverberates 
with echoes of anxiety about our humanism. Its ambiguity is related to the dialectics of 
revealing and covering, which shrouds the fundamental question of Being, inscribing the 
effort of memory and inevitable loss into the space of literature, where the existential 
drama of our humanity is staged in the most acute manner.
This poem is also a good exponent of the type of inhale-exhale dynamics mentioned 
earlier. It is a meditation that begins with an image taken from childhood. However, after 
this timeless contraction (“whatever age / I was”) into the flickering dot of subjectivity 
(“encloistered / in myself”), it expands by means of time (“how many times”) into a myriad 
of past selves, perhaps as many as sixty of them (“in three score / years”). Such a disper-
sion of identity into time-parcelled selves is evident throughout the whole collection. 
What makes these distinct instances of subjectivity feel like an individual being? It is 
narration – the modest thread of story that we weave from our experiences. Accordingly, 
in the poem “I Looked Into That” the lyrical subject sees “within / your death // unfold / 
your life // untold as yet” (ONW 48).
However, it seems that this life story cannot be rendered in terms of traditional 
mimetic literature, which remains locked within the paradigm of “being” – the ontic 
realm – and does not allow the light of Being to shine through. Carson seems to struggle 
with the mimetic tradition in poetry so as to rediscover, or recall to memory what might 
be called true Being. As Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe remarks in Poetry as Experience, the 
“[p]oetic act consists of perceiving, not representing.”26 In order to achieve this, Carson 
metaphorically strips his poems of all usual content, rejecting the image-ridden vein of 
lyrical poetry. In its place he institutes what could be called a “Braille or Morse” poetics. 
This type of a poem, whose pattern is repeated steadily and invariably throughout the 
collection, lets the words lose their primary meaning and become something like stones 
thrown into the depths of a well: “stone // upon stone / dropped // soundlessly” (ONW 41) in 
order “to plumb // what was / immeasurable” (ONW 53). Such rhythmic patterns resemble 
the dripping of rain, or the delicate (or even almost unheard) splashes of stones thrown into 
a well. Other metaphorical instances of such poetics are the beep of a radar – a “blip & 
echo” (ONW 22) – or “a blip (...) shown / by the scan” (ONW 118) on an uncanny medical 
26 P. Lacoue-Labarthe, Poetry as Experience, trans. A. Tarnowski. Stanford 1999, p. 67.
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apparatus. The poem becomes in this way something like a “display panel” (ONW 25) on 
which appearing words are joined as part of a meticulous, patient process of laying down 
line after line until “a beam / of intermittent // light flits / across // the window” (ONW 50). 
What is thus articulated, or “broadcast” is “a beam / in phased array // entering the mind / 
as arrows” (ONW 25). Thus, the poem is like a searchlight that is sweeping the dark regions 
(“minefield”), looking for something, or someone, until the lyrical “I” is “[t]ransfixed // by 
the searchlight / of your word” (ONW 110). The counterpart to this is a flickering of light, 
something that escapes our direct gaze or reading – the “beam” of the reader’s eye. Such 
moments occur in-between, or in the spaces that separate the words, on the edge of our 
gaze, as in the painterly technique of anamorphosis – a “looking awry” that is demanded 
by the optical illusion to reveal the full contents of the artwork.
The poem “As arrows” offers an illuminating commentary on this. The title simile 
refers to the way people perceive their lives. We, as humans, are hung somewhere between 
the “finger posts” of future and past, and “we / speed onwards / always looking // back 
at what / our destination // might have been / except for this // except for this / but still” 
(ONW 28, emphasis added). What is of primary importance here is the space in-between, 
signalled by the strange aperture of the stanza break (“an aperture / of silence”). This gap, 
or stretch, is the place where transcendence seems made possible. In this light, the intimate 
meditation on being takes place during the “small hours,” when time is not counted in 
purely technological terms, but by the internal sense of our personal time, the one dictated 
by the intimate Dasein, i.e. our mortality, measuring “one & two // & three / & more” 
and “calculating / incremental // steps between / the cracks” (ONW 18). The cracks are 
openings, crevices left out in the poems, moments when we leave ourselves to come back 
to our most intimate, “forgotten” Being. They invite us, although it seems unheimlich, i.e. 
strangely familiar yet evoking anxiety. This motif finds proper formulation in the poem 
“Come In,” which offers an invitation to look behind the poem, or rather look through 
the Sprachgitter (the title of Celan’s famous poem) – the bars of language or “the bars / 
of a cot // thumb / in mouth” (ONW 60) – at what may be looming behind and what is left 
out of the picture when we focus only on the mimetic meaning. It is an invitation to search 
for a deeper meaning, albeit not a secretive one, but a truth that is contained in the very 
gesture of inviting, or Celan’s beckoning to a handshake, which is contained in all poetry.
POETIC DWELLING
Carson, for example, invites us in the poem “The Floor” to enter a new landscape – “the 
absolute / ground whereon // you stand (...) beyond the threshold / in the middle // of 
a meadow” (ONW 97). Giving us a strong sense of having entered upon a clearing, this 
“ground” is the firm basis on which thought can rest. It is not a heavenly sanctuary, for “[p]
oetry does not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and hover over it,” as 
Hei degger claims; on the contrary, it “is what first brings man onto the earth, making him 
belong to it, and thus brings him into dwelling.”27 “There was Earth in them,” we read in 
a poem by Celan, “and / they dug.”28 The grounding or rooting of the poem is a matter of 
27 M. Hei degger, “... Poetically man dwells...”, in: Poetry, language, thought, op. cit., p. 218.
28 P. Celan, “There Was Earth”, in: 25 Poems, trans. A. S. Kline (available online).
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utmost importance for both Celan and Hei degger, who constantly reuse such metaphors, 
e.g. when the former claims that “the poem holds its ground on its own margin”29 and 
the meridian is “immaterial as language, yet earthly, terrestial,”30 or when the latter says 
that “[i]n poetry there takes place what all measuring is in the ground of its being.”31 This 
leads us to the question of dwelling and inhabiting, which are central to both thinkers and 
form an interesting outlook on language by subverting some of the traditional approaches 
to the human’s mastery of words and meanings.
Poetry’s task becomes clearer in this context, for literature means employing a lan-
guage whose self-referentiality brings us closer back to Being. This theme is picked up 
in the poem “Day In Day Out” which reiterates the meditation on the material world 
and words, exposing again the hard work of putting the right words together with a view 
to building a house, a home in language, or – in other words – a poem. Hei degger directly 
compares poems to buildings by saying that “[p]oetic creation, which lets us dwell, is 
a kind of building.”32 This poem is itself a certain metaphor of such a house as well as of 
the difficulty in laying strong foundations: “I lay stone / upon stone (...) I wrested from / 
the stony field (...) to build this / wall around myself // with no cement / but chinks of light” 
(ONW 115). This poem, with its steady pace as well as careful use of words and line breaks, 
brings to the fore the existential truth about the hardship of everyday life in building 
a sense of homeliness, i.e. a proper dwelling place. This process resembles the building 
of a poem – both have at their stake a certain intimate contact with Being, for “poetry, as 
the authentic gauging of the dimension of dwelling, is the primal form of building.”33 The 
bricks of the house and the word-bricks of the poem have to be carefully arranged so that 
no cement is necessary. It is the rhythm – in the sense of careful measuring – that provides 
the necessary mortar. The steady pace of the poems and their drip-drop measuring of 
time – “darkness / on darkness // echoing / a soundless track” (ONW 20) with “each step 
// extrapolated / to within // an inch of time” (ONW 38) – is the essence of Hei deggerian 
measuring. Its meaning is architectonic in both the literal and poetic senses of providing 
shelter, since the “taking of measure is what is poetic in dwelling. Poetry is measuring. 
(...) a high and special kind of measuring.”34 The true binding material is “light”: the see-
through pulses of revelations in which Being shows through. “Poetry builds up the very 
nature of dwelling,” Hei degger concludes, “poetry and dwelling belong together, each 
calling for the other.”35
Language, as the locus of Being, is not always a self-explanatory means of coming 
in contact with reality. It has to be used, like a tool, or intellectually pierced by the poem. 
Words should be put to use for the purpose of “fathoming the deep / of a well” (ONW 116) 
and sometimes even turned against themselves. In his discussion of Celan’s poetry, Hans 
Georg Gadamer observes that language acts as a roof under which we all live and shelter 
29 P. Celan, “Meridian”, op cit., p. 49.
30 Ibid., p. 55 (emphasis added).
31 M. Hei degger, “... Poetically man dwells...”, op. cit., p. 221 (emphasis added).
32 Ibid., p. 215.
33 Ibid., p. 227.
34 Ibid., p. 221.
35 Ibid., p. 227.
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ourselves. However, it frequently gains on weigh and becomes muddy, obscuring the 
light from above. This means that we sometimes need to pierce it, dismantling this cover 
in order to look the darkness above in the eye in a sublime moment of transcendence.36 
This, notes Gadamer, is the task of the poet: to undo the web of stifling meanings and 
remove further deadening layers of everyday mannerisms and clichés.37 The battle with 
those used-up, covering elements in language is exactly the task of poetry. In the course 
of that struggle, it turns out that words can act like building blocks, which have been used 
and will be re-used for much more than a single life span. In this context the question 
arises whether language is not primordial in relation to being. Hei degger argues that this 
is exactly the case and man is mistaken when he “acts as though he were the shaper and 
master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man.”38 “For strictly,” 
Hei degger continues, “it is language that speaks. Man first speaks when, and only when, 
he responds to language by listening to its appeal.”39 Language is, but it exists in a different 
way than man. It serves as the ability to name or address. Without language, we would not 
be capable of referring to each other and would not differentiate reality. Lacoue-Labarthe 
claims that “[l]anguage is the other in man; it constitutes him as man himself,” because 
without language the otherness, which gives rise to our subjectivity and the bond with 
the fellow men, would not be possible. Therefore, “language is what is proper to man,” 
meaning that “man is constituted beginning with language.”40 However, because language 
is what makes us and is still something other than man, our subjectivity slips away from 
our grasp and has to be located elsewhere, beyond the traditional metaphysics: “language 
is the essence, the inhuman essence of man; it is his (in)humanity” and “can be considered 
man’s origin.”41 The inhuman origin of humanity, the non-being which founds all being is 
the paradoxical nature of language. So, if poetry is language in its purified, self-referential 
state, it is otherness itself, or perhaps even a nothingness that can be offered to the other: 
a “gift of nothing or present of nothing,”42 which is echoed in Celan’s “Psalm”: “A Nothing / 
we were, we are, we shall / be still, / flowering: / the Nothing–, the / No-man’s-rose.”43 
Therefore, language as we know it has to be constantly surveyed and scrutinized, as its 
roof – though providing shelter – falls victim to the oblivion of humanity’s “inhuman” 
origin. This relationship and the consequent re-formulation of the poet’s task are meta-
phorically alluded to in another poem called “Nooks & Crannies”: “the roof itself” is 
something to which the poet will “put / a stethoscope // to see what ticks within” (ONW 
120). A masterful poem is the one which offers to us “the firmament / stripped so bare // 
the quiet you hear / is the frost” (ONW 126). In order to clear up and strip that firmament, 
however, one has to travel through language and following its course, return home.
36 H.-G. Gadamer, Gadamer on Celan. “Who Am I and Who Are You?” and Other Essays, trans. & ed. by R. Hei-
nemann & B. Krajewski. Albany 1997, pp. 80-81.
37 Ibid., p. 82.
38 M. Hei degger, “... Poetically man dwells...”, op. cit., p. 215.
39 Ibid., p. 216.
40 P. Lacoue-Labarthe, Poetry as Experience, op. cit., pp. 95-96.
41 Ibid., p. 96.
42 Ibid., p. 20.




The frost, a gentle and delicate image, which concluded the above quotation, is a meta-
phorical crystallization of the passage of time; it exposes the now, frozen for a moment 
in a sad anti-climax, an anti-revelation, “when now / is forever” (ONW 132). The col-
lection’s final poems are full of such images: “the vestibule (...) to founder in / the storm 
within // to keep at bay // the storm without” in “The Storm Without” (ONW 121), “the 
now // moonlit road / that fades away // just before it gets to the wood” in “I’m Trying 
to Remember” (ONW 125) or “the bastion (...) wherein // we drowned / its king” in “Siege 
Over” (ONW 124). These images remind one of the elegiac or melancholic moods of the 
Old English poems, such as “The Wanderer” and “The Seafarer,” chiefly because of their 
subtle existentialism. They evoke a sense of passing and a profound inability to achieve 
the ultimate metaphysical goals.
The motif of a path is exemplary here, as it is picked up in the poem “Often & 
Often,” which is about the search for it: “the path / I had to find // would come / to mind 
// by half gaps / betweenwhiles” (ONW 131). On the one hand, it could be interpreted as 
the path of life. However, its end, although obvious, disappears somewhere before the 
path “gets to the wood” and the focus is shifted to the fact of remembering – the only 
“pace” which keeps us on the right track: “I’d lean upon / my stick wherever // I might be / 
remembering // or remembering / remembering” (ONW 131). It is the art of remembering 
being that allows us to stay focused and conscious in the stream of time as it “flits from / 
split to split” (ONW 132). What is the role of poetry here? If we assume that language, and 
especially poetry, is a crucial factor in keeping alive the remembrance of Being, we can 
just as well imagine our lives as a journey along the shelves in a library, like in the poem 
“Night after Night.” The Sisyphus-like drudge is adequately formulated in its monotonous 
pace: “in room / after book– / filled room / upon storey // after storey” (ONW 127). We 
travel along the lines of a library, trying to find the other, and whether we name it God 
or Library (or Aleph, to borrow another term from Borges), it will remain a structural 
part of ourselves, as this venture comes down to self exploration: “trying to locate // 
a volume / lodged at // the back / of my mind.” Indeed, as Gadamer reminds us, poems 
speak about that which drives this tirelessly “digging” creature we call life down the 
“narrow stairwell” of human existence.44 Carson asks rhetorically “what do I know / of 
death” (ONW 136) and remains silent “about what– / ever brought us // here & you there” 
(ONW 138), for he is no prophet or seer. Still, he reminds us that to “close our eyes // for 
fear // of seeing // the immortal cell” (ONW 133) is to miss the “eyebright” – “something 
// to remember / me by” (ONW 137) – and thus to lose oneself, one’s sensibility and 
the ability to feel the world. “[T]o forget is / a common verb,” (ONW 139) we read in 
“What Then,” because remembering and forgetting are the most fundamental aspects of 
our lives. To remember Being is to be located at the exactly balanced spot, in-between: 
“between two leaves” or “between two doors.” To remember is to remember oneself in 
Being, “to walk with flowers” along the corridor where, as the concluding poem reads, 
we can “find the one / I’m looking for // between two sheets / you” (ONW 141). These last 
lines of the whole book mark a profound moment when the circle comes to a close – the 
44 H.-G. Gadamer, Gadamer on Celan, op. cit., p. 75.
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journey from “I” to “you” ends and the full dialectical swing draws us to something like 
an Aufhebung consuming all oppositions. As Gadamer puts it, we come to learn that the 
“you” I am for myself becomes apparent when I let myself feel the border of that which 
is real, brushing against death.45 This, as I would like to claim, is the ultimate meaning 
of the encounter that both Carson and Celan have projected into poetry. As the author 
of the “Meridian” put it:
Is it on such paths that poems take us when we think of them? Are these 
paths only detours, detours from you to you? But they are, among many oth-
ers, the paths on which language becomes voice. They are encounters, paths 
from a voice to a listening You, natural paths from a voice to a listening 
You, natural paths, outlines for existence perhaps, for projecting ourselves 
into the search for ourselves... A kind of homecoming.46
This homecoming, a return to the starting point by taking a memory trip, is an 
overcoming of a certain homelessness, which
so understood consists in the abandonment of Being by beings. Homeless-
ness is the symptom of oblivion of Being. Because of it the truth of Being 
remains unthought.47
In light of this, the final closing of the circle is not just a reflection of homecom-
ing or the rejoining of lovers. It is that process itself, just as in Hei degger’s interpretation 
of Hölderlin’s poem on this subject, which – as Timothy Clark remarks – “is not a poem 
about homecoming; rather, the elegy, the poetic activity which it is, is the homecoming 
itself.”48 Poems are essentially dialogic, meaning that they rely on otherness as such, be it 
the reader or language. Poems provoke encounters, demand attention and listening, thus 
establishing a date, a unique moment that is an anniversary, celebration: “the words the 
name / the date the place” (ONW 65). Celan was right in the Brema speech that poems 
are essentially dialogic and always “keep a course on something,” e.g. a place that can be 
inhabited or a piece of reality that can be named or spoken to. Every poem seeks to be 
washed on some kind of a shore, for the poem is “lonely” and “en route,” as Celan argues.49 
“[T]he poem has always hoped (...) to speak also on behalf of the strange (...) on behalf 
of the other, who knows, perhaps of an altogether other.”50 In order to achieve that task, 
it has to set out on a journey, a strange venture by way of which the subject has to depart 
from him- or herself and cross a dangerous territory in order to be able to come back and 
meet oneself again.
45 Ibid., p. 87.
46 P. Celan, “Meridian”, op. cit., p. 53.
47 M. Hei degger, “Letter on Humanism”, op. cit., p. 218.
48 T. Clark, Martin Hei degger, op. cit., p. 106.
49 P. Celan, “Meridian”, p. 49.




That ominous territory is the field of the other, which is the leitmotif of the philosophi-
cal investigations by Emmanuel Lévinas. The figure of the other is for him the source 
of all ethics, which – in his radical overturning of traditional philosophical hierarchies 
– precedes ontology. In Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence, Lévinas argues that 
a response to the other is in itself a fundamental ethical act, which only in turn engenders 
the thinking of essences, or beings. This elemental response, which he terms “saying,” 
is not a result of an encounter between entities, but makes them possible and prefigures 
them. Saying, he claims, is not just communication or representation of facts, for it “sig-
nifies otherwise than as an apparition presenting essence and entities.”51 Thus, the basic 
language of a responsive gesture – a response to the other, the “you” – opens up the other 
as a neighbour, a comrade in being, setting up that figure as the source of responsibility: 
“relationship with a neighbour, incontestably set up in saying, is a responsibility for the 
neighbour.”52 Thus, saying means being responsive to another, as it constitutes the open-
ing up to the other, which grants him a meaning that is not exhausted the “said” – the 
actual content of the enunciation, its secondary effect. The moment of opening up is the 
moment of exposure, when we grant signifyingness to the other without objectification, 
or substantialization. In this sense, “[s]aying is communication, to be sure, but as a condi-
tion for all communication,”53 meaning that the act of exposing oneself and responding 
to the other, who is calling us to responsibility, is the prerequisite for the formation of all 
identities, or the world of “essences” in general.
Thus, Carson’s preoccupation with the “you” or the “other” becomes an argument 
in favour of the ethical component in poetry. By opening up towards the other, Carson 
achieves an important ethical end – he renews and warrants a contract with otherness, 
grounded in an ethical opening, which is free from any content whatsoever, but reinstates 
an elementary fragility and understanding, piercing through the all obstacles in com-
munication:
The unblocking of communication, irreducible to the circulation of infor-
mation which presupposes it, is accomplished in saying. It is not due to the 
contents that are inscribed in the said and transmitted to the interpretation 
and decoding done by the other. It is in the risky uncovering of oneself, 
in sincerity, the breaking up of inwardness and the abandon of all shelter, 
exposure to traumas, vulnerability.54
Carson’s lyrical subject is no longer encloistered in a safe haven of some presupposi-
tions about the reality and metaphysical givens. It is a subject “deconstituted” from those 
beliefs that would safeguard a simpler sense of belonging and truth. Its new coordinates 
are “vulnerability,” “exposure to affection,” “sensibility,” “passivity,” “exposedness,” “ex-
posure to expressing,” “to saying, thus to giving” – i.e. “the most passive passivity” which 
51 E. Lévinas, Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence, trans. A. Lingis. Pittsburgh 2006, p. 46.
52 Ibid., p. 47.
53 Ibid., p. 48.
54 Ibid.
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“is inseparable from patience and pain.”55 By encompassing the other with a responsibility, 
the subject of those poems allows the other to enter him, inhabit his intimacy to provide 
a ground for mutual responsibility and respect: “you seethe into / my inner ear // the ves-
tibule // wherein we meet // to founder in // the storm within” (ONW 121). This provides 
a basis on which proper intersubjective relationships can be established, providing firm 
ground for a truly ethical acceptance and mutual sheltering, ultimately making it possible 
to find, amidst all struggles, a place of refuge, where “we lean into // one another / whatever 
wind blows” (ONW 123). In the poem “Syntactical,” this joining is described as a syn-
tactical gesture of responsiveness that Lévinas writes about: “a moment / of conjunction 
// & / communion // (...) an ampersand” (ONW 84). In this sense, Carson proposes a new 
language, or a new grammar of ethics, which we have to learn in order to create new, stable 
ethical bonds. Thus, this kind of poetry provides – as Seán Hand put it – “actual means 
to express responsibility for the other and the precedence of the other, without effectively 
suppressing them in the process.”56 This also crowns the argument that Ciaran Carson is 
a poet whose task is not to offer pure innovation, but who tries to rethink certain subjects 
in poetry, turning himself into a poet-philosopher in a tradition which Hei degger valued 
so highly. For, as Hand concludes, if what we are dealing with is “an interrogation of, and 
a seeking for, the Other,” then “poetry and philosophy can now be viewed as sharing the 
same unrealizable ideal.”57 Although it cannot be denied that it is indeed an appropriation 
of that unattained ideal, the new path and redefined goal are in fact poetry’s vital con-
tribution to the discussion over ethics and politics in a country torn by violent conflicts. 
The task assigned to us by the other is the one of patience and disavowal, or absolution 
of all identities that might entail harming the other. On the other hand, by offering one’s 
suffering as the ultimate gift, we are freed of deadly affects which are consumed in the 
“burning for the other.” This disinterestedness is possible only when a attentiveness and 
patience to the call of the other are preserved. Then, we may find out that “[t]he subject is 
inseparable from this appeal or this election, which cannot be declined.”58 Carson shows 
in his poems how this encounter is made possible through the work of poetry.
*
To recapitulate, in the poetry collection On The Night Watch Ciaran Carson embarks 
on a final journey towards the understanding of death and its intimate relationship with 
writing. It is only then, at the most difficult point in the evolution of thinking and self-
knowledge, that literature is revealed to be the most precise language in which it is pos-
sible to shed all external problems and perform an “attack on the border,” a hunt which, as 
a struggle with solitude and language, leads to the furthest boundary of this world, towards 
the boundary of what is human.59 This exploration leads Carson towards the conclusion, 
55 Ibid., p. 50.
56 S. Hand, Emmanuel Lévinas (Routledge Critical Thinkers). New York 2009, p. 53.
57 Ibid., p. 76.
58 Ibid., p. 53.
59 M. Blanchot, “Kafka i literatura”, trans. A. Wasilewska, in: Nienasycenie. Filozofowie o Kafce, ed. Ł. Musiał & 
A. Żychliński. Kraków 2011, p. 117.
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suggested by Blanchot and Lévinas, that it is only the deepest confrontation with the 
inhuman abyss, which opens up before any writer, as he or she comes to terms with that 
“unthought ground of thought,” a silent murmur of a proto-language that makes subjectiv-
ity possible. It is, as Lévinas claims, a sort of phenomenological reduction, a movement 
back “to that hither side (...) in which everything shows itself. (...) In it the indescribable is 
described.”60 This gesture of homecoming, a return to oneself via the space of literature, 
where one has to confront with the ultimate negativity, is embodied in Carson’s book, 
where – by way of facing up to the radical otherness – it is finally possible to see that 
“saying, before it conjugates a verbal sign, is already an ethical gesture.”61 In this way, 
Carson goes beyond himself and emerges, like Orpheus, with a new perspective, restoring 
Being to its primary place and recovering language as the inhuman foundation of human-
ity, putting it on the right level – somewhere beyond our ability to grasp it, but in contact 
with the profoundest aspects of human life.
Does the end of that intellectual road annul the space covered in this volume of 
poems? Certainly not, for it constitutes a meridian, to employ Celan’s metaphor, which 
encompasses human experience and allows one to return home from that odyssey with 
a deepened outlook on our own humanity and – what is of even greater importance – 
with a renewed attitude towards otherness. The discovery of an absolute alterity within 
ourselves – transcendence in immanence, so to speak – is a source of a renewed ethics 
that forces us to retain an attentive, open attitude. The responsibility for the other – 
a fundamental tenet for Lévinas – is the only ethical position one can safely assume. The 
promulgation of such philosophy, derived from experience and reinforced in poetry, is 
in my opinion the highest literary achievement of Ciaran Carson. His unrelenting search 
shows that it is possible to experiment and think in literature – a conclusion that is most 
pertinent when we consider the post-modern quandary of simulacra and radical cutting off 
from reality in favour of post-historical intellectual games and puzzles that receive much 
of today’s critical attention. Carson proves that a writer’s journey, a movement of thought 
in verse, can be as fascinating, thought-provoking and insightful as life itself, without 
losing sight of both ethics and aesthetics, the dissolution of which is rightly proclaimed 
as the downfall of true reflection.
60 E. Lévinas, Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence, op. cit., p. 53.
61 Ibid., p. 52.
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WHAT IS THERE TO BE FOUND 
ON THE HEAP OF HISTORY? 
– THE EXPERIENCE OF TIME, 
PARTICULARITY AND NEGATIVITY 
IN BENJAMIN AND DOCTOROW
A rag as a matrix of history. Or rather histories, small fragments constituting the, so 
called, petite histoire. Or experience of history rather than history itself. We already have 
plenty of rags, instead of one. This ragged – and not torn apart, as the tragic component 
is what I wish especially to avoid – nature of the experience of the past will be the subject 
matter of this essay. Many rags and one at the same time, because this fragmented matrix 
is still a structure, just like a rag, worn out in some places but still holding together with 
small threads of felt, the soft material of petite histoire, impregnated with its softness 
against every drama, which demands its protagonists to be incorruptible. This matrix has 
to produce its own register, its own tensions and negativity on the dialectical antipodes 
of Greek tragedy. The model of history as a rag is a basic concept of two texts: Arcades 
by Benjamin and Ragtime by Doctorow; this is also their model of an individual, because 
the stake of the vision of the past created in these works is to establish a notion of par-
ticularity (encompassing both human and objects) as a rag and examining its potential. 
Comparing these two authors and then manoeuvring, sometimes meandering between 
them, I would like to extract this non-dramatic, finite perspective on particularity. Make 
the best of finitude, without ever overstepping its competences and its modest dominion. 
Let its weak transcendental status become the source of its autonomy, without ever being 
too optimistic about it, because optimism is always a lack of wariness, which can be only 
disastrous for the very particularity we are entrusted with.
The structure of Arcades and Ragtime is similar, their purpose, however, entirely dif-
ferent. They both construct the past and at the same time collect it (the constructive and 
story-teller/collector effort form here a dialectical unity) out of the fibers – aphorisms in 
the first case and short anecdote-like fragments of stories in the second. This fragmented 
structure does not solely reflect the doing of historic memory, being distanced in time 
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from the events it tries to grasp; it is first and foremost the nature of the historic material 
itself. First, it has to be said that there is no real division between the former and the latter, 
to us historic facts are always dialectically entangled in remembrance and its apprehension 
mechanisms. Transcendental theory has taught us that there is no sense whatsoever in 
trying to filter the former from the latter; to substract1 the consciousness from the facts 
is a misguided idea from the outset, as the consciousness is always present during this 
substraction. “To read into the future is difficult, but to see purely into the past is more 
difficult still. I say purely, that is without involving in this retrospective glance anything 
that has taken place in the meantime. The »purity« of the gaze is not just difficult but im-
possible to attain.”2 Secondly, the fragmentation of historic occurrences and remembrance, 
its dialectical subjective counterpart, is based on the nature of the medium in which they 
are both immersed, that is the time. Time, the element of both history and memory, is 
ragged itself; it is inherently non-homogenous and does not have to wait for occurrence 
or remembrance to be shred. Both Benjamin and Doctorow adopt the Augustinian vi-
sion of time, underlining the non-existence of particular moments, these alleged present, 
past and future “nows” happening and then pronounced in no(w) time. However, unlike 
Augustine, while analyzing this phenomenon, they do not adopt the perspective of the 
universal flow of time but put themselves in the impossible position of its non-existent 
moments. From this stand, time presents itself as based on null intervals forming a con-
tinuum. The latter is paradoxical in its nature, because due to the intervals being null and 
void it is very simple to surpass them and establish a continuum but, on the other hand, 
a continuum of nothingnesses is absurd, as it amounts to nothing, not even to a single 
point in time. Accordingly, Benjamin and Doctorow share the vision of history as waste 
of these non-existent nows. This heap of history is not being formed out of the things long 
past, consigned to oblivion, because they were not rational enough and therefore had been 
overlooked by the Owl of Minerva. The heap of history is what is being formed just now, 
in the very moment of every occurrence in time. A moment has no(w) time to pass into 
history, it simply passes away in the very moment of its appearance. “Now”, a ultimately 
abstract concept as analysed by Hegel, is itself this huge heap or rather a container, having 
no size at all, as it is fit to contain what is non-existent.
However, both Benjamin and Doctorow do not content themselves with this refuse 
dump they call history. They wish to fill every single “now” with proper content; stretch its 
non-existence as to form a moment, formally as hyper-fleeting as it was in the writings of 
Augustine and nevertheless standing on its own (on one, or rather one quarter of foot, but 
still standing) and tangible for the experiencing subject. The meticulous preparations of 
this possible content, paradoxical substance of the non-existence is the great task of both 
Arcades and Ragtime. Citations/aphorisms collected by Benjamin and stories written by 
Doctorow are made to fit the non-existence, their apparently secondary3 character is cor-
relating to the latter; the secondary importance is the non-existence on the level of content, 
just as “now” is the non-existence on the level of form. The aphorisms and stories are 
1 G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. transl. A.V. Miller. Delhi 1998, p. 47.
2 W. Benjamin. The Arcades. Project. transl. H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin. Cambridge Massachusetts 1999, 
p. 470.
3 Ibid., p. 258.
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punctiliously weighed out in order for the “now” to be able to retain them and not to stum-
ble under their burden. The Augustinian vision is given a dialectic twist here, as both of 
the non-existences, the one from the level of content and the one from the level of form, 
are joined together and thus submitted to the law of double negation which results in their 
substantiality as a moment, a concrete point in time. “Now” puts on a little weight. Again, 
this procedure of double negation (non-existence sublated in non-existence) is performed 
by remembrance (both Arcades and Ragtime understand themselves as remembrances4) 
rejoining past “nows” with present ones. “It’s not that what is past casts its light on what 
is present, or what is present its light on what is past; rather image is that wherein what 
has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation.”5 The present 
remembrance is a non-existent echo of a non-existent past and due to this double negation 
they both gain their own substantiality; they manage to tie a tiny Gordian knot on the 
structure of time. It is of course an ambiguous operation, as tying a knot necessarily tears 
the fragile rag even further. “Now” is still its own passing in time; this time, however, its 
passing comes into history. En passant, it leaves behind a tear of a rag, no longer void and 
anonymous but given some individual features. The montage-technique which Benjamin 
says to be his principal method6 consists precisely of turning the non-existence of a frame 
(a cinematographic term which refers here to the formal character of “now”) into a visible 
image on the screen of history.
The structure of the enterprise of Benjamin and Doctorow is the same, their atten-
tion, however, is placed elsewhere. Benjamin is focused on the rags themselves; he strives 
to fish them out of the relentless timeline and of this enormous rubbish dump called the 
Parisian National Library where he works on Arcades. Benjamin believes, ironically of 
course (because it is an ironic procedure to flee from one fragment to another), that this 
collection of oddities, all being the immediate effects of capitalist economy, can be stolen 
from the latter in the procedure of fragmentation. Deconstruction, the very procedure 
which the social system uses to gain power over its products, is turned against itself. Ben-
jamin restlessly disassembles the historic matter he deals with, so long as there is nothing 
left for the further dismantling. He believes that the smaller the fragment is, the bigger 
chance that it cannot be further deconstructed and, by means of this operation, submitted 
to the social system. So, when a singular fragment amounts to nothing, it becomes further 
untouchable by the universality. “Construction presupposes destruction”, writes Benjamin 
commenting on the methods of historiography.7 This destruction is necessary precisely 
to get to the necessary indeconstructible particle. These indeconstructible nothingnesses 
can be extracted by the subject merely touching upon them, jumping from one to another 
in a movement that eludes the eye. However, these jumps have to be performed with force 
necessary to crash the aforementioned time continuum into its moments. The past can be 
seized only as an image which flashes up at the instant when it can be recognized and is 
4 ”...history is not simply a science but also and not least a form of remembrance (Eingedenken).” (W. Benja-
min. The Arcades. Project. transl. H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin. Cambridge Massachusetts 1999, p. 471).
5 W. Benjamin. The Arcades. Project. transl. H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin. Cambridge Massachusetts 1999, 
p. 262.
6 Ibid., p. 460.
7 Ibid., p. 470.
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never seen again. “In order for the past to be touched by the present instant (Aktualität) 
there must be no continuity between them.”8 Unlike the Romantic ironists, Benjamin 
claims that the fleeting dealings with the subject matter are not an expression of subjec-
tive distrusts towards it, but the only way to grasp its essence, or rather to retrieve and 
reconstitute it out of the dismembering movement of time. “The truth will not esacpe us” 
reads one of Keller’s epigrams. He thus formulates the concept of truth with which these 
presentations take issue.”9 The Arcades not only break with this stance, by claiming the 
to be one of the characteristic, but it simply equals truth with it. On the condition that the 
latter is treated properly, as a series of negations of negations, ironic changeability can be 
turned into a chain of firm Kierkeggardian leaps establishing the immovable singularity 
of moments thus deconstructed. What guarantees the inalienable character of the latter is 
therefore what makes them into rags, perfectly unimportant dust left behind the constant 
circulation of reality, having the global market for its matrix.
Paradoxically, this production of garbage, this inopportune waste performs the 
task of accumulation, although, the latter goes against the accumulation as it functions in 
capitalist economy. The accumulated waste do not bring profit through accumulation, it 
does not become fit for trading. The accumulation of historic material here is not amassing, 
where it is the capital, the collected totality that is the goal. Of course, relations are being 
established through this process, but it is not the corpus they form that is important, but its 
ability to react reflexively with its singular moments, to whom it is submitted dialectically. 
The relation is not substantial itself, it is just an empty background, consisting solely of 
negation. As a background it has its purpose not in itself, but in letting the foreground, that 
is the individual moments, resonate. Therefore, the relation establishes the autonomy of its 
elements in the aforementioned movement of negation of the negation, which is not dou-
ble anymore but, thanks to the all-encompassing quasi-ironic movement of the historian, 
forms a whole net of particulars. The latter is called by Benjamin a dialectical image10 or 
a constellation.11 The more rags the merrier, the tighter is the bulwark of double negation. 
It prevents the systemic negation from creeping in and taking possession of the garbage, 
reappropriating it into the eternal recurrence of the market. Accumulation is waste and 
sheer uselessness here, as autonomy of the particular moment form the point of view of 
the system is precisely its uselessness. This is how memory works, how it should work, 
if it would really work, and not just go with the flow of memories, substituting one with 
another with no particular order and of course no duration. History is the work which 
makes the past occurrences come into being, occur for the first time, not seized by the 
system in their non-existence, not manipulated into disappearing. Benjamin is the master 
of accumulation thus understood. He interweaves the past into a strange, ragged tapestry 
of the Arcades, undoing the work of Cloto, the weaver whose weaving is made to unweave 
according to the laws of timeline discovered by St. Augustine.
So, Benjamin undoes the timeline into fragments and what is he aiming at next 
is to give them a really good publicity. The text of Arcades, being extremely difficult, 
8 Ibid., p. 470.
9 Ibid., p. 463.
10 Ibid., p. 464.
11 W. Benjamin. The Origin of German Tragic Drama. transl. J. Osoborne. London 2003, p. 34.
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is at the same pop-cultural in its very core, because it is rags that it deals with, just as 
pop-culture does and, precisely as pop-culture, it tries to make them attractive. The afore-
mentioned montage-technique anticipates pop-culture, or rather keeps pace with its first 
wobbly steps. However, Benjamin as the PR-specialist attempts to turn the advertising 
techniques against themselves, substituting the exchange value of an object for its ulti-
mate non-interchangeable particularity. It is advertising done from the perspective of the 
second formulation of the categorical imperative. Benjamin is a paradoxical trendsetter 
of the past, turning the notion of consumption upside down, as he lances, along the pat-
terns frequently used in the advertising industry, the object which has already underwent 
consumption and is therefore past interest and only a waste. Arcades are pop-cultural in 
exploring the realm of superstructure, indulging in its most superficial layers; they are also 
pop-cultural in trying to prove that there is an autonomy to it, although Benjamin aims at 
the real autonomy, not the one suggesting itself for the client in order to attract him-her 
and make him-her buy the product.
We might risk saying that Benjamin is seriously, or truly pop-cultural, as he sees 
in pop-culture – in its rags just as they are, with no dialectical sublimation or metaphori-
sation – the truth that it can never see for itself. He treats it as the ultimate phenomenon, 
it can never be in itself. Being perfectly aware of the dependence of the superstructure 
on the social system, he searches for the level of minuscule, being at the same time 
the level of absurd, where the former no longer performs the function of social veil of 
Maya obfuscating the reality of exploitation. “With the vitation of their use value,” Ben-
jamin cites Adorno, “the alienated things are hollowed out and, as ciphers, they draw in 
meaning.”12 Properly deconstructed, this fact of being hollowed out forms a promise of 
ultimate unimportance, which is, as I have already said, a negative way of stating the ab-
solutely positive phenomenon of the autonomous existence of an object or person. Just as 
in the aforementioned categorical imperative. “The technique of telescoping past trough 
present”13 proceeds exactly in the manner that we are now discussing; it is the maximal 
enlargement through maximal diminution, as if one were to look through both lenses of 
the telescope at the same time. The present diminishes the past, as in its optic the latter 
is precisely the past, something which is worn-out, ragged, and therefore, belongs with 
the heap of history, but this way it can be seen magnified, as it is finally put out of the 
context, that is the constant circulation of the market whose part every rag had been when 
it belonged to the non-existent present. Now, it becomes its own goal, to cut the long story 
short, cutting off all the threads which linked the science of history to the work of Cloto.
The line of thought adopted by Benjamin here is a subtle discussion with the Ni-
etzschean vision of history. Benjamin is in agreement that it is only what is actual that 
matters, but what is actual for him is what is a historic blind alley, the most unlikely, or 
rather absurd things to be remembered, as there is no possibility whatsoever for these 
structures to come in useful in the present. “...the eternal, in any case, is far more the 
ruffle on a dress [which necessarily has to be an outmoded one] than some idea.”14 The 
12 W. Benjamin. The Arcades. Project. transl. H. Eiland and K. McLaughlin. Cambridge Massachusetts 1999, 
p. 466.
13 Ibid., p. 470.
14 Ibid., p. 463.
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thesis of Benjamin that there are no periods of decline15 does not mean simply that there 
is something worth considering in every one of them. There is much more to it, as it is 
precisely the emptiest ones that are the most actual and therefore determine the pattern 
for interpreting the others, the ones that proved more fruitful in their own times. Benja-
min is keen on the “proposal of a gradation of the superstructure.”16 However, what he 
proposes is to reverse the current order, by placing what is least important on the top. As 
it is precisely the fruitfulness that is the death of the particular, following the example of 
these abortive times and recognizing the conditions of possibility of their abortiveness, we 
have to perform a great task of disarming all the historic productivity. “Overcoming the 
concept of “progress” and overcoming the concept of “period of decline” are two sides of 
one and the same thing.” (Benajmin 1999: 460) Only upon understanding this we arrive 
at the actuality in the Nietzschean sense.
This leads us to the problem of the possible subject of this disarmament and of 
the history-writing. Benjamin writes about the necessity of continuing this procedure “...
ad infinitum, until the entire past is brought to the present in a historical apocatastasis.”17 
This of course requires an infinite subject who could perform the task of deconstructing 
the timeline from the very point where it started into a series of rags tiny enough not to be 
further deconstructed. This impossible requirement activates the theological dimension of 
Arcades, referring us to the concept of Pascalian God as the only one to see at the same 
time the infinitely great and the infinitely small (the timeline as a whole and its single 
moment, respectively). The promotion techniques Benjamin uses, and this is of course 
another moment where the laws governing the advertising industry are being turned upside 
down, do not target anybody, an everyman from the street. They address the Absolute 
subject, which is understood here not as a concrete person but in the Hegelian manner 
as an intricate structure of considerable capability of negation. It is the Absolute that has 
to be seduced by this amazing commercial which Arcades constitute from start to finish. 
Because it is solely this transcendent and not just transcendental I who can redeem “now” 
and ultimately rise its non-existence through the ranks of history to become the eternity 
of singularity.
However, what is of primary importance is not the One who redeems, but the very 
possibility of being redeemed on the part of a rag. It is being reached at in the decon-
struction process analysed above. Benjamin translates the latter into a unique dialectics 
of dream and awakening. The Parisian arcades are the dream of the bourgeois society 
entering into the process of decadence. In order to make this process work for the particu-
lar, and not against it, to make it actual according to the definition of historical actuality 
provided above, we have to go through the “...awakening from the nineteenth century.”18 
This waking up, however, should not be understood in terms of classical rationalism as 
destroying the illusory character of ideology and finally being able to tell the existent 
from the dream. Crude facts are certainly not the best friends of Walter Benjamin, nor is 
he prone to view the rational thinking as a remedy to the aforementioned decadence. The 
15 Ibid., p. 458.
16 Ibid., p. 465.
17 Ibid., p. 459.
18 Ibid., p. 464.
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awakening, very different from the state of being already woken up, is a dialectical process 
having both ideology and decadence as its integral parts. It is the unraveling of a dream 
described in the famous beginning of In Search of the Lost Time, to which Benjamin 
refers in the text of The Arcades.19 This individual experience is translated by Benjamin 
into an universal one, that is into the unknotting of a given superstructure, its decadence 
in time. Benjamin writes about “the perceptual worlds [that] break up.”20 The historian 
deliberately provokes and repeats this process. S/he indulges into a chaotic parade of im-
ages it produces in order to pin the latter down, stabilise their particularity, without ever 
putting them together into a new totality.
Unlike Benjamin, Doctorow who uses the very same techniques, does not under-
stand their effect as redemptive. There is nothing indeconstructible to the rags torn away 
from the timeline. Doctorow indeed uses them as subjects for his history, but not in the 
sense of them being autonomous. They are subjects only as being subjected to the universal 
processes. Without these particular carriers the movement of the capitalist social system 
would be uninhibited, as they are also the sources of relative friction to it. This way, its 
infinite fastness would equate absolute stillness, as it is relative friction that is necessary 
to keep the movement moving, preventing it from returning to its beginning in no time. 
The Augustinian vision of time claimed to be the first linear and therefore Christian one, 
assuming no friction, is in fact circular and equates eternity. The rags, in Ragtime, are meant 
to provide the movement of history with its difference, shown by Hegel to be its indispen-
sable part. Phenomenology of Spirit demonstrates that the truth of movement is the exact 
opposite of the Zenonian paradox; the intervals do not contradict it, but are its essential 
conditions. The rags are there for the movement, as having nothing else to devour, it would 
have to devour itself, as the great spideress Ungoliant did in Silmarillion. In other words, 
the Zeitgeist, understood in Lacanian way as the malicious demon, would have no fun.
Operating on rags, Doctorow does not search their way out of the system. According 
to his vision, there is nothing small enough to be indeconstructible, not even the human 
suffering. The latter is perfectly usable as the mainspring of commerce; it perpetuates the 
movement as in the meaningful scene of tram-journey, propelled by the suffering of Tateh 
and Evelyn and ending (of course the categories of beginning and end are to be treated 
relatively here) with building the power of the film industry. Human suffering here pos-
sesses no evocative power of Levinasian face. Justice is not indeconstructible, as Derrida 
wants to have it21 and there are no unforgettable lives and moments, as Benjamin claims.22 
Willing or not, everyone “point his life along the lines of flow of American energy”.23 
Although Doctorow is not a historian of a period of decline, on the contrary, he deals with 
one of the most productive and significant ones in the modern history, he makes it appear 
as utterly insignificant, by showing its reverse, that is its representation in the lives of par-
ticular subjects thrown into it and perpetuated by it into perfect nonsense. This specific 
view makes the beginning of the 20th century appear as the parade of oddities. The times 
19 Ibid., p. 464.
20 Ibid., p. 462.
21 J. Derrida. Spectres de Marx. L’État de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle internationale. Paris 1993, p. 15.
22 W. Benjamin. Illuminations. transl. H. Zohn. New York 1969, p. 70.
23 E. L. Doctorow. Ragtime. London 1985, p. 102.
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are productive, every event proliferates into hundreds of others. However, this multiplica-
tion does not make any sense and therefore cannot be called significant. “Those who saw 
Houdini’s performances in this period of his career say they surpassed anything he had ever 
done. He brought masons onstage who built a brick wall ten feet high which he then walked 
through. He made a full-sized elephant disappear with a clap of hands. Coins poured from 
his fingers. Doves flew from his ears. He stepped into a packing case previously examined 
by the audience. It was nailed shut and tied with a stout rope. No drape was set up in front 
of the packing case. It was pried open. It was empty. A collective gasp went up from the 
audience as Houdini was seen running into the theater from the lobby. He leaped onstage. 
His eyes seemed to gleam the color of blue diamonds. Slowly he lifted his arms. His feet 
rose from the floor. He stood six inches above the floor. Woman panted. Suddenly he col-
lapsed in a heap. There were exclamations of disbelief followed by prolonged applause. His 
assistants helped him to a chair. Houdini asked for a glass of wine to restore his strength. 
He held the wine up in the spotlight. It turned colorless. He drank it. The wineglass disap-
peared from his hand.”24 Superstructure, pure and simple; the quotation above is the best 
possible exemplification and metaphor of its idiosyncratic and idiotic structure.
It is agreed that these manifold tricks flying from the ears of Houdini: the particular 
subjects, heroes and heroines of Ragtime are waste. However, being waste, a non-existent 
part of the heap of history does not protect you from being used by the social system. 
Claiming the latter, Benjamin forgets of recycling, the procedure which the modern so-
ciety invented to deal with its garbage and its human resources. The recycling enable 
the capitalist society to get back its share of everything which was previously used. This 
process is unending, its movement being not just a secondary procedure but the vehicle 
of the system. Ragtime shows the reality driven by the repetition compulsion, applied first 
and foremost to its particular subjects/carriers. We see Evelyn Nesbith, Harry Houdini, 
Tateh or Mother being constantly reinvented; their new characters being reuses of one 
body, treated by the system like a recyclable container for an equally recyclable content. 
Ragtime proceeds according to the dialectical movement of sublation of these small gaps 
and intervals, which we have seen to be necessary for the movement, precisely as being 
submitted to sublation. There is no hope for the dialectical negation of dialectics, no pos-
sibility of autonomy gained by means of deconstructing the social deconstruction, taking 
it to its limits. Time is constant process of recycling the non-existent “nows”. This is why 
they never exist, because they are always everything else than themselves; this is why 
they do exist, because they do repeat incessantly in the course of time.
For the protagonists of Ragtime, the revival power of double negation stops to be 
a blessing and becomes a torture. This is valid for both types of double negation: the 
one linking form with content (for Doctorow these would be the structure of the society 
and its particular content, respectively) and the historic one, linking past and present. 
“Today, nearly fifty years since his [Harry Houdini’s] death, the audience for escapes is 
even larger”25 – this is the link Doctorow establishes between past and present. Today, 
double negation works even faster than in the beginning of the 20th century, thus the 
24 Ibid., p. 153.
25 Ibid., p. 15.
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increased requirement for escapes which became all the more impossible. One of the 
possible directions of these escapes is always the past, treated with nostalgia and turned 
into a retrospective utopia. Doctorow critically cuts off this source of self-delusion. 
First, the past itself was not a virgin land, it already imposed a killing pace on its non-
existent moments; second, the past is not autonomous, the present sucks it into its vortex, 
perpetuating the relation of double negation between them and urging it to quicken its 
step. According to the Nietzschean vision of history, there is no past beside the present. 
Doctorow adopts this view and gives it a postmodern twist. His literary style being not 
just a portrayal but realization of the process of drawing the past into the circulation of 
the present, the latter rushing faster than ever and being all the more destructive. The 
aim of his pursuits is the exact reverse of the one adopted by Benjamin. Despite his 
critical stand, he does not wish for a change, or rather does not believe in its possibil-
ity. Therefore, he brings the compulsive movement of the social system into light and 
makes it the proper hero of his book. His critical slogan being “Nothing to be done”26 he 
perpetuates and invigorates the movement in a conscious attempt to make his critique 
virtually undistinguishable from the blind obedience to the dull necessity of the universal 
laws. Despite his sympathies for the socialist and emancipatory movements, the cases of 
Coalhouse Walker, Tateh or Emma Goldman are just a part of the all-consuming mess 
formed by the capitalist superstructure.
The superstructure works full steam ahead and everything is meticulously dis-
tributed 27, as to come in handy for the relevant part of the base. Egyptian wallpapers, or 
paper cut outs, capitalism embraces every single trash until death (of the latter of course, 
never of the former) do them part. Therefore, everything singular in the system form the 
heap of history, as it is considered of no value or status of its own. It can never align with 
itself, find its proper position, like (the chair of) broken Theodor Dreiser.28 At the same 
time, however, there is no such thing as the heap of history where singularity could be 
safe from further exploitation. A singular person or object can never toe the line; like that 
God-forsaken chair, he/she/it is always as stupidly out of place as Houdini invited to the 
party given by Mrs. Fish. However, this unhappy non-alignment is what the situation is 
form the point of view of the chair, its owner, Harry Houdini and every other individual; 
this is only their subjective situation. The objective social forces encounter no obstacles 
whatsoever to the exact alignment of the position of these singularities in the totality of 
the system. However uncomfortable they, themselves might feel about it, they all form 
together a merry and very practical gathering, just like the one in Mrs. Fisher corridor. 
The striking absurdity of superstructure, which is so clear in the situation just mentioned 
and which so often rises to the surface of Ragtime in general, is by no means an antithesis 
of rational systemic character of the base. They complement each other, because absurd 
is not an independent element here; it is just that its rationality and rational functioning 
are external to it, alienated from it to be managed by the system.
26 S. Beckett. Waiting for Godot. Chatham 1965, p. 1.
27 M. Foucault. Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison. transl. A. Sheridan. New York 1995, p. 141.
28 E. L. Doctorow. Ragtime. London 1985, p. 28.
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Despite perceptible fondness Doctorow has for his heroes and heroines, he cher-
ishes no illusions about them and the historic trash bin they found themselves thrown 
into. The patriotic accessories produced by Dad29, being garbage and at the same time 
a very well selling product, are a perfect representation of the position of the individual 
subject of history. It is pushed forward on the assembly line, falling straight into the trash 
bin and instantly retrieved from there only to be pushed forward and thrown away again 
and again. The style of Doctorow mockingly follows this production machine. Not only 
the anecdotal stories of Doctorow as certain totalities, but every single phrase of this 
book – short but not condensed, on the contrary, concentrating on secondary details and 
chaotically mixing them together – is like a chocolate-bar package thrown away on the 
street, just to be picked up for further reuse. To show the eternal recurrence of recycling 
is the purpose of the literary method of joining together separate plots, much-overused 
nowadays, but perfectly appropriate for Ragtime. It is to show the social system being 
made from a scratch, or should I say, from a rag. Everything is useful: thousands of 
millions of sublated scratches on the surface of the movement, the latter shining like 
a new Ford T, thousand of millions of rags being tied together and thousands of millions 
chewing gums spit out and then successfully glued into the intimidating palace of capi-
talism designed by Stanford White & CO.30 The book with its telegraphic style seems 
like a strange assembly line, spitting out garbage, one sentence after the other, and then 
weaving it into an impressive tapestry. The latter is so similar to the one of Arcades and 
yet completely disenchanted and having, in fact, nothing to do with its twin. The motif 
of the flying carpet, so important to the advertising imagery of Parisian arcades, is dear 
to Benjamin for whom it means the possibility of breaking off and smuggling all the 
absurd wonders of the 19th century in the very texture of the carpet. For Doctorow, if he 
had used it as a metaphor for the construction of his book and the manifest fantasticality 
of its action, the flying carpet would have meant only the craze of the world represented 
in the novel. Indeed, Ragtime takes us to a different and somewhat wondrous universe; 
nevertheless, the absurd does not enjoy freedom from the oppression of the rational in-
strumentality. As we have already said, it is not the opposite of the latter but its dependent 
and calculated effect.
Doctorow functions, therefore, as a Hegelian valet for the modern post-secular 
philosophy and the notion of individual which is its foundation stone. The latter, precisely 
as in Benjamin, is the notion of indeconstructible and therefore perfectly singular entity, 
its major characteristic being negativity. It inherently opposes itself to the totality of the 
system, which cannot in any way access it or seize power over it. Just like a valet for 
Napoleon, Doctorow restlessly deconstructs individuality thus understood, by turning 
the notion of absolute singularity into the notion of finitude, the latter suggesting lack 
in place of completeness, dependence and helplessness in place of autonomy. The rags 
are not singular; they are torn apart, indeed, but with all their threads still leading to the 
cloth of the system, like the roads leading inevitably to Rome. They can do nothing about 
it, neither free themselves, nor adapt fully to their situation, as to gain some control over 
29 Ibid., p. 11.
30 Ibid., p. 20.
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it from within. They can do nothing on their own; their finitude and raggedness, being 
a weakness and not an asset, is dialectically contingent upon the system and confined 
to it. It is disposed (and disposed of) smoothly in the recycling cycles of the latter. The 
superstructure of capitalist world-system is built on the sands of finitude and not on the 
rock of an indestructible rest, as Benjamin wants to have it. Therefore, it cannot lay claim 
to the dialectical independence, it cannot by freed from its source by means of actualiza-
tion.31 The particular intervals, as immediately sublated in and by the movement, cannot 
be mistaken for the residue of messianic hope. They cannot give a utopian promise of any 
kind. Trash is always carefully sorted, placed, posited and parceled., no place to be left 
for the non-place here.
Pointing to the above, Doctorow plays valet not only for the indeconstructible 
individual but also for the highly-cherished notion of negativity itself. The post-secular 
dogma says that the absolute alterity of the individual equals negativity. In Ragtime, on 
the contrary, the latter is structurally placed in its entirety on the part of oppressive total-
ity. The negativity as the ability to distance and differ oneself from the universal play of 
social forces is completely driven out by the negativity as the all-devouring movement of 
sublation, the former and the latter being two concurring and complementing sides of the 
notion at least since Hegel. Derrida is wrong in establishing a perfect balance between 
them, as he tries to do in Spectres of Marx. When it comes to power, there can be no com-
parison between the system and a rug, so there is no common ground to be found for the 
purposes of counterweighing the former with the latter. Of course, sublation does not mean 
destruction, this is a well-known fact. Of course, it does not mean destruction. Sublation is 
recycling. This is the kind of perverse non-destructive treatment we, individuals get from 
the social system. Recycling, from its very definition, is the very opposite of destruction. 
It has to be, as system needs its intervals, its difference to sublate and survive. Indeed, 
universal negation performed by the social system is not destruction, but it is precisely here 
that we are furthest from the indeconstructible individual. Because it is precisely the inde-
constructible that can only be destroyed by the system, as it cannot be submitted to endless 
mutations, the latter being the effects of sublation. Sublation is not destruction, and so 
what? Preservation is not a separate moment of Aufhebung opposed to the deformation 
of the sublated moment by negativity, something that the individual can relay for safety. 
It is the movement of sublation itself which preserves while it consumes and constantly 
perverts the identity of a given rag. What is preserved than is not the individual core but 
the transcendental condition of being a carrier of the universal, a non-specific character 
of being the subject of manipulation, as well as constant subjective non-adjustement and 
falling behind the universal movement The latter, however, has nothing to do with the 
objective phenomenon of critique; the duplicity is not a cradle of consciousness being able 
to distance itself from the pervasive oppression and manipulation. This Enlightenment 
motif is being deconstructed here, duplicity being nothing more than alienation coupled 
with defenselessness of the individual being dragged by the hair in any direction where 
the systems wants to have it




Benjamin does not understand rag just as it is – as a rag. He mistakenly lends to it 
a component of messianic absolute negativity. The latter is being rather alchemical in its 
nature, as it is produced by means of changing an aphorism into a magic formula. Benjamin 
deals with words and language, painstakingly manufactures their complete detachment 
from reality, as he believes this procedure to be the sole guarantee of the autonomous 
particular. The magical character of these proceedings is quite obvious, with dialectics 
and historical materialism becoming incantations. Hegel was a magician, his concept of 
sublation can be traced back to the writings of great alchemists. Benjamin follows him 
in this vein, as it is certainly a magical practice to distill pure gold of rags. The work 
of negation should not proceed this way, luring and seducing poor Gretchen, the finite 
individual and then, upon understanding that it is no philosophical Eliza Doolitlle that 
could be turned into absolute subject, will contemptuously outcast it as a popular girl.32 
The ordinary finite subject unable to reach the required standard is left to itself, while its 
dialectical hypostasis, no longer in connection with its possible real counterpart, is being 
perpetuated as a paradisiac panacea to the weaknesses and vices of modernity. This quid 
pro quo is the reason why the famous theological hunchback introduced by Benjamin.33 in 
is in fact the Cartesian malicious demon. The former seduces particularity with absolute 
negativity, while the latter did it with the seeming positivity of facts. This strange figure 
of dialectical anti-valet, being a small and ugly manipulator, no longer symbolizes the 
inability to recognize greatness, but the shift in negativity from the grandeur of Zeitgeist 
to the messianic rest, allegedly small enough to be prevented from further deconstruction.
Does the argumentative strategy adopted here equals letting the universality have 
the last word? Not in the slightest. The point that Doctorow makes and his vision of finitude 
is rather just a starting point in the discussion. It should rebound from its claims, try to turn 
them upside down and construct a new, more promising perspective on particularity, still 
having rag for its matrix and patron. Being a particular myself, I find no pleasure whatso-
ever in triumphing over the illusions of its possible autonomy. I am aware of the dialectical 
character of the notion of illusion in this context and agree with its positive emancipatory 
potential, first shown by Schiller in Letters upon the Aesthetic Education of Man. We 
have no choice but to base our hopes for the renewed and reinforced particularity on its 
necessary illusory character, stemming from the fact that it is lodged in the superstructure. 
This position is not an inevitable ruin of particularity, but the objective situation of the rag 
that should be somehow dealt with and worked through. These illusions, however, have 
to be safeguarded against reality, in order to be sublated in it on their own terms and not 
on the terms of the latter. In order for the sublation to retain the moment of real and not 
just fake preservation. Without the legitimacy that only effectiveness can give them, they 
would be only mirages, parts of the ideological universe, giving the system the alleged 
absolute singularity on a plate, by obfuscating the real relationship between the former 
and the latter and therefore inhibiting the possibility of change.
Therefore, our illusion has to be a down-to-earth one. Our rag has to be non-gilded. 
It should be brought down to its proper level, to the level of refuse, but without being left 
32 T. W. Adorno. Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life. transl. E.F.N. Jephcott. London 2005, p. 58.
33 W. Benjamin. Illuminations. transl. H. Zohn. New York 1969, p. 253.
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to itself there. Turning the valet into a figure of negativity is what I am trying to reach at 
here. As we have already said, the negativity is monopolized by the recycling process, this 
is precisely the point that the valet is making. Where is his critical potential than which 
could support particularity? There is none, and this is precisely why the work or rather 
strife of negation is being done. The individuals are always on the verge of disappearing 
and this wretched condition is the transcendental condition of their possibility. Particulars 
are so desperate to keep their position precisely because there is nothing immanent to it 
that they could fall upon. Particularity slips itself through its own fingers, with no mes-
sianic rest to be found. The individual leaves its fleeting mark while disappearing; the 
former and the latter, the appearance and its careless sublation are the very same moment 
and movement of the time/recycling/assembly line. They are not separate instances, but 
the averse and reverse, two different positions in the very same situation. The first is that 
of the universality, the line itself, which presses forward, while the particular, the second 
one, tries to push back. In the end, or rather in a second the latter will disappear anyhow, 
but its minute and momentary difference is non-negligible, like a bubble appearing on the 
surface is not simply non-existent just because it is gone right away.
Only the valet has the eye to spot this difference, as it is the most finite finitude that 
is its domain. Only the valet has the eye and patience to follow these finite subjects, as they 
reside in conventions, the latter being the universality incarnated, the concrete formulae 
of the above-mentioned immoral social imperative saying that the individual subject is 
always what it is not. To define the nature of this difference and, earlier still, to simply 
prove its existence we have to have a narrow escape between Doctorow and Benjamin. 
Both of them operate on conventions and have a very different take on them. Doctorow 
builds his characters upon them to emphasise the priority of the system over an individual. 
Hysterical women gestures, man so manly that it borders on the absurd – they are all ut-
terly conventional, these conventions being in constant recycling process, mixed together 
without restraint in the social guinea pigs like Evelyn Nesbith. Doctorow examines the 
beginning of the 20th century because, just like Gombrowicz, he tries to capture the birth 
of new conventions, the latter being degraded and declassed values in the Nietzschean 
sense of the word. The eclectic absurdity of this nascence, which brings into mind the 
Christmas shopping madness, is what makes the characters in Ragtime so colorful, an aw-
ful word to describe a rather pathetic quality. Pathetic, because it is not authenticity that is 
the core of the colorfulness of Evelyn; it is rather the objectivity itself being so awkward 
and grotesque that it constitutes such wild and improbable characters and situations which 
are so integral to Ragtime and its charm. All this mayhem, this wildest jungle is just the 
process of bourgeois socialization. It is the universal boredom of convention deserving 
to perish and perishing in Anacsymandrean world of capitalism, which „...composed and 
decomposed itself constantly in an endless process of dissatisfaction.”34 Upon dissecting 
the behavior and motivations of the protagonists of Ragtime, we can see this embarrassing 
quality of objectivity standing behind them and utterly responsible for them. A perfect ex-
ample is the scene where the demands of city-traffic and show-business meet in an absurd 
situation where Harry Houdini visits the severely injured sandhog in the hospital to elicit 
34 E. L. Doctorow. Ragtime. London 1985, p. 93.
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the ”tricks” that made him survive the catastrophe.35 Doctorow works here as a valet also 
for the objectivity itself, shedding on the latter the flickering light of grotesque. His book 
is thus an excellent example of the notion of comism introduced by Alenka Zupančič: „.in 
comedy, the universal is on the side of undermining the universal.”36
Benjamin also operates on the conventional, however, his method is entirely dif-
ferent. He dissects a conventional phenomenon so long as it finally becomes unique. The 
fragments he finds are true gems among trash which is precisely what is so amazing about 
his book; it is a collection of conventional rubbish that become absolutely unparalleled 
and unusual. This attitude, although absolutely impressive, is in fact deceptive. Decep-
tive is the structure of an aphorism (as the literary representative of an individual), as it 
suggest the autonomy of its subject matter, always already deceiving us with the spatial 
representation of its self-reliance. The layout of an aphoristic book is, therefore, the doing 
of the malicious demon. Benjamin presents these fragments as separate, whereas in reality 
they are entangled in the context of the books they were borrowed from and, earlier still, 
entrapped in the context of social reality. However, his alchemist inclinations and incanta-
tions float above the latter, Benjamin, as well as any historian who would approach his/hers 
subject in this vein, is no God, not even a minor one. A God-like activity of re-creation, 
the pretense to treat the aphorisms as a dwarfed, but redemptively effective version of 
paradisiac Names is to leave the interchangeable historic prototypes of the latter to their 
interchangeability and entanglement.
These prototypes stuck and stored somewhere in between the views of Benjamin 
and Doctorow, somewhere in their shadow, have to be caught by the hand. Not to be pulled 
out of the context, deracinated magically and transubstantiated into a paradisiac negativity. 
This is impossible, as they are inalienably connected to these conventions which alienate 
them. Therefore, if we are to find any factors which undermine this relationship, we have 
to search within it. We have to surpass it relatively and bashfully, not by thrusting ourselves 
outside, but by carefully fingering, point by point, to check whether and where could it 
be corrupted a little in favour of the subjective identity. Otherwise we will not surpass 
it at all, only pretend to do so. This is the purpose of this weak duplicity and difference 
I introduced in the previous paragraph. Let me expand on the notion. There can be found 
nothing unique to the social rags, nothing unconventional about them, nevertheless, as 
subjects/carriers they embody these conventions, sign them with their proper names, at 
the same time, lagging behind them, too slow to keep pace and match them fully. This 
embodiment-failure, embodiment as a failure, make the individual form – being in itself 
a mere empty shell, container for universality – internalize and subjectivize the universal 
content, by marking it with its own insufficiency. It is because these shells are not com-
prehensive enough, the universal conventions begin to differ slightly within themselves. 
Not that it disturbs the sublation process; on the contrary, it is this difference, in constant 
process of being surpassed, that we recognized as the necessary condition of the identity 
of the system. This time, however, going back to these initial premises, we see them being 
slightly modified, creating a bit of cramped space for the individual.
35 Ibid., p. 78.
36 A. Zupančič, The Odd One In: On Comedy. Cambridge Massachusetts 2008, p. 28.
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The condition of the perfect balance of the universality with itself via the particular 
is its momentary destabilization in the latter, a slight stumble impersonated by a rag. This 
impersonation of the movement, forced personal attachment to the convention causes 
a momentary struggle between the social practice itself, being absolutely dialectically 
flexible, and its bearer, the ridicule individual body, which tries to cling to it and appropri-
ate it to itself. Once again, the universality of time and production is dependent upon the 
negligible quantity of the particular. This time however, we recognize the latter reacting 
to the pressure of time, blocking it, if only for a flash of time, for one single dialectical 
contraction of muscles. This hopeless battle being fought endlessly recreates its very field, 
the universal medium where the rags fall apart. However, these unfavourable consequences 
make it no less a battle. It is just that the conditions of possibility of the system are, at one 
and the same time, a defensive reaction against it. The recycled trash is nothing more than 
the process of recycling, but it is no less the trash itself in its dilly-dally, in the momentary 
reluctance to be sublated. The disregarded “now” responds to the violent current of the 
universal commotion with the ephemeral passivity, a sort of finite and lightweight heavi-
ness aimed at delaying time in favor of the individual. This is how negation of negation, of 
the non-existence by the non-existence works, not by proceeding but by failing to proceed. 
Hegel points to this failure in the end of the second chapter of Phenomenology of Spirit 
and calls it sophistry.37 Sophistry is the analysis of recycling process, that is approaching 
it from the perspective of separate moments, failing or maybe refusing to see their total-
ity. An ass of an individual sees the totality of the function as dysfunctional, that is as 
composed from elements which do not entirely suit their infinite function, simply because 
of being finite. Although this failure is not just a subjective one, but a necessary element 
of the movement, Hegel somehow cannot bridle his dissatisfaction and anger with the 
forgetting consciousness. Why is that, after all he is perfectly aware that to take two steps 
forward the dialectics has to take one step back, or at least hesitate for a little while? It is 
because the individual has an agenda of its own; it uses this necessity, inseparable from 
the movement of the system, and yet contradictory towards it.
Hegel is impatient with the individual subject as a decent bourgeois is with a ped-
dler, the one who comes back to the waste with newly recycled products to negate their 
productivity, that is their ultimate shapelessness as the subjects of constant interchange-
ability. The latter is not just external, meaning that every individual can be replaced with 
the other; it is first and foremost internal, the subject being in itself just a constant exchange 
of different social functions, with no core that would cover them all. Kant had a disturbing 
metaphysical inkling when, back in the 18th century, he defined the subject as a function, 
that is something which has no firm identity in time, the latter being only formal and 
not related to the subjective content. No more than a single argumentative step is needed 
here to arrive at the above-mentioned Foucaultian notion of distribution as the effective 
management of these functions by social powers. Peddler collects the rags and mourns 
them, refusing to perform the work of mourning in order to be able to take the necessary 
steps forward. He refuses to acknowledge the inevitable changes of function of its object, 
the latter being complemented by repetition, eternal recurrence of the system as a whole.
37 G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. transl. A.V. Miller. Delhi 1998, p. 77.
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We might ask, what does s/he mourn, if we agreed on the interchangeability of one 
function of the subject with any other without rest and with no core binding these changes 
together. Indeed, there is no such metaphysical instance; there is, however, a phenom-
enological relation between the subject and the object which produces the peddler-effect. 
Consciousness, to paraphrase Hegel from the introduction to Phenomenology of Spirit, is 
the fact of lagging behind its object and its movement.38 It is there, in this retarded experi-
ence of an object, in the failure to objectivise on the part of the individual, that the latter 
creates its proper objects matching its own individuality. These are, simply, the leftovers 
of every individual experience of universality, stained with finitude. They should not be 
mistaken for the Benjaminian indeconstructible rest. Just as the subject, having nothing 
indeconstructible in itself, they are the remnants of their previous systemic functions, 
heading, of course, to some new assignments, but (in)fallibly lagging behind them. These 
rags are also shapeless, but in a very different way from the shapelessness that is forced 
on them by the social system. It is a sort of misshape, that is a lack of clear contour or 
defined border given to every individual on its way on the assembly line, in order for the 
sublation to fit it smoothly into the structural social puzzle.
Upon experiencing these misguided objects, the individual attaches itself to them 
as to wholesome ones. It recycles without recycling, that is s/he relates to the objects 
and, therefore, uses them, but without submitting to the dialectics. This is the agenda 
that I mentioned earlier and this is what Hegel finds so irritating, that the individual 
collaborates with the system only by refusing collaboration. It fails to adapt itself to its 
situation, make it easier for the system by letting go of these silly leftovers. Progress, 
the evolution of rationality throughout history is a harsh therapy against this petty sen-
timentalism. Its purpose is the absolute unification of these two moments, the ragged 
gap and its sublation, in order for them to pass into one another seamlessly. However, 
for the time being, there is still a small space between past and present negation where 
the individual jostles with its pushing cart, an item so often appearing on the margins 
of Ragtime. I use it now as a transcendental artifact, as silly as the subject using it and, 
at the same time, as deserving of our attention and philosophical care. It is a figure of 
gathering, the form of memory which for Hegel would be forgetting, because collecting 
particular remembrances entails forgetting or rather casting out their future, the dimen-
sion of time towards which the Hegelian dialectical past is oriented for the, so called, 
progress. There is no negativity to this silly jostling and, yet, it is negativity, impure and 
far from absolute, but stubborn enough to leave a mark while disappearing. Its patron is 
Don Quixote, a petty idiot and a pre-modern peddler of peddlers (having his tin armor 
instead of a cart), who fixes on the past as if it never blended with the present. This way, 
refusing his sensibility, it makes the past itself seem idiotically out of place, because 
the proper place of the past is with the present and without this link past in itself seems 
ridiculous. This is, however, what makes her independent. Of course, this cannot stand 
too long, cannot withstand the test of time. Nevertheless, it is here, now, in front of our 
38 I am paraphrasing here, but at the same time turning this paraphrase upside down, as Hegel actually speaks of 
consciousness trying to catch up with its object (G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. transl. A.V. Miller. Delhi 
1998, p. 49-50).
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eyes. And than again. And again. It is real, no matter that it is just a momentary reality, 
shattered by a blink of the never-shutting eye of the society.
True, we need to assume that there is a rest of some sort, to be the subject of this 
struggle and petty obstinacy. There has to be a sort of peddler-cogito underlying these 
experiences. It is, however, nothing substantial, but purely formal; it is precisely the cogito, 
the Kantian “I”. It takes on the form of name, understood as differently as possible from the 
notion of name in the nominalist tradition. Given at the moment of birth, it has no internal 
significance, as a new born baby is yet no one. This abstraction and purely formal character 
is the guarantee of the indeconstructibility of the name, as everything which is in any way 
definite and defined can be redefined. Yet, there is something missing here, an element of 
concreteness is lacking, to differentiate my name from the same name given to any other 
person. Ragtime, which is full of such abstract instances, plays on this lack to underline 
the fact that its seemingly concrete protagonists are just containers of universal chaos. 
A very simple yet clever tool is used to elicit the status of theirs. It is a small shift in the 
level of abstraction; the protagonists are not called by their names but by the family roles. 
This should not suggest that Ragtime aims at portraying the so called everyman. The book 
is very far from this subject, which is in fact a construction expressing deep attachment 
to the liberal notion of individual, a variation on a theme taken from the good, old credo 
of classical Enlightenment. Everyman is the effect of a clash between abstractly and ahis-
torically understood individual and abstractly and ahistorically understood universality, 
that is Fate. The life of the former is overshadowed by the later, particularity is bearing 
his/her Fate like Sisyphus of Albert Camus. This unimaginable burden (the everyman is 
never a happy one) stresses the individuality on which it weighs; by means of contrast and 
shocking disproportion it emphasizes the non-negligible difference between an individual 
and its universal fate. Doctorow does not share these existential illusions, as he understands 
universality as a concrete social and historical phenomenon, which do not clash violently 
with the individual life but provide it with content. The latter is seemingly particular and 
enhances identification, which is a part of ideological strategy of assimilating individuals 
into society. This is the idea Doctorow expresses by using a family role for the purposes 
of identification of the protagonists. This ID is abstract enough to suggest that we do not 
deal with an individual, pure and simple, but it is also tangible enough to obtain the ef-
fect of mock concreteness. This is the position of the „boy”, his „Mother” and „Father”, 
„Mameh” and „Tateh” and, last but not least, “Mother’s Younger Brother”, in whom the 
abstraction is made all the more poignant by the ironic play with a seeming designation 
“younger” which is absolutely empty and invalid as we know nothing about its necessary 
component, that is the older brother.
As to perform the function of a pushing cart, the transcendental support of our 
silly pretenses, the name has to have an element of concreteness, otherwise it could refer 
to anything. It is a paradoxical case, as this concreteness has to be undefined. Otherwise, 
names would suffer the same fate as any other concrete phenomenon, they could be re-
defined freely by the system. This contradictory quality is obtained through indication, 
the proper grammatical mood of the existence of the name. When we turn around in the 
street because someone called us by our name, it is not because s/he is invoking some 
nominalistic, purely singular truth about us. Name do not exist in the garden of Eden, 
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however, this does not mean that we cannot react upon being called, that we do not iden-
tify with this sound, although, it is not so very different from all the others. However, had 
this supposed concreteness of indication not been deconstructed by Hegel in the chapter 
on Meaning? When writing about indication, had he not shown its ultimate abstraction? 
I believe not, as he forgot to join the “this” which is indeed perfectly abstract with the 
gesture performed while indicating which is inherent to the meaning of “this”, that is it is 
itself already linguistic, and yet it is also something corporeal lagging behind the purity of 
abstract sense and therefore providing it with a concrete reference. It is this gesture that is 
responsible for the indication to have the internal possibility to indicate, that is to always 
refer to one single object at a given moment of time. It is thanks to this vocative gesture 
that our names call and pin us down to ourselves. The process of autoidentification func-
tions in a parallel manner; it is this same kind of gesture, making us turn inwards instead 
of turning around in the street. We call upon ourselves to name the social conventions we 
are partaking in. It is necessary to affix this gesture to the universality we are subjected 
to, as individual consciousness, facing constant change, has to be performative and con-
stantly track itself down amidst the conventional mayhem. The capitalist society forces 
the cogito to pinch itself over and over again in order to check whether the implication 
ergo sum still functions for him or her. This gesture is the rest that survives recycling. 
Apparently, it is very far from the messianic rest, but in connection with the fact of always 
lagging behind the system, it is enough to incite the possibility of subject being something 
more than just a carrier.
For the time being, we made acquaintance with a ragged individual causing the momentary 
ungainliness of the movement of ideal convention, putting the latter into effect by imped-
ing it. This means that we achieved nothing yet. For the time being, the peddler is just 
a transcendental figure, or rather figurine, with no concrete strategies to support its case. 
It is already ahead of us to establish them. To catch an individual moment red-handed, 
before its too late. To make the momentary imbalance within the movement of sublation 
attain a sort of uneven balance, permitting the individual to stay on the surface of the 
dialectics for longer than a moment. Learn this moment to gather its momentum, trans-
posing its passive resistance into active contestation. This is no task for Sofocles, but for 
a transcendental valet, as the subject here is a peddler and not Oedipus rex (although, it is 
worth thinking that the latter ends as a peddler). Amidst the eclectic absurdity of conven-
tions, which brings into mind the Christmas shopping madness, there reside a reasonably 
stubborn particular, nothing more. Nevertheless, it is precisely this rag of a subject that 
is the reason for the philosophy of today. Mainly because it is real, I dare say. Making it 
more real, as for the time being it is just the reality of illusion that it enjoys, this is what 
is worth of critical conceptualization. The latter should not shun from strengthening the 
peddler with every possible means and at any conceptual price. If it need be, it should make 
the concept itself into a rag, in order to fit the requirements and “size” of its content. It is 
worth trying, even if we have every reason to believe that the objective systemic condi-
tions of the operation threaten it to be a complete failure.
Surprisingly, the favor may occur to be mutual. Maybe this seemingly silly subject, 
so much in need of support, will get the philosophy out of this awkward situation with 
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which it deals for more than a hundred years. I would like to call it post-colonial, because 
it is an effect of a failure of the conceptual project of domination of the Enlightenment 
reason. Instead of being the instrument of freedom, it occurred to be a founding stone 
for at least some of the historic catastrophes of the 20th century and simply a sad mecha-
nism of functioning of the capitalist society, projected into the realm of ideas. Having 
a down-to-earth and yet decently transcendental problem to face, philosophy might finally 
recover from the disappointment and disenchantment which it has gone through. This 
disappointment have forced some, like Rorty, Sloterdijk or Habermas, although the latter 
would not admit it too willingly, into the shallow of skeptic relativism, only to avoid the 
charge of rational imperialism. The others, Benjamin being the most prominent example, 
having to deal with the compromising of reason and yet not willing to resign from the 
philosophical project altogether, have begin to construct intricate utopias with conditions 
of possibility scored so subtly that there is no chance for an ordinary rag to realize them. 
The project that I wish to propose may find its way between these Scylla and Charybdis of 
modern philosophy. With a little bit notional help from its friends, the particularity could 
be strengthened, which would take the odium of imperialism of the notion itself and, on 
the other hand, prevent form indulging in the impossibilities just because the possible 
seems out of reach and has lost its rational formula. The objective here is a transcendental 
vaccine, that is a remedy which stems from the malaise, in this case, form the universality 
which behaves like a virus carried by its individual subjects/bearers and therefore can only 
be cured by being turn against itself in proportions. This idea of a vaccine calls for the 
applied dialectics, something which speculative philosophy aimed at once it understood 
itself as a phenomenology. Dialectics is the only method that can provide for the particular, 
as it is the only one able to operate on such minute contradictions, as the one between the 
universal movement and its particular embodiment/unit. It is the only one that is subtle 
enough to make this contradiction a firm one, applying the tricks of the trade of negation 
as to oppose and reverse the vertiginous movement of the system it has itself unleashed. 
This rewound Aufhebung would be the dialectics of a valet, tediously negating, and dif-
fracting the universality, subjecting it to diminution, shifting the balance as to obtain the 
small change of particularity.
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VISIBLE WORLDS AND THE ART 
OF NARRATION: CULTIVATION 
OF UNRELIABILITY THROUGH 
VISUALIZATION BY VLADIMIR 
NABOKOV AND ITALO CALVINO
I never say that the knight is unreal. I say that he does not exist.
That is very different.
                                                                       (Calvino 2013, 215)
[reality] is one of the few words which mean nothing without quotes
                                                                             (Nabokov 1991, 312)
1. LONGING FOR THE PAINTER’S ART
In his introduction to Our Ancestors trilogy, Italo Calvino writes: “The tale is born from 
an image, not from any thesis which I want to demonstrate, and the image is developed in 
a story according to its own internal logic. The story takes on meanings, or rather, around 
the image extends a network of meanings that are always a little uncertain, without insist-
ing on an unequivocal, compulsory interpretation” (Calvino 1998, 3). This statement seems 
to suggest that the visual image has primacy over language, or even over the idea itself. We 
may easily find a confirmation of this concept in Calvino’s other writings – for instance, in 
his posthumously published Six Memos for the Next Millennium, where he describes how 
his early childhood experiences of books constituted entirely of the enjoyment of images 
in the color illustrations, and when he finally learned to read the words, they had a disap-
pointing effect compared to the potent impulse that the visual stimuli earlier gave to his 
imagination (Calvino 1993, 93-94). Words, the materials that the writer has at his disposal, 
seemed pale and ineffectual, because they told a single story, instead of the open sea of 
narrative possibilities that the illustrations opened before the child’s mesmerized vision.
It may be argued that Calvino’s own writing is an attempt to break out of the con-
straints of language into that open sea of visual possibilities: “In the end, what I try to do, 
the only thing that I would like to be able to teach, is a way of seeing, that is, of being in 
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the world. Basically, literature cannot teach us anything besides that” (Grundtvig 2007, 
171). Thus, to Calvino, seeing equals being in the world – it is the essence of experience. 
Making the reader see is equivalent to making him/her experience the world of the story: 
seeing is believing.
Vladimir Nabokov, who loved the visual world with an eagerness that is evident in 
the unfailing precision of his sensory details (to be caressed by the ‘good reader’)1, seems 
to have had a similar idea in mind when he created one of his wonderfully unreliable 
narrators. Hermann, the narrating hero of Despair, apostrophizes the reader as follows:
How I long to convince you! And I will, I will convince you! I will force you 
all, you rogues, to believe... Though I am afraid that words alone, owning 
to their special nature, are unable to convey visually a likeness of that kind: 
the two faces should be pictured side by side, by means of real colors, not 
words, then and only then would the spectator see my point. An author’s 
fondest dream is to turn the reader into a spectator; is this ever attained? 
The pale organisms of literary heroes feeding under the author’s supervision 
swell gradually with the reader’s lifeblood; so that the genius of a writer 
consists in giving them the faculty to adapt themselves to that – not very ap-
petizing – food and thrive on it, sometimes for centuries. But at the present 
moment it is not literary methods that I need, but the plain, crude obvious-
ness of the painter’s art. (Nabokov 1989, 16)
What Hermann is trying to convey here is the astounding likeness between him 
and a stranger met one fine day in Prague, whom he will proceed to murder in a sordid 
insurance swindling scheme, only to find that the likeness existed in his own eyes only. 
The poor reader, at the mercy of Hermann’s delusions, has to solve the problem of the 
text by carefully analyzing the visions that the narrator paints with his words. So, ironi-
cally, Hermann manages better with his medium (words) than the painter would with his 
(actual images). Crucially, Hermann does succeed in this passage to create an illusion of 
the “crude obviousness” of the image in his eye that is as irresistible to the reader as the 
actual painting would have been – that is, the painting of a real double, and not the im-
age of Hermann and his future victim as they really are. And, while he is at it, Hermann 
takes a stub at the peculiarity of the writer’s art: making the inexistent heroes that have no 
life of their own feed on the lifeblood of the readers, thus gaining a certain corporeality 
and claiming a kinship with the readers at the same time. In fact, it is this image of the 
literary heroes as vampires, highly unsavory yet quite effective, that sticks in the reader’s 
memory above all else.
Nabokov here conducts a certain game on the borderlines between the written word 
and the visual image – transgressing the boundary for the express purpose of subjugat-
ing the reader to his devious narrator. In fact, the visual phenomena may be said to be 
1 „In reading, one should notice and fondle the details... We should always remember that the work of art. Is 
invariably the creation of a new world, so that the first thing we should do is to study that new world as closely as 




characterized by a peculiar unreliability: what we believe we see may or may not be reality, 
and yet we will obstinately believe it to be true precisely because it appears before our 
eyes. Thus, this double nature of the visual phenomena is the secret source of power for 
the narrator’s unreliability.
This paper will analyze the uses of visualization for the crafting of narrative power. 
It appears that Calvino and Nabokov develop a very peculiar kind of unreliability due 
to their employment of word pictures, extremely detailed and tangible descriptions, and 
other devices that make the words melt into images, while images remain fluid and change-
able, eluding the fixity of their material form.
2. THE NONEXISTENT KNIGHT
2.1 THE PARADOX OF INEXISTENCE
In this most delightful novella which ends the trilogy Our Ancestors, Calvino indulges in 
the perverse act of delineating an absence. The protagonist of his text, we are told, does 
not exist. There is merely a representation of him, accomplishing the mighty deeds of valor 
on the battlefield and living a perfectly virtuous life – without, it seems, being alive at all.
But how can you visualize something that is not there? How can you prove that 
something does not exist? Calvino, this most visual of contemporary writers, finds a way 
to produce the effect he seeks, managing not only to pass off his protagonist as something 
perfectly believable, if a little unusual, but also to make negation into a spatial presence, 
tangible to the reader, as it is intangible to the other characters of the text.
To accomplish this remarkable feat, the author begins his game with a scene of 
a tedious army inspection, in which our invisible protagonist is appropriately the last to be 
reviewed, and the emperor, far from being intrigued by the paradox of the Nonexistent 
Knight’s existence, simply accepts it as one of those inevitable facts of life, because “he 
was old and tended to put complicated questions from his mind” (Calvino 1977, 7). While 
Agilulf presents himself literally as the knight in shining armor, a chivalric ideal, it seems 
that he is nothing but a construct, with no substance to it, and appears as a visible object 
without having any actual existence, a “nonexistence endowed with self-awareness and 
will-power” (Calvino 1962, xvii cited in Weiss 1993, 56). Self-awareness is precisely the 
aspect of human nature that makes one into an existent, that defines conscious life in 
a creature which otherwise would represent a dead matter. The author inverts this aspect, 
giving a playful spin to the Cartesian cogito: the material aspect of life is deleted, leaving 
intact the self-awareness. Thus, the nonexistent Knight does exist in terms of Descartes’s 
formula. The Knight has a purpose and will-power, but nothing to apply it to – he is 
a pure construct of convention, and the experiment of the tale is to see what happens when 
conventional narrative of a chivalric romance, with all its key elements, such as a quest, 
a trial of virtue, a necessity to defend a lady’s honor, military conquests, supernatural 
adventures and duels with semi-magical creatures, is applied against its own essence, 
constructed as an empty hero, an outline2 – in short, what happens when a convention is 
faced with its own codified image.
2 Cf. Rushing 2010. 
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This aspect is presented symbolically in Agilulf’s coat of arms which contains noth-
ing but a repetition of itself, thus being an epitome of empty convention: “On the shield 
a coat of arms was painted between two draped sides of a wide cloak, within which opened 
another cloak on a smaller shield, containing yet another even smaller coat of arms. In faint 
but clear outline were drawn a series of cloaks opening inside each other, with something in 
the center that could not be made out, so minutely was it drawn” (5-6). This introduces the 
mise en abîme theme, typical of postmodernist discourse, which is yet slightly ironic in its 
application: the idea of the device was originally borrowed by literary theory from heraldry.
2.2 VISUALIZING THE INVISIBLE
The full realization of what Agilulf’s inexistence implies is revealed in the following sentence: 
“Agilulf with all his armor was pierced through every chink by gusts of wind, flights of 
mosquitoes, and the rays of the moon” (Calvino 1977, 13). This phrase forces us to recognize 
with dramatic intensity the absence that is the paradoxical essence of Agilulf’s (in)existence. 
When the reader is simply told that the armor was empty, the initial impression of amused 
surprise is quickly replaced by a normative “suspension of disbelief” – if in this world the 
empty armor can act by the sheer strength of will, so be it. Within the covers of the book, 
such is the unquestionable, irreducible reality of its world – even if it consists of nonexistents. 
Soon, perhaps, the reader will replicate the emperor’s resigned tendency “to put complicated 
questions from his mind.” But when told that Agilulf’s armor was freely penetrated not only 
by the metaphysical moonbeams and the unfathomable wind (which may easily be under-
stood as symbols, and thus not tangible “presences”), but by the nasty, annoyingly whizzing 
and blood-sucking insects, whose reality it is impossible to ignore, we begin to both feel 
the metaphysical discomfort of the poor bodiless creature, protected from dissolution in the 
world only by the shiny shell of his white armor, and to appreciate his blessed indifference 
to all the affairs of corporeal nature. Mosquitoes provide the final unignorable touch of reality 
to the word picture Calvino’s narrator paints. The flights of mosquitoes that we are forced 
to track through the emptiness of armor cross Agilulf out, negate his presence. Thus, instead 
of describing the void, the narrator makes the reader see the absence by tracking the quick 
trajectories of the flying insects straight through the space that should have been filled with 
warm-blooded, if a little unsavory flesh of the old warrior. Negative space, indeed.
The story relies on visualization in a degree far beyond the usual “picturesque” 
quality of a literary text. One could even argue, that the words derive their meaning 
from the images, and not vice versa. So, for instance, a person born blind would not be 
able to understand the language of the novel, even though s/he could well comprehend 
the linguistic value of the words on the page. The words remain abstract, until they are 
embedded into a visual reality. This, of course, corresponds to Calvino’s concept of the 
primacy of visuality over the abstraction of language.
2.3 PROTEAN NARRATOR
But let us examine the mysterious figure of the narrator. One of the most important quali-
ties of the voice we hear from the first pages of the novel is its changeability. In The Non-
existent Knight the identity of the narrator remains covert and is subject to the suspicion 
of deceitfully withholding the information necessary to our understanding of the story:
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In Italo Calvino’s Il cavaliere inesistente, on the other hand, the reader is 
given strong clues that the teller of the tale is a certain type of narrator and 
then as soon as the reader attempts to identify him, the rules are broken and 
the reader is forced to reassemble the pieces hastily and to construct a new 
and different narrator. This throws into confusion many of the reader’s early 
perceptions of the characters in the work, which are based (at least in part) 
on the assumption, which later turns out to be false, that the narrator has 
stood in a certain relation to them.” (Barrett 1992, 57)
As Barrett notes, up to Chapter 4 we assume the narrator to be omniscient. Clearly, 
this narrator enjoys full access to the minds of the characters, and also possesses the 
knowledge of their apparent and hidden motives. On the other hand, this assumption is 
constantly put under the pressure of doubt. When we learn of the emperor’s review of the 
army, Charlemagne seems to meet Agilulf for the first time, even though it is noted that 
“by now every word, every gesture was foreseeable, as all else in that war which had lasted 
so many years” (5). Yet in further chapters it is obvious that Agilulf has been there for 
quite a while, regularly participating in all the activities of the army, including the feasts, 
at which it must have been rather hard to ignore the knight encased in full armor, with his 
visor down, in the midst of all the other messily feasting warriors (certainly, not wearing 
armor). Thus, the narrative seems to turn around, now assuming that the nonexistent knight 
was not at all a stranger to the emperor and his company. At the same time, the way the tale 
is being told suggests that the narrator has no concern for the inconsistencies in the story.
This situation is repeated in many instances, without causing any uneasiness to the 
narrator, who makes no effort at all to revise and correct the inconsistencies or at least 
to explain them in some way to the reader. For example, in chapter 4 the narrator seems 
to place herself (this is where we learn that the story is being written by a nun in a convent 
as some kind of penance) outside the time frame of the evens described: “World conditions 
were still confused in the era when this took place” (34), yet it is later revealed that the 
time of narration is only slightly removed from the time of action, and, in fact, the nun 
herself participated in the battles as an amazon-knight, Bradamante3. Curiously, when we 
first learn of Bradamante’s existence, we see her naked from the waist down and in the 
act of peeing, a curious and rather mischievous way for the narrator to introduce herself 
to her audience. It almost seems that at that moment the narrator had no awareness of 
having any other identity beyond that of the storyteller. Other examples of such problems 
may be found almost on every page.
Thus, the narrator who evolves in the tale is very peculiar. Of course, we are 
dealing with unreliability, which becomes apparent long before it is revealed that our 
3 Sister Theodora sometimes seems to indicate that her temporal position is much closer to our own time, than 
to the story time: she mentions that she is “following a tale told in an ancient almost illegible chronicle” (105). At 
another instance, however, she states: “I am writing in a convent, from old unearthed papers or talk heard in our 
parlor, or a few rare accounts by people who were actually present” (34), thus indicating that there are still living 
witnesses of the events described. In fact, her position in a convent seems to grant her a certain a-temporal status, 
and from this position even contemporary events seem ancient, while what happened a long time ago seems quite 
recent and fresh. 
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3rd person omniscient storyteller is actually a 1st person character, who, moreover, is one 
of the principle figures in the tale itself. But what kind of unreliability? Let us examine 
some of the key moments in which the narrator makes use of unusual devices or when the 
ambivalence of the storyteller’s position is brought to the foreground.
2.4 THE GROTESQUE AND THE REAL
Take, for instance, the first representation of the battle. The narrator begins by a disclaimer, 
stating that she knows nothing about war, “apart from religious ceremonies, triduums, 
novenas, gardening, harvesting, vintaging, whippings, slavery, incest, fires, hangings, 
invasion, sacking, rape and pestilence” (34). Of course, this very disclaimer coyly con-
tradicts itself: what is war but fires, invasion, sacking, rape and pestilence? The implicit 
irony of this statement is somewhat camouflaged because the list of the acts violence is 
prefixed by a list of peaceful and even tedious-sounding practices (novenas, gardening, 
etc.). But something in the narrator’s tone makes us suspect that she herself is oblivious of 
the irony. There is a naïve, pleading intonation that sounds authentic: “We nuns have few 
occasions to speak with soldiers, so what I don’t know I try to imagine. How else could 
I do it? Not all of the story is clear to me yet. I must crave indulgence” (34). This voice is 
quite convincing, even while it contradicts everything we have deduced about the narra-
tor from the earlier chapters. It seems that the narrator simply meandered from one mode 
of storytelling (convent, tedium of uneventful life) to another (danger, violence, death).
Thus we have both a knowledgeable and a naïve narrator, who switches between 
these states at will. Perhaps this is why her descriptions seem simultaneously grotesquely 
fantastic and grippingly realistic. When she describes the conventions of the battle, there is 
a number of amusing details, so incongruously fantastic, that they make us forget that what 
is described is in fact quite horrific. For instance, “coughing was the signal that the battle 
had started... the whole Imperial army coughed and shook in its armor, quivering and shak-
ing as it raced towards the Infidel dust, hearing more coughing getting nearer and nearer” 
(35). The pathos of what is supposed to be a heroic epic is completely diffused through this 
ridiculous and rather realistic image – yellow dust, paladins shaking in unmanageable fits 
of coughing, met by reverberating sounds of more coughing from the enemy side. Next, the 
initial approach of the opposing warriors is followed by a stage of mutual cursing, in which 
the exact weight of each expletive needs to be properly registered and responded to, for 
which purpose the services of an army of translators are required. Again, this is a picture 
at once comic and somehow completely believable: taking into account the medieval love 
of complex conventions, it is quite possible that the exact score of the grievances inflicted 
in the battle would be kept by the army administrators, with all the consequences.4
Our narrating nun, sister Theodora, freely admits that “what I don’t know I try 
to imagine... Not all of the story is clear to me yet.” (34). The reluctant reader has a choice 
of options: s/he may choose to dismiss the fantastic descriptions as the product of the 
4 The comedy of this representation properly brings into balance the macabre imagery of the initial chapter of 
The Cloven Viscount. There, as we are being introduced to the hero, we have to face the horror of war, with the full 
impact of an image just as fantastic and realistic at once: bones and wings mixed together, birds of carrion poisoned 




nun’s inexperience, and/or simply a creation of her active imagination, but s/he may also 
suspect her to be divulging the strange truths of her world. And when in the last chapters 
these readers find that the “nun” was also the amazon, one of the most active participants 
of the battle, the normal reaction would be a sort of frustration at having been misled by 
the narrator’s suppression of that key piece of information. The excuse of inexperience 
now appears a ruse to smuggle in a piece of forbidden reality, something that perhaps 
might be censored as inappropriate in a chivalric romance. Now that Sister Theodora has 
merged with the knight Bradamante, we seem to get an explanation of that protean qual-
ity she exhibited throughout the story – the knowledge of war came from her identity as 
a warrior, the innocence – from her identity as a nun.
And yet again, the nun who is also a warrior and a lover into the bargain is a highly 
dubious figure – each identity cancels out the other. In fact, on rereading it appears that 
the narrator considers adopting various identities in the course of her story. This issue is 
analyzed in detail by Barrett, who indicates that the reader is led to suspect that the story 
is being told by each character in turn. It seems a very interesting suggestion: various 
developments in the plot may appear to be controlled by the voices of Raimbaut (romantic 
excitement), Sophronia (mystery and withdrawal), Torrismund (misanthropic uncertainty), 
and even Gurduloo (protean to the core – uncertain of his own existence despite possess-
ing a material body), and from time to time Sister Theodora asserts her own identity of 
a nun bent over the empty page in word-seeking penance. “Bradamante” is only the last, 
and perhaps most fitting identity. We may even risk saying that the idea of merging with 
Bradamante has entered the narrator’s head as she was seeking for a conclusion to her 
narrative – it seems both fitting and unexpected. And this impression persists even on 
repeated readings.
The narrator’s admission that “not all of the story is clear to me yet” should have 
forewarned the reader that she too was trailing the fantastic images appearing before 
her eyes, meandering after the pictures and the ideas that follow in their train. By decid-
ing to merge with one of her characters as a means of finding a suitable ending for her 
story, the narrator playfully underscores the nature of her narrative – it is merely a story, 
an inexistent world with inexistent characters, who yet exist because of the reality of 
the words on the page, the tangibility of the book in our hands and the visibility of the 
images, flashing their iridescent feathers on the screen of our imagination. Heroes and 
kings, beautiful maidens and noble knights, the rotten business of war and the tricky 
business of love is a pattern of a fairytale that, like a book for small children, is drawn 
rather than written.
2.5 MAPPING, DRAWING, FABULATING: THE MEANDERING NARRATOR
The narrator’s penchant for visualization reveals itself when she, quite like Hermann in 
Despair, longs for the painter’s tools instead of her writing ones:
To tell it as I would like, this blank page would have to bristle with reddish 
rocks, flake with pebbly sand, spout sparse juniper trees. In the midst of 
a twisting ill-marked track, I would set Agilulf, passing erect on his saddle, 
lance at rest. But this page would have to be not only a rocky slope but the 
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dome of sky above, slung so low that there is room only for a flight of cawing 
rooks in between. With my pen I should also trace faint dents in the paper 
to represent the slither of an invisible snake through the grass or a hare stop-
ping, sniffing around through its short whiskers, then vanishing again. (106)
From that point on, the narrator keeps playfully switching between the storytelling 
modes, using words within which images are inscribed, holding yet another curl of words 
within them. She draws on her paper a map, which gradually becomes so crowded with 
information that it becomes a structuralist diagram of plot developments and, at the same 
time, a symbolic representation of chivalric adventures (with wavy lines, drawings of 
whales, arrows, ships, crosses, etc.). Once again, the narrator’s innocence and craftiness 
are combined in this act: the map resembles nothing as much as a child’s drawing, and yet 
it has the complexity of a project by a puzzle-maker who masterminds multiple levels of 
discourse. Moreover, the reader does not have direct access to the map/drawing. Inscribing 
her story by drawing lines and pictures (which remain, however, invisible to the reader 
otherwise than through the moderation of the words on the page), the narrator makes the 
story recede from reality into the realm of a symbolic narrative, a myth, a fable.
Sister Theodora herself seems prone to lose her way in reading her own map: “I can’t 
think what this line is doing passing the same place; by now my paper is such a mess of 
lines going in all directions” (114). This, of course, is parallel to the developments of the 
plot, which seem to entangle messily, until the final resolution cuts through the fanciful 
knots, at which point we feel that what seemed to be chaotic has in fact been deliberately 
plotted. Yet, on rereading several problems crop up: it seems that the narrator experiences 
spells of boredom or even writer’s block, during which she casts about for some new idea, 
new inspiration. The tale at times becomes unfocused, turns back on itself, seeks a way of 
escape from the convention (“convent”) that it has chosen, to suddenly exclaim ecstatically:
A page is good only when we turn it and find life urging along, confusing 
every page in the book. The pen rushes on, urged by the same joy that 
makes me course the open road. A chapter started when one doesn’t know 
which tale to tell is like a corner turned on leaving a convent, when one 
might come face to face with a dragon, a Saracen gang, an enchanted isle 
or a new love. (140)
Thus, our storyteller is not the regular unreliable narrator, whose inconsistencies 
are caused by some flaw or motivated by some hidden purpose. The tone is that of a myth-
maker, or a folk storyteller, someone who speaks in images that drift into his/her brain, the 
impact of which is quite beyond the speaker’s control. We are witnessing an improvisation, 
complex and wonderfully involuted, with the improviser unsure of his/her next move and 
quite unembarrassed about it. It is not a malicious purpose, personality issues, hidden mo-
tives, inexperience or inability to properly interpret facts that mars the story. In fact, it is 
not marred by the unreliability at all – it is all part of the enchantment. We are following 
a magic lantern, by whose light we see incredibly vivid images of unimaginable things – 
and if the light reveals at one instance a knight, and at another a virgin in his place, and 
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yet at another – a whale, well, we are in the realm of a fairytale where metamorphoses are 
only to be expected. We may call this type of narrator a meandering narrator – someone 
whose tale wanders through space and time propelled by its own fictionality and nothing 
else, no specific moral or practical purpose, only the self-impelling dynamic of the story 
that continuously forms and re-forms itself.5
And this peculiar unreliability is sustained through the visibility of the narrative. 
Every reader would rebel against being told things which are in constant disagreement 
with each other, refusing to suspend his disbelief – and yet, through the magic stream of 
images, the reader is hypnotized into submission. The tale has its own logic, precarious 
and inimitable, but when the absence can be made tangible, when the pure air of fiction is 
mixed with realism which is quite extraordinary in its morbid details – when these things 
happen, the invented world becomes irresistible.
3. DESPAIR
3.1 UNRELIABILITY IS ANNOUNCED
Just as Calvino weaves his imagery into a flighty, changeable narrative, so does Nabokov 
in Despair create a narrative that is devilishly uncertain, and yet “succeeds largely be-
cause of its old-fashioned virtue: the creation of a concretely realized world of intriguing 
interest” (Carroll 1982, 82).
This concretely realized world is, however, dangerously unstable. Hermann takes 
pains to announce himself to be a “spectacularly unreliable narrator” (Carroll 1982, 83). 
Like Calvino’s nun, he refuses to correct inconsistencies in his story, to rewrite the obvi-
ously flawed passages, rejecting any tendency to subject his manuscript to any editing or 
revision whatsoever: “I could, of course, have crossed it out, but I purposely leave it there 
as a sample of one of my essential traits: my light-hearted, inspired lying” (4). In fact, 
he seems to celebrate his own fabulating, throwing it into the reader’s face, enjoying the 
reader’s confusion (amply imagined by him), reveling in the reader’s misunderstandings 
and misreadings caused by the multiple traps in the text set by this malicious narrator. And 
the only clues that may help to unravel the questionable reality of the tale are contained in 
the visual images inscribed within the text: thus, Hermann uses the visibility of his world 
both to trap and to offer a way of welcome release to his “victims.”
5 Curiously, in a letter to Giovani Falaschi dated 4th November 1972, Calvino admits that the ploy of making 
the nun and Bradamante merge in the final chapter “came to me at the end, at the point when I was writing the 
conclusion” (Calvino 2013, 417-418). This off-hand statement creates the impression that the author has not thought 
through this device and has not written the novel with it in mind. Moreover, the tone in which the writer speaks in 
the letter about Our Ancestors suggests that he treated the trilogy merely as warming-up exercises before writing 
his more substantial fiction. However, Calvino is hardly the author whose straight-forward statements should be 
explicitly trusted (within or without his fictions). It is well known that he devoted particular attention to the formal 
aspects of each of his books and developed a series of constraints beforehand, which provided boundaries and, 
to some extent, formed a skeleton to his fictions. The convention of the narrator is far too important to form as an 
afterthought. Moreover, the fairytale convention chosen by the writer is perfectly in line with  the narrator’s mode, 
and Calvino knew far too much about the folk tales, having edited an anthology (Calvino 1956), to be unaware of 
this fact. His statement may be interpreted as a slyly oblique explanation of the nature of the narrator, and not the 
author of the story: it is narrator, whose mind runs on with the story without revising it, dreaming up new images 
and new solutions in the course of the telling. 
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Thus, perhaps unlike Calvino’s narrator, Hermann in Despair seems to know from 
the very beginning what he is after, even though his text has a quality of immediacy that is 
enforced by the narrator’s position as a criminal (a murderer) fleeing from justice and just 
about to be captured. His style, his language and frequent changes introduced into the flow 
of narrative all indicate that he clearly intends to fool the reader – or to make an April fool of 
him: “And a damn fool I have made of someone. Who is he? Gentle reader, look at yourself 
in the mirror, as you seem to like the mirrors so much” (24). However, what exactly is the 
nature of the hoax is subject to interpretation: Hermann’s inversion of the convention of the 
double or, perhaps, his clever simulation of insanity which might help him avoid capital 
punishment after his eventual capture. Hermann’s outrageously unreliable narrative attempts 
to put into brackets everything the reader intuits about his world: it often seems that the only 
safe procedure of reading is to always invert whatever the narrator states in his story.
Yet, of course, this is hardly helpful. Unreliability may be said to work in a literary 
text only when there are clear boundaries to it, when the reader understands that, though 
many aspects may be doubtful, there is a certain world in which the heroes move, act and 
suffer, and establishing this world by unraveling the corruptions of unreliability is the 
whole purpose of reading. Most crucially, the truth about this world exists. With Hermann, 
we have no such luck. His world, it is true, seems tangible enough: he is a failed business-
man, living in a flat in Berlin and sometimes going to the countryside for a holiday in his 
blue car, with a not very bright and gleefully unfaithful wife, encumbered in addition by the 
wife’s cousin-lover, an alcoholic and an unsuccessful painter. Hermann’s adventures and 
experiences have a clearly visual quality: he often describes in meticulous detail scenes, 
faces, interiors. And yet, Hermann crafts his depiction of “reality” in such a way as to place 
the reader in the position of forever doubting his bearings in this topsy-turvy world – and 
even doubting the possibility of ever decoding it, if not the very existence of this world.
3.2 HERMANN’S WORLD AND THE GAME OF MARBLES
Hermann’s favourite device is to concoct a very concrete, highly detailed description of 
a particular scene which is marred by a peculiar defect, and which he himself carefully 
points out to the reader:
On coming back from Prague to Berlin, I found Lydia in the kitchen engaged 
in beating an egg in a glass – “goggle-moggle,” we called it. (...) She started 
to turn the spoon in the thick yellow stuff, grains of sugar crunched slightly, 
it was still clammy, the spoon did not move smoothly with the velvety oval-
ity that was required. (...) “Well – had a good trip?” asked Lydia as she went 
on energetically turning the handle, with the box-part held firm between her 
knees. The coffee beans crackled, richly odorous; the mill was still working 
with a rumbling and creaking effort; then came an easing, a yielding; gone 
all resistance; empty. I have got muddled somehow. As in a dream. She was 
making that goggle-moggle – not coffee. (30-31)
What is going on in this scene? Hermann seems to be relating a humdrum incident 
of his married life, to all appearances of no importance to the plot of the novel. And yet 
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something very strange is happening here: the scene, with its delicious synaesthetic detail 
(spoon moving “smoothly with the velvety ovality”, “richly odorous” crackling) is com-
bined out of two distinct episodes, melted together. The first, egg-beating episode, takes 
place when Hermann for the first time sees his wife after meeting Felix (the presumed 
double); the second scene with the coffee-beans is borrowed from the future, when Her-
mann sees his wife for the last time, trying to instruct her about the insurance scheme. 
Thus, the snake of time is made to bite its own tail: the beginning is merged with the end. 
Synaesthesia, the confusion of senses, is used to introduce the confusion of events, or, 
more precisely, a temporal loop. What is significant here is not the temporal conflation 
itself, but the way Hermann crafts it: “I have got muddled somehow. As in a dream.” He 
is instructing the reader on how to interpret the scene: it is a dream-sequence, soon to be 
continued, and in a dream world slightly different rules apply.
And this is merely the first of the series of such conflations of events. It is very easy 
to take this as a symptom of Hermann’s madness – William C. Carroll tantalizingly calls 
it “memoria interrupta” (93) – yet there is more to this ploy than a mind raging outside its 
bounds: Hermann’s dating of events in his narrative is meticulously exact, which proves 
that he is perfectly aware of the chronological aspects of his tale and is in full control of his 
memory. Temporal “muddling” is a device he uses, on the one hand, to convince the reader 
of his presumed insanity, and, more importantly, to melt concrete reality into something 
fluid and unpredictable which is supposed to make a very specific effect on the reader.
Hermann breaks the mould of time on at least two more occasions: when he de-
scribes his first visit to what will become the scene of his crime, and when he sends Felix 
his covert “invitation to a murder.” The location of the (future) crime is central to the 
novel, peppered as it is with symbols of doubles and bifurcations of fate.6 Hermann works 
very hard on inducing a sense of eeriness in the reader even before it becomes clear what 
exactly will happen in this quite ordinary patch of the forest:
“What a creepy spot,” said Lydia. “Really, I’d be afraid to stay here all by 
myself. One could get robbed, murdered – anything...”
A lonely spot, quite so! The pines soughed gently, snow lay about, with bald 
patches of soil showing black. What nonsense! How could there be snow 
in June? Ought to be crossed out, were it not wicked to erase; for the real 
author is not I, but my impatient memory. Understand it just as you please; 
it is none of my business. And the yellow post had a skullcap of snow too. 
Thus the future shimmers through the past. But enough, let that summer 
day be in focus again: spotty sunlight; shadows of branches across the blue 
car; a pine cone upon the footboard, where some day the most unexpected 
of objects will stand; a shaving brush. (37-38)
6 Hermann murders Felix near a lake, where “a Y-stemmed couple of inseparable birches grew... (or a couple of 
couples, if you counted their reflections)” (33). Y-sign may be interpreted in various ways: as a sign of a double, or 
as a sign of the bi-furcation of fate – which, in Nabokov’s works, always stands for the author, or as a pointer to a ho-
monymous question “why?” – cf. Ksiezopolska 2012, 180. Note also the proposition that the actual narrator of the 
tale is not Hermann, but Felix, briefly outlined in the monograph, which deserves to be examined more directly.
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Lydia, an avid reader of detective novels, is allowed to provide a fitting introduc-
tion, ushering the reader into the “creepy” atmosphere. Hermann next makes a cinematic 
montage of the visual scenery: instead of the summer day we see the black-and-white 
picture of a March wood, which is suspended in mid-air, while the narrator unhurriedly 
contemplates it, throwing hints of significance to the reader (note the ominous “skullcap” 
on the exclamation mark of the signpost), while the scene grows transparent; the camera 
cuts to the shot of the sunshine-suffused present, only to shift back to the bleak future 
with the incongruous object in the foreground (the pinecone turning into the shaving 
brush). That object will be among the various “murder weapons” – Hermann will duti-
fully shave and groom Felix before shooting him, to make his victim appear more like 
himself. On first reading, we have no way of knowing the function of the brush, and 
the narrator succeeds in mystifying us. This concrete object is the finishing touch in the 
rather well-executed picture (Hermann’s literary output is very uneven): it draws atten-
tion to itself, it gives just the right feeling of strangeness and, because it is both mundane 
and mysterious, it appears menacingly sinister. On second reading, with the hindsight 
of Hermann’s crime and folly we read this scene with a feeling akin to the experience of 
déjà vu – we not only remember the scene, but remember remembering it. This precisely 
reflects Hermann’s state of mind:
A pleasant summer day and a peaceful countryside; a good-natured fool of 
an artist and a roadside post... That yellow post... that particular landmark 
subsequently became a fixed idea with me. Cut out clearly in yellow, amid 
a diffuse landscape, it stood up in my dreams. By its position my fancies 
found their bearings. All my thoughts reverted to it. It shone, a faithful 
beacon, in the darkness of my speculations. I have the feeling today that 
I recognized it, when seeing it for the first time: familiar to me as a thing 
of the future... Yes, that’s it, now I am getting it clear – I certainly did have 
that queer sensation; it has not been added as an afterthought. And that 
yellow post... How meaningly it looked at me, when I glanced back... (35)7
Hermann is making us notice, study, memorize and (falsely) recognize that absurd 
yellow post, “cut out”, as if superimposed on the quiet landscape by a picture-book maker, 
who uses it to point to something highly important. Hermann needs to convince us it has 
a meaning, that it is relevant – and he is trying too hard. The first, cinematic passage would 
be sufficient to induce the feeling of menacing strangeness, but all this talk of “remember-
ing”, “recognizing”, “queer sensation”, etc. does little to further the peculiar impression 
of weird foreboding that – to Hermann – seems both exciting and morbid.
The next instance of temporal conflation is done with much more subtlety, so 
much so, that it is quite easy to miss the instance altogether. The focus of the scene is on 
the letter that Hermann is trying to post to Felix. Curiously, he seems unable to drop this 
7 The cited passage envelops the earlier quoted fragment – in the novel, this game actually goes on for several 
pages, with the narrator patiently hammering the point home, until the reader is quite overcome with all the com-
binations of temporal references and indicators of significance. 
148 2013
IRENA KSIężOPOlSKA
letter into the post box, passing five or six boxes and still retaining the fatal letter. This is 
when he notices two little girls:
I stood there, bending under my burden as before, and looking from under 
my brows at two little girls playing near me on the pavement: they rolled by 
turns an iridescent marble, aiming at a pit in the soil near the curb. I selected 
the younger of the two – she was a delicate little thing, dark-haired, dressed 
in a checkered frock (what a wonder she was not cold on that harsh Febru-
ary day) and, patting her on the head, I said: “Look here, my dear, my eyes 
are so weak that I’m afraid of missing the slit; do please, drop this letter for 
me into the box over there.” She glanced up at me, rose from her squatting 
position (she had a small face of translucid pallor and rare beauty), took the 
letter, gave me a divine smile accompanied by a sweep of her long lashes, 
and ran to the letter box. I did not wait to see the rest... (124-125)8
Hermann is first preoccupied with the letter, and then with the beauty of the little 
girl – yet, he does wonder at her light garb. In fact, her clothing is perfectly appropriate 
to the season: she, with the entire setting of this scene, is borrowed from an earlier epi-
sode – Hermann’s semi-hallucinatory wanderings through the town of Tarnitz, where he 
is supposed to meet Felix (dated October 1st):
I stood under the porch and looked at two little girls playing marbles; rolling 
by turn the iridescent orb, now bending to give it a push with the back of 
the finger, now compressing it between the feet to release it with a hop, and 
all this in order that the marble should trickle into a tiny pit in the ground 
under a double-trunked birch tree; as I stood looking at that concentrated, 
silent and minute game, I somehow found myself thinking that Felix could 
not come for the simple reason that he was a product of my imagination, 
which hankered after reflections, repetitions, masks, and that my presence 
in a remote little town was absurd and even monstrous. (69-70)
While Hermann looks on, the reader of course notes the peculiar Y-trunked birch 
tree which is a double of the tree marking the site of the future murder. The game of 
marbles is described in almost the same words in both episodes, yet Hermann seems 
to be oblivious to the fact that he is mixing up two separate events. Interestingly, he does 
experience a feeling of déjà vu, but not during the episode that comes chronologically later, 
where it would be justified by half-unconscious memory. And on that occasion, there is no 
sign of exaltation that he exhibited while describing the murder spot, quite the opposite, 
there is every sign of weary distaste: “every man with a keen eye is familiar with those 
8 Note the forward-looking little messenger that Hermann employs – she seems a wink at the reader above Her-
mann’s head, though that would be an anachronism, as the passage appears already in the Russian text of Despair, 
written long before the character of Ada, or Ardour: Family Chronicle or Lolita.
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anonymously retold passages from his past life: false-innocent combinations of details, 
which smack revoltingly of plagiarism. Let us leave them to the conscience of fate...” (70).
Of course, that illegitimate nature characterizes all of Hermann’s premonitions-
memories: he tries to convey to the reader that scenes are familiar to him as “thing[s] of 
the future”. But in the game of marbles we have a level of unreality that is quite dizzying 
even for such a novel as Despair. First, the little girls in Tarnitz suggest to Hermann the 
unreality of his existence – without, it seems, any obvious reason. We may only guess 
that to Hermann the game (depicted as a thing of beauty) somehow communicates the 
wretched nature of his mad dreams. Or, perhaps, he may be feeling that he is “losing his 
marbles”, as the saying goes, slipping into insanity.
But there is another possibility always present in Nabokov’s texts: Hermann may 
intuit that the game the girls play is an allegorized reflection of the celestial game that gods 
are playing with him. Shade, in Pale Fire, is elated to discover traces of this game in his 
life: “It sufficed that I in life could find / Some kind of link-and-bobolink, some kind / Of 
correlated pattern in the game, / Plexed artistry, and something of the same / Pleasure in 
it as they who played it found” (Nabokov 1996, 479-480). However, to Hermann, a failed 
artist and a proclaimed atheist, the game is a menace: in it he would be a plaything and 
not the player. That is why he feels queasy with the suspicion that his life is turning into 
a repetitive hallucination, he is nauseous because he intuits that not only Felix is an illusion 
of his obsessed mind, but also he, over-real Hermann, may be fictitious as well.
But to return to the Tarnitz episode: in the novel it has a very peculiar status, 
appearing as a sort of sustained hallucination or a dream – objects melt into each other, 
Hermann’s actions are often absurdly inconsequent, he dreams those unsettling layered 
dreams, walks in circles, fighting a feeling that he is somehow back in his own past (un-
known to us and quite tantalizing, because it may contain the secret trauma that shapes 
Hermann’s character). The two girls with their marbles seem to be part of this illusory 
pattern. It has been suggested that the whole episode is a hallucination within the book 
(Saugee 1974, 56), yet it is because of the link forged there between Hermann and Felix, 
that some letters are exchanged between them later on, which eventually leads to the 
murder in the forest – the kernel of Hermann’s tale. Deleting this episode as a fantasy 
would make the whole plot crumble.
And, even if the first episode is illusory (or invented by Hermann in retrospect), 
what of the second game of marbles? The little girl who mails the letter does not belong in 
the February day with her light clothing, which would mean that she either exists in a dif-
ferent time frame, or does not exist at all – and thus, the fatal letter could not have been 
delivered to Felix, he could not have come to the appointment with his killer, Hermann 
could not have shot him in the woods, and so on. Things fall apart.
Saugee postulates that “we can try to sort real from unreal, but since we must use 
as reference the document of a self-deluding neurotic, the task is futile” (Saugee 1974, 58). 
One is tempted to agree with this statement, and yet – even though the readers experience 
frustration and the literary detectives have trouble pulling apart Hermann’s delusions, 
his deliberate lies and the actual story as it happened (has it happened at all?) – there is 
something so concrete about the world of the novel that both readers and critics are con-
tinuously tantalized and drawn to it, instead of being repulsed by all the unreliability they 
150 2013
IRENA KSIężOPOlSKA
face. Besides, the root of the problem is not quite Hermann’s psychotic state, but rather his 
deliberate effort to create in the reader a certain uneasiness, an existential anxiety that he 
himself is continuously suffering from.
3.3 THE CARTESIAN DEMON
Hermann is suffering from a very particular paranoia – not an actual clinical condition, 
but an existential anxiety that William C. Carroll fittingly calls “the Cartesian nightmare.” 
In truth, his most terrible fear is that his existence would lose its meaning if somewhere 
in the world there existed his double – Hermann’s anxiety is that this double would prove 
to be real, and thus his whole existence would be pushed out into the realm of mirror reflec-
tions.9 That is why he decides to put into action his very hazily and inexpertly concocted 
murder scheme: he feels that he must delete the double that threatens his reality in the 
world. He nears the realization of this truth in a rare moment of lucidity: “’Please, God!’ 
I said with force, and failed to understand, myself, why I said so; for did not the sense of 
my whole life consist now in my possessing a live reflection? So why then did I mention 
the name of a non-existent God, why did there flash through my mind the foolish hope 
that my reflection had been distorted?” (67).
All Hermann is trying to do in his manuscript is to convince the reader (and him-
self) that the existence of the double gives him a certain power over reality, the power 
to distort it and bend it out of shape by playing with two identical images, with the viewer 
never quite sure whether the image before him is the object or the subject in the com-
plicated game. Hermann tries to pose as a deus deceptor, or a Cartesian demon, whose 
existence may overturn our entire understanding of reality:
I will therefore suppose that, not God, who is perfectly good and the source 
of truth, but some evil spirit, supremely powerful and cunning, has devoted 
all his efforts to deceiving me. I will think that the sky, the air, the earth, 
colors, shapes, sounds, and all external things are no different from the il-
lusions of our dreams, and that they are traps he has laid for my credulity; 
I will consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, and 
no senses, but yet as falsely believing that I have all these; I will obstinately 
cling to these thoughts, and in this way, if indeed it is not in my power 
to discover any truth, yet certainly to the best of my ability and determina-
tion I will take care not to give my assent to anything false, or to allow this 
deceiver, however powerful and cunning he may be, to impose upon me in 
any way.” (Descartes 2008, 16-17)
For Descartes, this is merely a stage in reaching the firm ground of his “cogito”: 
his obstinate refusal “to give my assent to ... allow this deceiver ... to impose upon me” 
echoes Calvino’s Knight’s existence by “will power ... and faith in our holy cause.” Yet, 
before one reaches this safe haven of faith in one’s own existence, there is this horrible 
9 Note, in this context, Hermann’s fear of mirrors: at one point, he grows a beard because he cannot bear to see his 
own face in the mirror (177).
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suspicion, not only that the world around is a counterfeit affair, but that one simply does 
not exist at all – “having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood and no senses” – quite 
like Calvino’s Nonexistent Knight. Failure to believe in his own existence is precisely the 
ailment that Hermann is suffering from. He inadvertently betrays himself in the chapter 
on God, beginning tantalizingly with the phrase: “The nonexistence of God is simple 
to prove” (101).10 His discussion of the metaphysics, logically flawed and reeking of self-
delusion – and ironic since, in Hermann’s world, there is, indeed, an almighty god who is 
also a deus deceptor (the author) – succeeds only in proving that his existence as a self-
aware being is fraught with existentialist uneasiness. Discussing afterlife in which the 
newly dead would meet their deceased loved ones, Hermann apostrophizes the reader 
directly in the following way:
Now tell me, please, what guarantee do you possess that those beloved 
ghosts are genuine; that it is really your dear dead mother and not some 
petty demon mystifying you, masked as your mother and impersonating her 
with consummate art and naturalness? There is the rub, there is the horror; 
the more so as the acting will go on and on, endlessly; never, never, never, 
never, never will your soul in that other world be quite sure that the sweet 
gentle spirits crowding about it are not fiends in disguise, and forever, and 
forever, and forever shall your soul remain in doubt, expecting every mo-
ment some awful change, some diabolical sneer to disfigure the dear face 
bending over you. (102-103)
Obsessive repetition, peculiar choice of words (horror, endlessly, fiends in disguise, 
awful, diabolical, disfigure) and the peculiar – verging on Dostoyevsian hysterics – tone 
of the narrator indicate that this is not an abstract philosophical discussion, but something 
very personal and directly relevant to Hermann. His problem is, of course, something 
quite obvious to us – his fictional status. Nabokov’s heroes are quite often tormented by 
the realization of their unreality and attempt in various ways to battle the terrible God-
author who determines their lives and deaths. But in Hermann’s case, the unbearable state 
of existence shadowed by a constant suspicion of nonexistence, does not limit itself to the 
figure of the narrating hero.
Suffering from the constant feeling of being embroidered into someone else’s fic-
tion, Hermann attempts to take his revenge – forcing the reader to experience the same 
existential anxiety, the same qualms of inexistence that torture his mind. If he appears 
insane, it may be a clever camouflage, serving multiple purposes. When he announces that 
he intends to make an April fool of the reader, this is a mild understatement: in fact he is 
after inducing in the reader the same state of paranoia that he exhibits in the text. When 
at the end he projects himself as director of a film11, who is simultaneously the leading 
10 Note that these thoughts are consistently linked in Hermann’s manuscript with the God issue, indicating his, 
perhaps subconscious, awareness that in his text there might be other powers working over his head.
11 Note the consistency with which Hermann makes use of the cinematic allusions: two instances were already 
mentioned above (the first description of the crime scene, and the ending of the novel). There are many more exam-
ples – to mention just a couple: when Hermann sees Felix for the first time, he is reminded of a film about doubles 
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actor, making his escape, ordering the public to make way for him, he is not addressing 
his fictional audience, but rather his readers, thus embroidering them into his fictional 
world, entangling them into his deceitful story, enmeshing them into the fluid realm of 
existential instability.
4. THE NONEXISTENT NARRATORS
It is interesting to note that both Calvino’s and Nabokov’s narrators have a similar attitude 
to their task of transcribing their story. Hermann, on beginning his account, seems bored 
with it and interrupts it with the following explanation: “Dull work recounting all this. 
Bores me to death. But yearn as I may to reach the crucial point quickly, a few preliminary 
explanations seem necessary. So let us have done with them...” (5). However, even though 
he seems to have committed himself to the dull task of setting the scene, he backslides 
into boredom that is made worse by an unbearable agitation:
I think I ought to inform the reader that there has just been a long inter-
val... I have been sitting in a queer state of exhaustion, now listening to the 
rushing and crashing of the wind, now drawing noses in the margin of the 
page, now slipping into a vague slumber, and then starting up all aquiver. 
And again there would grow in me that prickly feeling, that unendurable 
twitter... and my will lay limp in an empty world... I had to make a great 
effort in order to switch on the light and stick in a new nib. The old one 
had got chipped and bent and now looks like the beak of a bird of prey. (5)
The tale seems to be escaping from Hermann, and instead of getting on to the es-
sence of his story, he continues to write about the process of writing, concentrating on the 
external circumstances, his writing materials, his own distress. The state of excitement 
and inability to proceed with the task of writing, “that unendurable twitter,” even the 
scribbles in the margins of the manuscript are well familiar to Sister Theodora, who also 
wants her tale to rush on but seems unable to concentrate on her task, and keeps writing 
about herself in the process of writing:
One starts off writing with a certain zest, but a time comes when the pen 
merely grates in dusty ink, and not a drop of life flows, and life is all outside, 
outside the window, outside oneself, and it seems that never more can one es-
cape into a page one is writing, open out another world, leap the gap.“ (71-71)
I realize only now that I have filled page after page and am still at the very 
beginning... I long to hurry on with my story, tell it quickly, embellish every 
page with enough duels and battles for a poem but when I pause and start 
rereading I realize that my pen has left no mark on the paper and the pages 
are blank.” (105-106)
(identified by Stephen Blackwell as “The Student of Prague”, cf. Blackwell 2002/2003); Hermann also pretends 
to be an actor needing an understudy when he tries to “recruit” Felix.
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For both narrators the tale seems to be a sort of penance: to the nun – an attempt 
to save her soul; to Hermann – an attempt to restore his faith in his own existence. Fore-
grounding their creative efforts, they make the readers realize that the heroes they are 
reading about are simply characters of stories – in a sense, nonexistent; at the same time 
the narrators legitimize themselves by indicating that they exist on a higher level than their 
heroes – and thus appear as truly existent, which quality is made doubtful again when the 
readers realize that the narrators are also the acting heroes.
Thus, both The Nonexistent Knight and Despair seem to deal with the Cartesian 
problem: what does it mean to exist and how may we interpret the unreliable phenomena 
around us. Is it enough to possess self-awareness to truly exist? What do we become when 
conventions that mark our boundaries – like the armor of the nonexistent knight – are 
transgressed or altogether abandoned? Can we then continue to exist?
In Descartes’s Meditations, the doubt of one’s existence turns out to be precisely 
the proof of that existence. Yet, for Agilulf, this doubt brings about his apparent demise. 
Self-awareness of the Nonexistent Knight survives the assault of doubt from the outside: 
when Torrismund undermines his past deeds on which his identity is grounded, this 
merely launches Agilulf’s quest for the proof of his origins. He does not seem to need 
the belief of others to exist, rather – insubstantiality in others always gives him the feel-
ing of “perfect calm and security” (21). When he reaches the goal and finds Sophronia, 
still a virgin by her own admission, this confirms the soundness of Agilulf’s identity, 
her virginity being the Holy Grail of his quest, since his knighthood and all the subse-
quent titles were based on the single deed of saving Sophronia’s virginity from being 
violated. Yet, when he goes back to Sophronia’s cave with the Emperor, she is a virgin 
no longer, having spent the night with Torrismund. In theory, this should not have 
upset Agilulf: even before he began his quest, the emperor postulated that it would be 
a miracle for Sophronia’s virginity to be preserved after 15 years, even in a convent, and 
Agilulf calmly replied: “Violated chastity presupposes a violator. I will find him and 
obtain proof from him of the date when Sophronia could be considered a virgin” (82). 
Logically, therefore, what Agilulf should do at this moment of trial is to demand from 
Torrismund a confirmation of Sophronia’s virginity before their lovemaking – which 
he would have duly received. Yet, all Agilulf hears is Sophronia’s admission that she 
has raised Torrismund, and this is enough to make him doubt his own reality: “I have 
no longer a name! Farewell!” (129).
Self-doubt destroys the Knight: when his armor is next found, it is truly empty, 
and Raimbaut takes possession of it. The knight who did not exist now also ceased to be 
real. However, we may never be sure of what really happened to the invisible knight – he 
dissolved into the air, and yet – was the outline of the armor truly necessary for his exist-
ence? May we really postulate that because that outline was broken, he exists no longer 
– remembering, that he has never existed before, though he was real enough. In fact, we 
may propose a different solution to Calvino’s tale, which may explain not only the ultimate 
fate of its protagonist, but also the dubious role of its narrator.
The identity of the narrator is in fact the question that is never properly solved in the 
story. We have already established that it cannot be Bradamante. Yet, “Sister Theodora” is 
also merely an outline, a role: her “ownership” of the text does not explain the three first 
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impersonal chapters, told from a clearly omniscient position. But what if Agilulf, dissolv-
ing after taking off his armor, did not cease to exist? What would he become? Perhaps, 
he would become a mere voice – a narrating presence, a sort of omniscient, omnipotent, 
omnipresent (non)being, almost a god, but a god who longs to learn humanity and tries 
to find an embodiment for himself – in the characters of his tale.
Agilulf’s disembodiment perfectly explains the narrative stance of the first chap-
ters: even the white knight that he used to be is no longer his identity, which explains the 
use of the third person in relation to him. The consequent adoption of the identity of a nun, 
shut up in a convent, may be seen as his attempt to adopt humanity, to be able to understand 
it better: a nun is the next logical step, as a figure who is removed beyond the margins of 
active life, and yet may observe it and comment on it. The final adoption of Bradamante’s 
identity is a sort of repayment for her love – she is thus allowed to merge with the man she 
loves. It is also a conversion of a passive observer (a narrator) into an active hero – which 
was actually the true object of the Nonexistent Knight’s quest.
Agilulf’s voice, beginning in the semi-metallic tone of objectivity, is made to pass 
through all stages of human partiality, gradually growing in warmth. In the first chapters 
we can easily notice changes of tone: for instance, when the voice describes Bradamante 
there are sudden switches of intonation, from the ironically descriptive to admiringly 
lyrical, to abstractly poetic:
Raimbaut could not believe his eyes. For the naked flesh was a woman’s: 
a smooth gold-flecked belly, round rosy hips, long straight girl’s legs. This 
half of a girl (the crab half now had an even more inhuman and expression-
less aspect than ever) was turning round and looking for a suitable spot, set 
one foot on one side and one foot on the other side of a trickle of water, bent 
knees slightly, leant on the ground, arms covered with iron bands, pushed 
the head forward and the behind back and began quietly and proudly to pee. 
She was a woman of harmonious moons, tender plumage, and gentle waves.
Raimbaut admires the loveliness of the girl’s body, Sister Theodora produces her 
typical description of half-woman and half-crab in the unlyrical act of urinating, and 
Agilulf’s voice breaks through, with his typically abstract poetry of “harmonious moons, 
tender plumage, and gentle waves”.12
Sister Theodora’s narrative also frequently betrays the tendency to defuse the epic 
pathos, typical for Agilulf. The Nonexistent Knight always corrects the tales of the other 
12 Here it would be appropriate to comment on Calvino’s statement in the Italian Preface to the trilogy that the first 
person narrator was added because the author felt the need  to “counter the objective coldness, typical of fabulous 
narrative, with an element capable of introducing rapport and lyricism, something the modern narrative cannot do 
without.” (Calvino 1962, cited in Weiss 1993, 64) It is interesting to note in the context of this pronouncement that 
according to Marc Beckwith in his anthology of Italian Folktales Calvino frequently deleted the very element that 
introduced the narrator into the story – usually, part of the story ending, when the narrator would indicate his/her 
involvement with the characters of the tale (Cf. Beckwith 1987,  247). This testifies to Calvino’s awareness of the 
existence of the narrative convention including the elements he needed for his novel in the tradition of the folktales. 
His statement might be interpreted as a subtle hint for the reader to pay attention to the changes of the tone from 
that “objective coldness” to “rapport and lyricism”, which is motivated by the secret identity of the narrator. 
1552013
VISIBLE WORLDS AND THE ART OF NARRATION: CULTIVATION OF UNRELIABILITY THROUGH VISUALIZATION...
knights by adding the humdrum details which completely destroy the legendary status of 
the narratives. Sister Theodora manages quite as well: she narrates how in his first battle 
Raimbaut is constantly thwarted in his attempt to avenge his father, through bureaucracy, 
mistranslation, misidentification and so on, until even he can no longer feel the passion 
that moved him to join Charlemagne’s army. Her other tactics of introducing grotesque, 
fantastic or grossly realistic elements into descriptions of epic events were already dis-
cussed above. Thus, there is at the very least an affinity between the nun and the knight, 
and if he has become encased within her figure, as earlier he had been within his white 
armor, it would be quite elegant and very fitting.
As the narrative progresses, the Knight learns to subdue the abstract to the par-
ticular, sustaining the various believably human intonations, giving more and more space 
to the developing “self” of the narrator, until it is ready to become an active self. Earlier, 
he did not exist because he lacked passion and empathy – the purpose of his narrative is 
to save his soul by teaching him what it means to be human: not merely self-aware, but 
also aware of human frailty and suffering and love. His narrative makes him complete – 
not an ideal, not a presence, but a person with desires and needs.
It is obvious that Calvino did not perceive the status of his characters as unchange-
able. Villagers of the Koowalden, freed from the tyranny of the Knights of the Holy Grail, 
explain to Torrismund: “We ourselves did not know we existed... One can also learn 
to be...” (138). Gurduloo, having a body but lacking a stable name and the self-conscious-
ness that is the Cartesian formula of existence, is constantly threatened by “being swal-
lowed up into nothingness” (Migiel 1986, 58). His nonexistence is complementary to the 
Knight’s. They are Calvino’s doubles, not rivals (as in Nabokov’s text), but two alienated 
halves that, reunited, would constitute a complete human being. Yet, the compilation of the 
opposites that is effected in the first story of the trilogy (rather crudely, by sewing together 
the two halves earlier torn asunder by a cannon shot) does not take place in The Nonexist-
ent Knight: Gurduloo does not take up Agilulf’s armor to merge with him. Instead, it is 
suggested that Gurduloo may still learn how to exist – without any use of magic, it seems. 
If a creature without awareness may hope to become fully human through experience, 
why should we deny the same possibility to a self-aware but disembodied consciousness, 
searching completeness through art?
If we accept this supposition, Calvino’s narrator in The Nonexistent Knight would 
represent a paradoxical case of an omniscient narrator who is unreliable, a disembodied 
third person narrator who pretends to be a first person narrator. In Genette’s terms, we 
would have here an extradiegetic narrator (above the level of the main story) who is si-
multaneously an intradiegetic one (narrating the story from within), and a homodiegetic 
narrator (involved in the action) who pretends to be a heterodiegetic one (not participating 
in the action). Calvino manages to mix up all the helpful narratological categories – his 
nonexistent character-narrator is abstract and specific enough to simultaneously wear all 
the available masks.
Thus, both Agilulf and Hermann are narrators who try to exert their existence through 
their texts. Hermann constructs a concrete world to battle the paranoia of his Cartesian night-
mare (suspicion that everything, including himself, is a dream); Agilulf through his narration 
tries to recover his existence, going beyond the stage of self-doubt into the firm ground of 
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self-assertion, trying on various roles of his human characters who exist in the flesh. Both 
narrators, however, by telling their stories also fictionalize those who might have existed as 
corporeal creatures into the “pale organisms of literary heroes” who now need the lifeblood 
of the readers to exist. Of course, both narrators feed on this very lifeblood themselves, 
regaining reality through our efforts to visualize, decode and understand their worlds.
The text that encodes those visions is as changeable as the sea and perhaps this 
is why it enchants us and leads us through the meanders of literary detection and philo-
sophical speculation: “The polymorphic visions of the eyes and the spirit are contained in 
uniform lines of small or capital letters, periods, commas, parentheses – pages of signs, 
packed as closely together as grains of sand, representing the many-colored spectacle of 
the world on a surface that is always the same and always different, like dunes shifted by 
the desert wind” (Calvino 1993, 99).
There is one more aspect of the tales that must be pointed out in conclusion of this 
discussion. In the introduction to his Italian Folktales, Calvino cites the Tuscan proverb: 
“The tale is not beautiful if nothing is added to it” (Calvino 1980, xxi). This, perhaps, 
gives us a gentle hint of the nature of Calvino’s own tales: they are incomplete without the 
reader’s participation. The same might be said about Despair: the mode of narration, with 
its fluidity and visuality, is designed to draw the readers in, making them in some way 
interact with the tale (if only to give the lifeblood to the heroes). We add our interpreta-
tions, trying to understand what the Nonexistent Knight stands for (all commentators of 
the novel invariably see the figure of Calvino’s protagonist as an allegory), what is the 
source of Hermann’s paranoia (all of Nabokov’s commentators seem convinced that his 
narrator is deranged), what happens to Agilulf after he dismantles his armor, what happens 
to Hermann after his narrative is completed and the page is turned, who the true narrator 
is in Calvino’s tale, and who is the true master of discourse in Nabokov’s. We add to the 
tale, thus revealing its beauty.
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HOW MUSIC TURNED INTO 
PHILOSOPHY AND WHAT 
IMPLICATIONS DOES THIS HAVE?
In this brief sketch I will focus on an issue that seems crucial to anyone who is engaged 
today in the philosophy of music. I will examine the unprecedented turn that took place 
in the 20th century. It could be said that this change involved the very essence of “musical-
ity,” namely – what we are willing to accept as music. First, I will briefly characterize this 
change. Then, I will try to develop a philosophical interpretation of this phenomenon by 
employing the notion of “ontological virtualisation,” developed in reference to Hei degger, 
Deleuze and a contemporary Scottish philosopher – Raymond Brassier. Finally, I will 
offer an interpretation of several artistic strategies adopted by contemporary composers, 
considering them as philosophical statements and asking about their philosophical ramifi-
cations. I will conclude by posing some questions inspired by changes in contemporary 
music which, as I believe, are relevant to philosophy of culture in general.
FAREWELL, HARMONY!
Since antiquity, music in Western culture has been regulated by a rigorous canon. It defined 
not only the rules of composition or performing techniques, but even the social and cultural 
contexts in which music was played and enjoyed. It is worth pointing out that the origins 
of this canon are, in a sense, identical with those of philosophy itself: what I have in mind 
here is the Pythagorean claim that a hidden mathematical order can be discovered in the 
universe. After all, one of the arguments supporting this claim was the ancient discovery 
that consonant intervals depend on simple proportions between the lengths of two vibrating 
strings. Let us take a closer look at some of the crucial features of this Western musical canon:
a/ Strict separation of “musical” and “non-musical” sounds. The former are produced 
only by means of musical instruments handled by trained musicians (the human voice can 
be considered as such an instrument). Therefore, music is the domain of professionals.
b/ Equal temperament. The physical qualities of sound and the nature of human perception 
allow for an essentially continuous gradation of sound pitch (a good example of which 
is a glissando performed on a trombone). However, the Western tradition has developed 
a convention of dividing it into twelve equal semitones.
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c/ Functional harmony. Chord sequences (and subsequently melodies) are constructed 
and follow each other in accordance with strict rules, the most important of which is that 
dominant chords (based on the fifth degree of a scale) are “resolved” towards tonic chords 
(based on the first degree of the same scale). Such “resolution” (when the tonic is played af-
ter the dominant) creates a sensation of repose and a feeling that tension has been relieved.
d/ Mathesis. Classical works of music employ simple mathematical structures on various 
levels: rhythm (bars and measures), arrangement of motifs, rules of counterpoint and so on.
e/ Classical musical forms. Each classical composition represented a given conventional 
form. Among them we find the song, plainsong, sonata, concerto, symphony, opera or 
music drama.
f/ Social and cultural contexts. These functions – as Plato already noticed – can be divided 
into two basic categories. On the one hand, we are dealing with situations in which music 
is supposed to impart a sense of gravity (pathos) to the situation. On the other, however, 
music performs a ludic function.
Today, this canon has lost its normative power. It no longer draws a clear distinc-
tion between musical and non-musical sounds, compositions and situations. This radical 
change, which can be experienced in contemporary musical culture, is without precedent 
and its historical significance to the philosophy of culture cannot be overestimated. In-
terestingly, there was no such break in mathematics, engineering or philosophy. Unlike 
those disciplines, Western music openly questioned its own fundamental principles and 
abandoned them. In short, “anything goes” in contemporary music as it is no longer 
governed by a single and universal set of principles. I leave aside here the question of the 
aesthetic or artistic value of various experimental works. The problem which this sketch 
undertakes is not related to aesthetics, but rather to philosophy of culture. I am concerned 
with the change that the ontological status of the work of art has undergone, and not with 
the various possible aesthetic evaluations of this process and its consequences.
It is quite impossible to point out a single or even chief cause of that turn, although 
one might discern several factors which influenced it. One of them was undoubtedly the 
development of technology. The emergence of mechanical and electronic means of record-
ing, playing, as well as creating sounds, completely changed our idea of what can and 
cannot be considered music. In 1920, an eighteen year old German communist, Dadaist 
and student of composition, Stefan Wolpe, presented a piece in which the only instruments 
and the only performers were eight gramophones playing at different speeds. Seven years 
earlier, the Italian Futurist painter Luigi Russolo published a manifesto titled “The Art of 
Noise,” where he claimed that: “We must break at all cost from this restrictive circle of pure 
sounds and conquer the infinite variety of noise sounds”1. In USA, John Cage composed 
in 1939 his experimental piece titled Imaginary Landscape No. 1, for two variable-speed 
gramophones playing frequency recordings normally used only for technical purposes. 
1 L. Russolo, The Art of Noise, trans. R. Filiou. Bristol 2004, p. 6.
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The Frenchman Pierre Schaeffer went even further. In 1948 he recorded his famous Rail-
road Study (Étude aux chemins de fer) consisting of sounds made by trains, which were 
recorded on tape and later edited. Schaeffer himself was not sure whether the result could 
be called music, so he decided to name it “musique concrète.” This novel idea proved 
inspiring for other composers, thanks to which musique concrète has become one of the 
most important currents in contemporary music in the second half of the twentieth century.
All of these experiments constituted a frontal assault on the Western musical canon, 
as they questioned all of its basic tenets and introduced to music sounds that were hitherto 
regarded as “non-musical,” thus breaking away from all formal rigour. At the same time, 
however, another parallel process of “dismantling” tradition was taking place – one that 
attempted to overturn it from within (without making use of “non-musical” elements, as 
well as limiting itself to traditional instruments and means of expression). I mean here 
the first dodecaphonic avant-garde, represented by Schoenberg, Berg and Webern. These 
composers knew perfectly well the classical rules of counterpoint and functional harmony. 
Nevertheless, they rejected functional harmony’s basic dogma – the rule of resolving 
dominant chords into tonic ones. They introduced the idea of creating music in accordance 
with strict mathematical procedures. One result of this was the destruction of traditional 
melodic patterns and harmony, which led to the later emergence of aleatoric techniques 
and the introduction of the element of chance to the structure of the musical piece.
Within just a couple of decades, Western music wandered far away from strict 
conventions, redefining what can and cannot be regarded as music, as well as opening 
a radical new world of surprising sounds and structures governed by chance. This turn 
of events becomes even more fascinating when we notice that it is irreversible. Once 
the canon loses its normative power, it can never regain its apodictic, self-evident and 
universal character. It is of course still possible to compose music according to classical 
rules, or to stylize it after the model of particular historical periods. Such “reactionary,” 
neoclassical attempts are indeed made by numerous contemporary composers. However, 
it is now only one of the many possibilities available to musical artists who are no longer 
required to accept any rules, apart from those they force upon themselves. Music, one of 
the pillars of Western culture, has changed during the last century to a greater extent than 
it had done in the previous two thousand years.
STARTING ANEW
Let us now employ the philosophical concept of nihilism to interpret the contemporary 
breakdown of musical tradition. What is nihilism? There are many answers to this ques-
tion. For the purpose of this sketch I will employ the definition proposed by a Scottish 
philosopher, Raymond Brassier, in an interview for Kronos quarterly:
Very simply, nihilism is a crisis of meaning. This crisis is historically con-
ditioned, because what we understand by “meaning” is historically condi-
tioned.
The pre-modern worldview (...) is one in which the world and human exist-
ence are intrinsically meaningful. (...) In this worldview, there is a natural 
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order, and that order is comprehensible to human beings in its broad outline, 
if not in every single one of its details.
The emergence of modern mathematized natural science around the 16th 
century marks the point at which this way of making sense of ourselves 
and our world begins to unravel. It [the pre-modern worldview] does not 
collapse all at once, but it begins to lose its official theoretical sanction (...).
Galaxies, molecules, and organisms are not for anything. Try as we might, 
it becomes increasingly difficult to construct a rationally plausible narrative 
about the world that satisfies our psychological need for stories that unfold 
from beginning, through crisis, to ultimate resolution.2
The analogy between the current state of music and Brassier’s description of nihil-
ism seems striking. Brassier considers nihilism to be the collapse of the conviction that 
a certain coherent and rational narrative could somehow mirror the metaphysical structure 
of reality and thus reveal the structure of this reality to us. In Western musical culture, it 
was the classical canon that played the role of that intimate link between reality and the 
work of art. It was born out of both theoretical speculation and experiments with sound 
conducted by the Pythagoreans. They believed in logos – the rational, mathematical struc-
ture of the Cosmos – which manifested itself directly in music. Harmony in music was 
supposed to reflect and participate in the harmony of the Cosmos.
Historical remarks aside, I will now attempt to outline very briefly a general on-
tology of the work of art by cross-linking certain concepts developed by Hei degger and 
Deleuze. First, let us distinguish between the ontic and the ontological aspect. The latter 
would refer to the broadly understood “convention” of the work of art – its “style,” the 
“rules” it follows and the “limits” of what the artist is and is not expected to do.
The ontic sphere, on the other hand, would be comprised of the individual decisions 
made by artists within these “limits.” This opposition between the ontic and the ontological 
could be supplemented with a Deleuzian axis whose poles are virtuality (i.e. permanent 
change, the potential for transformation) and actuality (i.e. presence, unchanging identity).
Let us now relate the abovementioned fourfold structure to a musical work of art, 
both in its classical and nihilist form. In a work of music which belongs to the classical 
paradigm, the ontological dimension is precisely determined and fixed, since it is regulated 
by the “canon” I described at the outset. Employing Deleuze’s terms, we could say that 
in Western classical music the ontological dimension of the work of art is “actual” as it 
constitutes an unchanging basis and a stable point of reference.
The ontological level of a classical musical piece is therefore actual in its character 
and fixed as far as its foundation is concerned. The ontic level, on the other hand, is virtual. 
Virtuality, or the free play of choice and differentiation, concerns the selection of musical 
themes, motifs and the adopting of particular techniques for developing them. Such stages 




of composition as arrangement, orchestration, harmonization, the choice of tempi etc., also 
fall within the domain of virtuality. What we are dealing with here is free invention – a dif-
ferentiating element which always starts working anew whenever a genuinely novel work of 
art is created. The presence of the canon (or actuality) on the ontological level does not – it 
must be emphasized – exclude radical virtuality on the ontic level (after all, radically diverse 
works within the same form were created and composers often attempted to broaden the limits 
of conventions; compare, for example, the symphonies of Haydn with those of Bruckner).
In contemporary music, on the other hand, we are dealing with a process which 
might be called the virtualization of the ontological level of the work of art. The canon 
is no longer a point of reference which guarantees that the work is metaphysically rooted 
in the structure of the Cosmos. The ontological level – the level of “what is acceptable” 
– becomes just as virtual as the moment of making particular technical choices by the 
composer. This means that the artists create the rules of their art whenever they write 
a new piece. It is worth stressing here that as a result of this the artist, whether he wants 
to or not, becomes a philosopher.
The ontological virtualization of the work of art burdens the artist as he is obliged 
to face a number of fundamental philosophical questions. What is a musical work of art? 
What are its rules? What is music itself? How does it differ from non-music? How can 
the musical work of art be constructed? What do its aesthetic value, cultural impact and 
social meaning depend on?
MUSIC AS PHILOSOPHY
Let us now consider a few of the most striking examples of philosophical strategies em-
ployed by contemporary composers who have been forced to give a completely new answer 
to the question “What is music?” This catalogue is far from complete and serves only as 
a general and highly subjective overview.
a/ Sonorism. In classical music the tone or timbre of sound were never really in the centre 
of the composers’ attention. They tended to focus on melodic patterns, harmony, the art 
of the counterpoint and the development of melodic variations. Perhaps the most striking 
feature of contemporary music is the change of attitude in this area. From the beginning 
of the twentieth century, composers have been more and more interested in the timbre of 
the sound itself. The philosophical implications of this trend seem quite obvious. Since the 
canon lost its apodictic character and sound was freed from the constraints of mathesis, 
what we are left with is sound as such. Thus, contemporary composers seem to claim that 
we need to explore its hidden possibilities and focus on its material aspect. Sonorism is 
the affirmation of the “materiality” of sound. Importance is attached only to that which 
is immediately heard. Music is not about conventions or hidden mathematical structures, 
but about pure sound at its most fundamental level.
b/ Spectralism, or changing the physical nature of sound. Spectral music originated in 
the sonorist circles but deserves to be discussed separately. This technique is based on 
computer analyses of sound spectra. Individual overtones can then be used to create scales 
and melodies, or they can even be electronically modified in terms of their pitch. This is 
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especially important from a philosophical perspective, since it completely changes the 
relation between the musical mathesis and the physis of sound. Mathematics interferes 
with the very physical nature of sound rather than simply regulating existing tones: their 
pitch, volume and order. After all, the breathtaking effects created by employing the 
spectral technique are the result of complicated mathematical procedures and the use of 
advanced equipment, which in fact made them possible. Never before has logos penetrated 
so deeply into the physis of sound.
c/ Radicalism. Moderation, temperance and the search for “the golden mean” are all vir-
tues that contemporary composers rarely refer to. They are rather interested in extremi-
ties and in breaking all imaginable boundaries. This tendency is exemplified in various 
experiments with sound volume, ranging from the deafening din generated by artists 
representing noise and power noise music (e.g. Masami Akita, Masonna, Government 
Alpha) to music created by Michael Pisaro and other composers of silent music, who 
combine subtle, barely audible sounds with complete silence. However, the radicalism of 
contemporary music does not boil down to the sharp contrast between the loud and the 
quiet. It rather originates in a desire – stimulated by the phenomenon of the ontological 
virtualization of music – to venture beyond the boundaries of musicality. Another aspect 
of contemporary radicalism is the ambition to evoke extreme, or at least unusual mental 
states. This approach is represented, among others, by repetitive music which is based 
on a monotonous pulse, putting the listener in a state of trance. This technique – whose 
sources may be traced back to the various ritual forms in European and non-European 
cultures – has been employed both by American minimalists (Steve Reich, Terry Riley) 
and techno artists (both avant-garde and popular ones). It can be interpreted as an attempt 
to revive the sacral and ritual dimension of music.
d/ Searching for music within the non-musical. The radical techniques of twentieth century 
avant-garde (especially “musique concrète” which forces the listener to focus on external, 
non-musical sounds) can also be interpreted as an attempt at reviving religious spirituality 
(understood as “constant mindfulness”). There is an undoubtedly “phenomenological” 
aspect to this approach which I locate in the attempts to purify experience and return 
to its “originary presentive” form.
e/ Socio-political critique. Cage’s music, which radically broke away from tradition, was 
part of the counterculture of the 1960s and 70s, although he was not directly engaged in 
social or political critique. Those decades, however, witnessed the emergence of certain 
trends which defined a new basic task of music, namely – resistance to capitalism and 
middle-class mentality. Artists like Cornelius Cardew3 or members of Fluxus identified 
with this approach, as they were bitter enemies of all academism and professionalism in 
art, which they considered to be limiting to individual creativity and freedom. Moreover, 
they defended a philosophical claim which could be summed up in the following way: art 
and musicality should show us a possible way out of consumerist society.




Any attempts to find a common denominator for the above strategies are not only bound 
to fail, but in fact seem unnecessary, because music appears now only in the plural. If 
contemporary composers really do arrive at a certain truth, it would consist of a discovery 
that there is actually no such thing as a musical absolute – “a set of all sets,” in Cantor’s 
language – and that any authentic effort to compose produces its own rules. This is of 
course a nihilistic thesis which is familiar to philosophy at least since Nietzsche’s “death 
of God” which was later given an ontological interpretation by Hei degger and Deleuze, as 
well as a mathematical one by Cantor whose ideas were later formulated in philosophical 
terms by Alain Badiou.
The dissolution of the Western musical tradition, understood as a coherent system des-
ignating the “ontological” level of the work of art, has become an unquestionable fact. 
Although this fact may be interpreted in diverse ways, one thing is clear – it provides 
a powerful argument against all those conservative and traditionalistic conceptions within 
philosophy of culture which claim that tradition and identity constitute an invariable point 
of reference in all cultural production. Since music, which was always regarded as a crucial 
ingredient of culture, radically broke with the past, can one still speak of the continuity 
and permanence of Western culture in its entirety?
One more problem arises here – how are we to perceive tradition once this break 
has occurred? What is the current status of that which formerly constituted the “ontologi-
cal” foundation of cultural objects? And how are traditional, “ontologically actual” works 
of art available to us today? They did not become “ontologically virtual” and thus do not 
resemble contemporary cultural objects, since what distinguishes them is still the classi-
cal canon described above. Because they were sapped of their apodictic character, their 
very identity has changed. To put it metaphorically, they have become their own spectre 
– something that is still visible, but has lost the power to materially affect reality. The 
phenomenology of such a “spectral,” phantom-like tradition is a philosophical challenge 
which lies beyond the scope of the present sketch.
There is another problem which I may only hint at here, an even more interesting 
question perhaps which contemporary music directs towards philosophy. In music the 
process of ontological virtualization is already accomplished, but in philosophy it has not 
yet been completed. Just like music, philosophy seems to exist today only in the plural. 
Various philosophical schools, methods and languages coexist and compete whose rep-
resentatives are unable to find a common ground. However, unlike music, philosophy is 
not a sphere where “anything goes.” It would be a difficult task to find a philosophical 
equivalent to Cage’s 4’33’’, or to noise music for that matter. It seems that philosophy keeps 
drifting away from logos, understood as mathesis, although in contrast to music it seems 
to be somehow chained to that concept, just as it is dependant on more or less traditional 
forms of expression. What needs to be examined is the nature of those dependencies, as 
they mark the place where we encounter the boundary between innovative thought, or 
language experiment, and meaningless gibberish.
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